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RAYS OF SUNLIGHT IN A SHADOW “WAR”: FOIA, THE ABUSES 
OF ANTI-TERRORISM, AND THE STRATEGY OF TRANSPARENCY 
by                                                                                                                     
Seth F. Kreimer∗ 
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the “Global War on Terror” has 
marginalized the rule of law. From the dragnet detentions in the aftermath of 
the initial attacks, to novel and secretive surveillance authority under the 
Patriot Act, to the incarceration and torture of “enemy combatants,” the 
administration’s “war” has sought to establish zones of maneuver free of 
both legal constraint and of political oversight. In the first half decade of 
these efforts, the tripartite constitutional structure which is said to guard 
against executive usurpation remained largely quiescent. Opponents both 
inside and outside of the government turned instead to subconstitutional 
structures to expose this self-avowed “dark side,” and to lay the foundation 
for a return to the rule of law. This Article examines four case studies of this 
strategy of transparency. At the center of each account lies the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). The studies highlight, however, the crucial roles 
played by a broader complex of structures of transparency that have come to 
constitute the framework of national governance during the last generation, 
the importance of the integrity of the civil servants administering those 
structures, and the fulcrum of sustained advocacy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A story of which I have always been fond concerns a friend of W.C. 
Fields, the actor Thomas Mitchell, who approached the elderly comedian 
as Fields lay mortally ill. Observing Fields, a famous religious skeptic, 
deeply engrossed in the study of a Bible, the friend expressed some 
surprise: “You’ve never been interested in the Bible, Fields, what are you 
doing with it now?” Fields looked up, paused, and responded in his 
characteristic voice, “looking for loopholes m’boy, looking for 
loopholes.” 
The rule of law in the United States has just been through a near-
death experience. The current administration has sought to flout 
constitutional principle by establishing law-free zones and constitutional 
black holes. It has engaged in duplicitous parsing of its legal obligations, 
and has invoked extralegal executive authority. In the process, it has 
undertaken what Vice President Cheney described from the outset as an 
effort to “work [through] . . . the dark side” and “spend time in the 
shadows” in pursuing what it characterizes as a “Global War on Terror.”1 
In the face of these initiatives, for the better part of six years, the 
tripartite constitutional structure which is said to guard against 
usurpation has remained largely quiescent. Congress was initially 
paralyzed by the aftershocks of the attacks of September 11, and, after 
the President’s party gained control of the Senate in 2002, by party 
loyalty. The courts awaited justiciable controversies, delayed by a 
combination of secrecy and sequestration of potential plaintiffs. When 
confronted with legal challenges, judges often proved unwilling to 
exercise the power of judicial review. 
Yet the Republic stands, and as we meet today our nation has begun 
slow progress toward effective limits to the abuses of the Global War on 
Terror. What follows is an effort to read the last six years with the eyes of 
W.C. Fields. Faced with a landscape apparently inhospitable to hopes for 
the rule of law, I will be “looking for loopholes.” I seek to identify 
 
1 Interview by Tim Russert with Dick Cheney, Vice President, on Meet The Press 
(Sept. 16, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/ 
news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html. Cheney continued by saying that “[a] lot 
of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, 
using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if we’re 
going to be successful. . . . [I]t’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our 
disposal . . . .” Id. 
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unacknowledged resources that set the stage for a return to 
constitutional values. 
I focus on four case studies in which challengers have sought to 
shine light on a shadow “war,” turning from litigation that directly 
challenged an overreaching Executive to adopt a strategy of 
transparency. In each, critics have used legal tools to generate 
information regarding abuses; that information in turn has laid the 
groundwork for legal and political initiatives to return to the rule of law. 
At the center of each account lies the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA). The studies highlight, however, the crucial roles played by a 
broader complex of structures of transparency that have come to 
constitute the framework of national governance during the last 
generation, the importance of the integrity of the civil servants 
administering those structures, and the fulcrum of sustained advocacy. 
And in each of the case studies, the determined efforts of the 
administration to keep details of abuses from the public testify in a 
backhanded fashion to the existence of an ongoing constituency for the 
rule of law. 
Part II begins with a brief account of the importance of 
transparency, the paucity of guarantees for it in the constitutional text, 
and the development of frameworks of transparency as part of our 
constitutional practice in the last generation. Part III.A traces the efforts 
to uncover the dimensions of the initial domestic dragnet for terrorist 
suspects in the aftermath of the trauma of September 11. It sets forth the 
interaction among state and federal Freedom of Information Act 
frameworks and litigation surrounding the closure of deportation 
proceedings. It concludes with the subsequent investigation and report 
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Inspector General, which 
retrospectively revealed many of the abuses of the dragnet. 
Part III.B examines two efforts to use transparency mechanisms to 
audit ongoing antiterrorist initiatives. Part III.B.1 reviews the successful 
use of the Freedom of Information Act to pry loose transcripts of the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals in Guantanamo along with 
information regarding individuals incarcerated there. Part III.B.2 sets 
forth the more complex campaign to bring to light the ways in which the 
novel surveillance mechanisms authorized by the Patriot Act have been 
used domestically in the “War on Terror.” That campaign combined the 
efforts of a coalition deploying political advocacy, FOIA requests, and 
substantive constitutional litigation. It ultimately generated both 
investigations by the Department of Justice Inspector General and the 
imposition of further disclosure and auditing requirements as a 
condition for the renewal of the Patriot Act. 
Part III.C details the efforts to expose the policy of coercive 
interrogation adopted by the current administration in the “War on 
Terror.” Resistance to that policy within the government generated both 
internal records of opposition and initial leaks regarding abuses. FOIA 
requests and litigation, enabled both by the disclosure of the existence of 
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documents sought and by a public controversy that could ground a legal 
claim for expedited processing, in turn allowed external critics to obtain 
documents that authenticated the accusations. Those disclosures 
impeached the policy and sparked investigations by internal watchdogs, 
as well as judicial and congressional intervention. Throughout the 
process, the integrity of civil servants has proven an essential condition of 
effectiveness for the strategy of transparency. 
Part IV concludes with reflections on the strategy of transparency. 
II. TRANSPARENCY, TEXT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 
It is common currency that transparency is a tonic to democratic 
legitimacy and to lawful government. On one hand, James Madison 
observed that “[a] popular Government, without popular information, or 
the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, 
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people 
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the 
power which knowledge gives.”2 On the other hand, Louis Brandeis 
famously proclaimed sunlight to be “the best of disinfectants.”3 
Yet the text of the American Constitution provides few explicit 
guarantees of transparency. Each house of Congress is constitutionally 
obligated to keep and publish a journal of its proceedings “excepting 
 
2 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 1 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 690 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), available 
at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s35.html. Cf. N.Y. 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“In the 
absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our 
national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas 
of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in 
an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of 
democratic government.”). 
3 LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (Nat’l 
Home Library Found. 1933); see, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS 29 (Michael 
James et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (“The greater the number of temptations 
to which the exercise of political power is exposed, the more necessary is it to give to 
those who possess it, the most powerful reasons for resisting them. But there is no 
reason more constant and more universal than the superintendance of the public.”); 
JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 162–64 (Currin 
V. Shields ed., 1958) (“Publicity is inappreciable, even when it does no more than 
prevent that which can by no possibility be plausibly defended. . . . [C]ases exist . . . in 
which almost the only restraint upon a majority of knaves consists in their involuntary 
respect for the opinion of an honest minority.”); LORD ACTON AND HIS CIRCLE 166 
(Abbot Gasquet ed., 1968) (“Every thing secret degenerates, even the administration 
of justice; nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and 
publicity.”); Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, reprinted in CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, 
INEVITABLE PEACE 241, 277 (1948) (“[I]t is possible to call the following statement the 
transcendental formula of public law: ‘All actions which relate to the right of other men 
are contrary to right and law, the maxim of which does not permit publicity.’”).  
 When Kant agrees with Mill, Acton and Bentham on a proposition, one might 
think that proposition rests firmly at the root of modern liberal democracy. 
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such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy.”4 This provision 
precluded a return to the blanket secrecy of parliamentary debate of 
seventeenth century England.5 But in the founding decade, the 
constitutional framework proved consistent with largely open 
deliberations by the House, a presumption of secrecy for the 
deliberations of the Senate, and a variety of confidentiality privileges for 
the Executive branch.6 
The President is required to “from time to time give to the Congress 
Information of the State of the Union”.7 He must provide information 
sufficient to persuade the Senate to consent to appointments and 
treaties, and if he seeks legislation, he must convince both houses of 
Congress to adopt it.8 These, too, are mandates consistent with a wide 
range of transparency. The Framers contemplated that in some 
dimensions, the Executive branch would partake of the virtues of 
“decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”9 Yet they envisioned no broad 
return to arcana imperii; the Executive’s actions were to be “narrowly 
watched and readily suspected” by an informed public opinion.10 For the 
popular branches of government, the constitutional text leaves the 
balance between secrecy and public accountability to rest largely in the 
interplay of political forces. Subsequent amendments have not altered 
the constitutional text in this regard. 
Justice Stewart observed that “[t]he Constitution itself is neither a 
Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”11 But what the 
 
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
5 See generally DAVID ZARET, ORIGINS OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 44–55 (2000). 
6 DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 47–55 
(1981) (discussing provisions for open deliberations in the House); id. at 55–65 
(detailing closure of Senate deliberations and the presumptive secrecy of “executive” 
journals); id. at 84–88 (describing the Senate’s 1794 “open doors” resolution); see 
generally id. at 10 (describing political competition as an “emergent alternative to a 
stable system of legal controls on secrecy” in the founding decades). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
9 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (describing “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” as virtues of a single 
Executive); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 392–93 (John Jay) (referring to the necessity 
of secrecy and dispatch in foreign affairs). 
10 Federalist No. 70 argues that a single Executive is better subject to “the 
restraints of public opinion,” since “multiplication of the executive adds to the 
difficulty of detection,” including the “opportunity of discovering [misconduct] with 
facility and clearness.” One person “will be more narrowly watched and more readily 
suspected.” THE FEDERALIST NO.70 supra note 9, at 427-30. And No. 84 contemplates 
that “[t]he executive and legislative bodies of each State will be so many sentinels 
over the persons employed in every department of the national administration,” 
whose “regular and effectual system of intelligence” will allow them to “communicate 
the same knowledge to the people.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 516 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
11 Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 636 (1975) (“The public’s 
interest in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free 
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“Constitutional” text omits, the last generation has embedded as a part of 
modern “small c” constitutional practice.12 For forty years, America’s 
governing structure has included a Freedom of Information Act. In the 
aftermath of Watergate, Congress implanted in law a framework of sub-
constitutional structures protecting transparency. It strengthened the 
Freedom of Information Act, provided protections for whistleblowers, 
reporting obligations, and a network of Inspectors General empowered 
to investigate and report to Congress.13 The Executive branch put in 
place another set of internal watchdogs.14 And in the last generation, the 
Court recognized, at least implicitly, the constitutional importance of 
 
Press, but the protection is indirect. . . . The Constitution, in other words, establishes 
the contest, not its resolution.”) (quoted with approval in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 
438 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978) (plurality opinion)). 
12 For a recent thoughtful analysis of legal materials that “constitute” the 
government, without being part of the constitutional text, see Ernest A. Young, The 
Constitution Outside the Constitution (Univ. of Texas Sch. of Law, Public Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper No. 119, Feb. 2007), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=965865 (forthcoming, Yale L.J.). 
13 Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)); Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 
1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000)); Presidential Records Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–
2207 (2000)); Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); Id. § 601 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–598) (providing for the appointment of a special 
prosecutor); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1871 (2000)), Inspector 
General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. App. 3 §§ 1–12 (2000)); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 
92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (providing 
whistle blower protection for federal employees) (amended by Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (enhancing whistleblower protections) and Act of Oct. 
29, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-424, 108 Stat. 4361 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C.) (extending and enhancing whistleblower protections)); General 
Accounting Office Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-604, 88 Stat. 1959 (establishing the 
GAO); GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.) (providing increased 
resources and authority to the GAO). 
 For discussion of the system of post-Watergate transparency structures, see 
ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED OUT 59, 69–71 (2006). On the expansion of the network 
of Inspectors General, see PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS 
GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 26 (1993) (noting the establishment of 
an Inspector General at the Defense Department in 1982; at the Justice Department 
in 1988; and at the CIA in 1989). 
14 E.g., History of the Information Security Oversight Office, 
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/about/history.html (“President Jimmy Carter 
established ISOO with the signing of Executive Order 12065, ‘National Security 
Information,’ on December 1, 1978.”); Mission and History: Assistant to the Secretary 
of Defense (Intelligence Oversight), http://www.defenselink.mil/atsdio/ (follow 
“mission/history” hyperlink) (established originally as Inspector General for 
Intelligence in 1976 pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 11905, redesignated in 1982). 
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constraining the government’s authority to interfere with dissemination 
of information that might disclose malfeasance.15 
During the first five years of the “War on Terror,” secretive Executive 
action combined with the panic triggered by the attacks of 9/11 and 
single-party control of the electoral branches to render electoral 
oversight flaccid and courts compliant. As constitutionally explicit checks 
and balances lay supine, the frameworks of transparency that have come 
to constitute our governing practice were mustered into the breach. 
III. STRUCTURES OF TRANSPARENCY AND A “GLOBAL WAR ON 
TERROR” 
Transparency can potentially discipline an overreaching Executive 
before, during, or after the fact. Before the fact, disclosure of dubious 
initiatives might serve as a speed bump, impeding adoption of 
problematic policies at the outset. Once policy is set, transparency in the 
execution of permissible initiatives might force corrections or deter 
excesses during the course of their deployment. Finally, ex-post 
disclosure of constitutional violations might precipitate discipline of 
malfeasant officials, and serve as a compass, disclosing where the 
government is headed and allowing political actors and the electorate to 
turn the political system back toward appropriate regard for 
constitutional values.16 
In the case studies that follow, as we will see, advocates attempted to 
invoke each modality. First, they sought to use sub-constitutional 
transparency frameworks to establish an arena for contemporaneous 
debate about the dragnet detention of terrorist suspects domestically. 
Second, they endeavored to provide the opportunity for ongoing audits 
 
15 The Court established protections for government employees who seek to 
inform the public about official overreaching. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury 
Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 
(1968). But cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006). It rebuffed efforts to 
gag the objects of public regulation. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 635–36 
(1990) (rejecting a rule that would inhibit the ability of a grand jury witness “to make 
a truthful public statement”). It has provided shields for media which obtain such 
information and convey such information. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713, 714 (1971) (reversing injunction against publication of the Pentagon Papers); cf. 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527–28 (2001) (reversing damage award against 
newscaster for broadcasting illegally intercepted conversation relating to public 
employees union; noting “state action to punish the publication of truthful 
information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards”). 
16 Each of these mechanisms, of course, is premised on the proposition that 
constitutional values have a political constituency. If such a constituency is lacking, 
disclosure is likely to have minimal effect. And indeed, if the constituency for 
extralegal repression is strong enough, transparency could force marginally law-
abiding Executives into still more extreme measures. What is striking about the 
“Global War on Terror,” however, is that the Bush administration continued to give 
lip service to the rule of law while operating in the shadows, suggesting that the 
constituency for legality is in fact an operative constraint. 
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of the conduct of Combatant Status Review Tribunals and the 
deployment of the Patriot Act. Third, they tried to reveal and 
delegitimize a policy of coercive interrogation. It is in the second and 
third roles that the sub-constitutional transparency framework has 
proven most effective. 
A. A Low Speed Bump: The Case of the Post-September 11 Dragnet 
In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, the administration 
undertook a broad-ranging effort to detain individuals suspected of ties 
to the attacks or to other terrorist activities. On October 25, 2001, three 
weeks after the beginning of the invasion of Afghanistan, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft proclaimed that the “anti-terrorism offensive has 
arrested or detained nearly 1,000 individuals as part of the September 11 
terrorism investigation.”17 In the early phases of the process, 
administration spokesmen regularly issued updates regarding the total 
number of individuals detained by this initiative, but officials also began 
to restrict the flow of information to Congress, advocacy organizations, 
and news media.18 Of particular import for the effort to sweep up non-
citizens, a September 21, 2001 directive by Chief Immigration Judge 
Michael Creppy required that immigration judges “close immigration 
 
17 John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors’ Conference 
(Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/ 
agcrisisremarks10_25.htm; see also Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 97 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 In tracking down thousands of leads and tens of thousands of tips, the practice 
was to “arrest any alien encountered in the course of investigating a JTTF [the FBI’s 
New York Joint Terrorism Task Force] or PENTTBOM [the FBI’s investigation into 
the September 11 attacks] lead who was found to be in the country illegally.” OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW 
OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS, at 14 (2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT].  
 Detainees labeled of “special interest” were held in indefinite detention until they 
were “cleared” by the FBI. Id. at 53–57. The criteria for a “special interest” 
designation were evidently quite broad. “[S]everal Middle Eastern men were arrested 
and treated as connected to the September 11 investigation when local law 
enforcement authorities discovered ‘suspicious items,’ such as pictures of the World 
Trade Center and other famous buildings, during traffic stops.” Id. at 16. Another 
individual of Middle Eastern origin was incarcerated for six months because he 
initially sought to purchase a car in early September and put down a deposit, but 
failed to return to consummate the purchase. Id. at 42. 
18 Dana Milbank & Peter Slevin, Bush Edict on Briefings Irks Hill, WASH. POST, Oct. 
10, 2001, at A1 (describing order that “briefings with sensitive information be limited 
to eight of the 535 members of Congress,” the sealing of and refusal to release 
“customary paperwork” regarding detainees, and difficulties encountered by lawyers 
seeking information regarding detained clients); Memorandum from John Ashcroft, 
Att’y Gen., to Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/011012.htm (reversing prior presumption of 
FOIA disclosure in the absence of foreseeable harm and substituting a policy of 
defending agency refusals to disclose as long as the refusal had a “sound legal basis”). 
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proceedings to the press and public (including family members of the 
deportee) in certain ‘special interest’ [deportation] cases.”19 On October 
29, 2001, a coalition of twenty-three civil liberties organizations, 
concerned by reports of racial and religious profiling, incommunicado 
detention, and physical abuse, submitted FOIA requests to the FBI, the 
INS, and the DOJ’s Office of Information Privacy, seeking information 
regarding the identity and circumstances of those detained.20 
As information regarding the dragnet made its way to the public in 
bits and pieces,21 the FBI granted expedited review, but rejected the 
coalition’s FOIA request on November 1, 2001, on the ground that 
responsive materials “could reasonably be expected to interfere with 
enforcement proceedings.”22 On November 8, 2001, the administration 
ceased reporting the number of individuals questioned, detained, or 
arrested, and refused to release information regarding the identities of 
those detained.23 The Attorney General defended that position both on 
 
19 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
20 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 97. 
 Contemporaneously, a group of members of Congress and Senators sought 
similar information by letter to the Attorney General. Marilee Miller, 22 Groups, 
Feingold Seek Names of 800+ Detainees, CAP. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at 3A; Letter from 
Sens. Russell D. Feingold, Edward M. Kennedy & Patrick J. Leahy and Reps. John 
Conyers, Jr., Jerrold Nadler & Robert C. Scott to John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. (Oct. 31, 
2001), available at http://www.cnss.org/feingoldletter.pdf. 
21 See Amy Goldstein, A Deliberate Strategy of Disruption; Massive, Secretive Detention 
Effort Aimed Mainly at Preventing More Terror, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A1 
(describing investigation identifying the cases of 235 detainees “located through 
court records, news accounts, lawyers, relatives and friends”). 
22 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (describing FBI reliance on 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000)). On December 10, 2001, the FBI affirmed its denial, 
id., on the basis that the requested material “could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) 
(2000). 
23 Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, U.S. to Stop Issuing Detention Tallies; Justice Dept. to 
Share Number In Federal Custody, INS Arrests, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2001, at A16 (The 
government would only release information “identifying how many people are being 
held on charges of violating immigration laws and how many are in federal custody.” 
This “decision to narrow the visible picture of the terrorism investigation comes after 
senior government spokesmen have in recent days offered conflicting statements 
about the pattern of detentions. It also comes as legal, civil liberties and immigration 
groups have begun to protest, contending the Bush administration is being so 
secretive that it is unclear whether the detentions are constitutional.”); see also OIG 
REPORT, supra note 17, at 1 n.2 (“[T]he Public Affairs Office stopped reporting the 
cumulative totals after the number reached approximately 1,200, because the 
statistics became confusing.”). 
 On November 9, 2001, the Justice Department commenced an initiative seeking 
interviews with approximately 5,000 foreign nationals between the ages of eighteen 
and thirty-three who had entered the United States after January 2000 from countries 
“where there have been strong al Qaeda presences,” and on March 20, 2002, the 
Justice Department undertook a second round of 3000 “voluntary” interviews. See 
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Press Conference (Mar. 20, 2002), available at 
LCB_11_4_ART11_KREIMER.DOC 12/5/2007 2:28:20 PM 
1150 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:4 
the ground that it protected the personal privacy of detainees, and that if 
the Department of Justice released information, “We might as well mail 
this list to the Osama bin Laden al Qaeda network . . . about which 
terrorists we have in our custody.”24 
On December 5, 2001, the coalition of twenty-three civil rights and 
human rights groups led by the Center for National Security Studies 
(CNSS) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed an action 
in D.C. District Court seeking relief from the denial of their FOIA 
requests.25 In the course of this litigation, the Department of Justice 
provided a series of disclosures beyond its initial public offerings. A 
disclosure of documents listing the number and status of detainees 
accompanied the DOJ’s January 11, 2002 answer to the FOIA complaint,26 
and a further proffer in June 2002 revealed details concerning the 
identity of individuals who had been charged under federal criminal law 
and the current number of individuals remaining in INS custody.27 But 
 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/ 
032002agnewsconferenceedvainterviewprojectresultsannouncement.htm. 
24 Attorney General John Ashcroft, Press Conference, Provides Total Number of 
Federal Criminal Charges and INS Detainees (Nov. 27, 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks11_27.htm. The 
Department of Justice was equally reticent in responding to congressional inquiries. 
See Russell Feingold, Editorial, Name the Detainees, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2001, at B7; 
Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sen. Russell 
D. Feingold (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.cnss.org/bryantletterencl.pdf. 
25 Complaint ¶ 2, Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 01-CV-02500 
(D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2002) (filed Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://www.epic.org/ 
open_gov/FOIA/detainee_complaint.pdf. For the complete case file, see The Center 
for National Security Studies v. The Department of Justice, available at 
http://www.cnss.org/cnssvdoj.htm. 
26 See Dan Eggen, Delays Cited In Charging Detainees; With Legal Latitude, INS 
Sometimes Took Weeks, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2002, at A1 (referring to newly released 
documents in the CNSS FOIA suit as providing “the clearest picture yet of the 
controversial and secretive dragnet” and using those documents to conclude that 
“[s]cores of immigrants detained after the Sept. 11 terror attacks were jailed for 
weeks before they were charged with immigration violations, according to documents 
released by the Justice Department”); Electronic Privacy Information Center, CNSS v. 
DOJ, http://www.epic.org/open_gov/foia/cnss_v_doj.html (“[O]f the 725 detainees 
listed in heavily redacted papers the groups received on Jan. 11, 2002, 344 are listed 
separately under the caption ‘INACTIVE CASES,’ which would seem to indicate that 
these individuals have been cleared of any link to terrorism.”); Joint Terrorism Task 
Force Working Group, INS Special Interest List, http://www.cnss.org/ 
insrelease011102.pdf (redacting identifying information from a partial list of 
detainees released in response to FOIA request); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, List of 
Detainees, available at http://www.cnss.org/federalcomplaints011102.pdf (providing 
names, status, and charges for numerous detainees). 
27 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 98 
(D.D.C. 2002) (“For 718 of the 751 individuals detained, DOJ has revealed their place 
of birth and citizenship status, as well as the dates any immigration charges were filed, 
and the nature of those charges.”). The disclosures also revealed that 338 of the 
individuals had been determined to be “not of current interest” to the September 11 
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individual information regarding those detained on immigration 
charges, including their names, details of their detention, and the 
identities of their attorneys, as well as the total number of individuals 
arrested and detained, remained sticking points for the administration.28 
While the coalition’s litigation proceeded, on January 22, 2002, the 
ACLU opened a second front by invoking New Jersey’s Open Public 
Records Law to seek the identities of INS detainees lodged in New Jersey 
jails.29 The New Jersey state trial judge initially ordered release of the 
requested information under state law, commenting that secret arrests 
are “odious to a democracy,”30 but retroactive interim federal regulations 
issued in response to that decision effectively preempted disclosure.31 
Even without judicial intervention, efforts to shield the identities of 
the detainees continued to fray. By the end of January 2002, for reasons 
of its own, the INS had effectively disclosed identifying information for 
the largest group of detainees. That group, held in Pasaic and Hudson 
County jails, was allowed to meet with advocacy groups for “know your 
rights” presentations.32 And in March 2002, the Inspector General of the 
 
investigation. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004) (No. 03-472) (quotation marks omitted). 
28 The administration also refused to disclose the “the total number of 
individuals arrested and detained in connection with its September 11 investigation.” 
Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 99. Having disclosed the number of 
individuals charged with violations of federal statutes and the number of individuals 
detained on immigration charges (and having subsequently disclosed that the 
number detained as material witnesses was small, with twenty-six identified at the time 
of trial), id. at 107, the refusal to disclose the total number arrested and detained is 
something of a mystery. My suspicious side wonders whether there is a hidden group 
which was arrested and summarily disappeared into CIA black sites or rendered to 
foreign jurisdictions whose existence would be disclosed by aggregate numbers. 
29 Elizabeth Llorente, ACLU Sues over Detainees; Demands to Know Who Is in INS 
Custody and Why, RECORD, Jan. 23, 2002, at A1; Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of New 
Jersey Files Lawsuit Seeking Information on Post-September 11 Detainees (Jan. 22, 
2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/detention/ 
11654prs20020122.html. 
30 Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of New Jersey Wins Access to Information on Post-
September 11 Detainees (Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
immigrants/detention/11677prs20020327.html?s_src=RSS; N.J. Judge Orders Counties 
to Release Detainees’ Names, FREEDOMFORUM.ORG, Mar. 28, 2002, 
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=15972. 
31 Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization Service 
Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,508 (Apr. 22, 2002) (codified at 8 
C.F.R. pts. 236 and 241) (forbidding any state or county jail from releasing 
information about INS detainees housed in their facilities, and making the rule 
effective on April 17, 2002, a week prior to publication); see also ACLU of N.J., Inc. v. 
County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 655 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (reversing 
grant of disclosure on the basis of preempting regulations). 
32 Elizabeth Llorente, INS Will Let Advocates Meet with Detainees, RECORD, Jan. 30, 
2002, at A1; Hanna Rosin, Groups Find Way to Get Names of INS Detainees; Presentations 
on Rights Planned in N.J. Facilities, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2002, at A16. This decision was 
contemporaneous with the issuance of an opinion by the INS General Counsel that 
“the INS has a duty to remove an alien with ‘reasonable dispatch’ and the removal 
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Department of Justice initiated an investigation into the September 11 
detention program.33 
During the next months, federal trial judges began to tug at the veil 
of secrecy that had been drawn over the dragnet, without substantively 
confronting the detentions themselves.34 In April, in Detroit Free Press v. 
Ashcroft, a federal trial judge in Michigan held that the blanket closure of 
deportation hearings to the public in “special interest” cases related to 
the anti-terrorist sweep violated the First Amendment and due process 
rights of the subject of the hearings.35 Characterizing the case as being 
“about the Government’s right to suspend certain personal liberties in 
the pursuit of national security,” the trial judge invoked the authority of 
Justice Murphy’s comment on the imposition of martial law in Hawaii: 
“The . . . constitutional rights of an accused individual are too 
fundamental to be sacrificed merely through a reasonable fear of military 
assault.”36 In May, a federal trial judge in New Jersey came to a similar 
conclusion in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, an action brought 
by newspapers seeking access to “scores, if not hundreds, of immigration 
hearings” in New Jersey that had been closed as “special interest” cases.37 
 
could not be delayed for the exclusive purpose of allowing the FBI to conduct an 
investigation to see if the person is a terrorist.” OIG REPORT, supra note 17, at 101. 
33 OIG REPORT, supra note 17, at 5. 
34 The Department of Justice adopted a strategy to avoid judicial review of the 
legality of efforts to hold immigration detainees indefinitely by mooting out habeas 
petitions once filed and continuing to hold detainees who had not filed habeas 
actions. See OIG REPORT, supra note 17, at 98–100. In April 2002, the Center for 
Constitutional Rights filed a class action on behalf of September 11 detainees seeking 
damages for abuse, Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 1, Turkmen 
v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307 (JG), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14537 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 
2004), but litigation on that case did not commence in earnest until two years later, 
Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307 (JG), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14537 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 29, 2004). 
35 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2002); see 
also Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(rejecting exhaustion arguments). The court consolidated cases brought by the 
Detroit Free Press, the Detroit Herald News, Congressman John Conyers, and a 
defendant in a removal proceeding, Rabih Haddad. Haddad’s hearings regarding 
detention and bail in December 2001 and January 2002 had been closed to the press 
and his family. The trial court rejected government claims that disclosing details 
regarding “special interest” detainees could impede terrorism investigations, in part 
because details regarding Mr. Haddad’s arrest had already been published, and in 
part because he and his counsel remained at liberty to disclose any details revealed in 
the hearings. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 947. 
36 Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 940 (citing Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 
U.S. 304, 329–30 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring)). 
37 N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (D.N.J. 
2002). The court again rejected the government’s justifications for closure, 
commenting that: 
The problem with the Creppy Memo is that there is nothing in it to prevent 
disclosure of this very information by the “special interest” detainee or that 
individual’s lawyer, both of whom are permitted to be present in the “special 
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After seeking relief from the Supreme Court, the administration was able 
to have the order to open the New Jersey immigration hearings stayed 
pending appeal.38 
On August 2, 2002, with only 74 of the original 751 INS detainees 
remaining in custody, Judge Kessler in the District of Columbia resolved 
the FOIA controversy regarding the coalition request for the detainees’ 
identities in favor of transparency in Center for National Security Studies v. 
United States Department of Justice (CNSS).39 Commenting that “[s]ecret 
arrests are a concept . . . profoundly antithetical to the bedrock values 
that characterize a free and open [society] such as ours,” she rejected the 
administration’s justifications for denying FOIA requests for the 
identities of the detainees and their attorneys.40 The core of the debate 
focused on FOIA Exemption 7(A), which allows agencies to withhold 
material “compiled for law enforcement purposes” that “could 
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.”41 
The administration asserted that revealing the names of the detainees 
could inhibit their future usefulness as informants once released, “allow 
terrorist organizations to map the progress of the investigation and 
thereby develop the means to impede them,” and “allow terrorist 
organizations and others to interfere with the pending proceedings by 
creating false or misleading evidence.”42 
The trial judge was unpersuaded by any of the justifications for 
withholding the names of the detainees. On the first point, the 
government had provided “no reason to believe that terrorist groups 
would [still] not know of the detentions” ten months after they had taken 
place, and moreover “utterly fail[ed] to demonstrate” that the individuals 
at issue “actually had some pre-existing link to or knowledge of terrorist 
activity.”43 On the question of possible interference with the investigation, 
 
interest” proceedings. Furthermore, if an appeal is taken, the transcript of the 
proceedings below would be disclosed in any event. 
Id. at 301. For additional discussion of the Creppy Memo, see supra text 
accompanying note 19. 
38 Ashcroft v. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., 536 U.S. 954, 954 (2002). The INS had 
earlier mooted out an action by a detainee by removing the closure directive in that 
case. N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 291 & n.1. 
39 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 112–13 (D.D.C. 2002). She had previously denied the 
plaintiffs’ efforts to use discovery in the case as a vehicle to further explore the 
dimensions of federal policy. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civ. 
Action No. 01-2500 (GK), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2983, at *7–8 (D.D.C. 2002). 
40 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 96 (quotation omitted). She went 
on to invoke “the core democratic values of openness, government accountability, 
and the rule of law” and the Judicial branch’s obligation “to ensure that our 
Government always operates within the statutory and constitutional constraints which 
distinguish a democracy from a dictatorship.” Id. 
41 Id. at 100. 
42 Id. at 101 (quoting government affidavits). 
43 Id. at 101, 102. Judge Kessler was offended by the government’s refusal in 
response to questioning to provide any information regarding the “standard used to 
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she rejected the government’s “mosaic theory” “that no information may 
be disclosed because ‘bits and pieces of information that may appear 
innocuous in isolation, when assimilated with other information . . . will 
allow the [terrorist] organization to build a picture of the 
investigation.’”44 No plausible argument from evidence supported the 
theory, since “the key Government affidavit on the mosaic theory was not 
even prepared for this case, but rather is a copy of the affidavit” prepared 
for the “special interest closure” litigation in Michigan, and did not 
provide a basis for concluding that the bare disclosure of names could 
have any adverse effect.45 On the other hand, Judge Kessler accepted that 
the “dates and locations of arrest, detention, and release” could plausibly 
“provide insights into the past and current strategies and tactics of law 
enforcement agencies conducting the investigation.”46 
August 2002 saw the affirmance of the Michigan order barring 
blanket closures of “special interest” immigration hearings by the Sixth 
Circuit in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft. In a unanimous decision authored 
by Judge Damon Keith, the panel began by observing that the “political 
branches of our government enjoy near-unrestrained ability to control 
our borders” and that the “only safeguard on this extraordinary 
governmental power is the public, deputizing the press as the guardians 
of their liberty.”47 Proclaiming that “[d]emocracies die behind closed 
 
arrest the detainees.” The government rested on the proposition that it could not 
“rule out” possible connections to terrorism for every detainee, and that “dire 
consequences . . . would flow from even one unnecessary disclosure.” Id. at 102. 
44 Id. at 103. 
45 Id. at 103–04. Judge Kessler rejected as well claims under Exemptions 7(C) and 
7(F) that the privacy interests and personal safety of the detainees required that their 
identities not be disclosed, observing that privacy interests were subject to balancing 
in the FOIA analysis, and the interest in “verifying whether the Government is 
operating within the bounds of law” provides a more than sufficient offsetting 
consideration: 
Plaintiffs voice grave concerns about the abuse of this power, ranging from 
denial of the right to counsel and consular notification, to discriminatory and 
arbitrary detention, to the failure to file charges for prolonged periods of 
detention, to mistreatment of detainees in custody. . . . The concerns are 
sufficiently substantial that DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General has initiated an 
investigation into the Government’s treatment of the detainees. 
Id. at 105–06. The relief required, however, that detainees be granted the opportunity 
to opt out of disclosure. Id. at 106. Judge Kessler also ordered a more thorough 
search for the requested policy documents because “it is simply not credible that no 
other documents are responsive to Plaintiffs’ request.” Id. at 110. 
46 Id. at 108 (quoting government affidavits). She also credited somewhat 
speculative fears that disclosure of the place of detention could target retaliatory 
attacks. Id. at 108. 
47 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682–83 (6th Cir. 2002); see also id. 
at 693 (“Even though the political branches may have unfettered discretion to deport 
and exclude certain people, requiring the Government to account for their choices 
assures an informed public—a foundational principle of democracy.”). 
 Lest readers miss the historic resonance of concern about secretive overreaching 
by government, Judge Keith referred repeatedly to the prevailing opinions in the 
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doors,” the opinion rejected the claim that the administration had 
constitutionally illimitable plenary power over immigration matters.48 It 
concluded that in light of the history of openness of deportation 
hearings and the importance of public access as “a check on the actions 
of the Executive . . . assuring us that proceedings are conducted fairly 
and properly,” the closure of special interest cases was inconsistent with 
the commands of the First Amendment.49 The opinion acknowledged the 
claim that a “mosaic” pieced together from information provided at open 
hearings could interfere with efforts to suppress terrorism, but concluded 
that a case-by-case evaluation of the threat was required before a hearing 
could be closed.50 “[W]e do not believe speculation should form the basis 
for such a drastic restriction of the public’s First Amendment rights.”51 
 
Pentagon Papers case. Id. at 683 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 
728 (1971) (per curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 683 n.1 (citing N.Y. Times Co., 
403 U.S. at 716 (Black, J., concurring)); id. at 692 n.9 (citing New York Times Co. v. 
United States for the proposition that threats to national security do not generate 
“deferential review”); id. at 693 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States for the 
proposition that “[t]he guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of 
informed representative government provides no real security for our Republic”); id. 
at 710 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States concurrence for the argument that 
the Framers were “[f]ully aware of both the need to defend a new nation” and to 
protect free speech). 
48 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683. 
49 Id. at 703–04. 
50 Id. at 709. The court noted that: 
[T]he Government subsequently admitted that there was no information 
disclosed in any of Haddad’s first three hearings that threatened “national 
security or the safety of the American people.” . . . The only reason offered for 
closing the hearings has been that the presiding immigration judge was told do it 
by the chief immigration judge, who in turn was told to do it by the Attorney 
General.” 
Id. 
51 Id. On remand, on September 17, 2002, the trial court found that Mr. 
Haddad’s due process rights had been violated by the initial closure and ordered that 
the government either provide a de novo open hearing or release him. Haddad v. 
Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799, 805 (E.D. Mich. 2002). Parts of the subsequent hearing 
were closed to the public to allow the introduction of particular sensitive evidence, 
but the government’s effort to use ex parte secret evidence was rebuffed, and 
Haddad’s counsel was granted access to the contested evidence. Detroit Free Press v. 
Ashcroft, Nos. 02-70339, 02-70605, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19991, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. 
Oct. 7, 2002). On September 23, 2003, the appeals from those orders were dismissed 
as moot in light of the entry and effectuation of a final order of removal. Haddad v. 
Ashcroft, 76 Fed. App’x 672, 673 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 In August 2002, Judge Rakoff in In re Material Witness Warrant, 214 F. Supp. 2d 
356, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), ordered an investigation of the case of Abdallah Higazy, an 
Egyptian who had been detained as a “material witness” in the aftermath of 
September 11. Higazy was bullied into a “confession” by FBI interrogators who 
threatened his family in Egypt with torture by Egyptian security forces. The 
“confession” was reported to Judge Rakoff as a justification for further detaining Mr. 
Higazy. When Mr. Higazy was definitively exonerated and one of his accusers was 
shown to have misrepresented crucial physical evidence, Judge Rakoff rejected the 
efforts of the government to keep the records of the case sealed. Id. Subsequent 
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Two months later, a 2–1 decision of the Third Circuit reached a 
different conclusion. In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, the court 
reversed the New Jersey District Court order opening “special interest” 
deportation hearings to public scrutiny.52 Writing for the majority, Judge 
Becker expressed skepticism that, as a matter of First Amendment 
doctrine, “the tradition of openness of deportation proceedings . . . 
meet[s] the standard required” to ground a First Amendment right of 
access.53 More broadly, the opinion framed the issue as part of an “era 
that dawned on September 11” in which the “war against terrorism . . . 
has pervaded the sinews of our national life . . . reflected in thousands of 
ways in legislative and national policy, the habits of daily living, and our 
collective psyches.”54 In this new era, Judge Becker wrote, it was sufficient 
to rely on the admittedly “speculative” assertions that opening any part of 
any special interest hearing could impede the effort to avoid terrorist 
attacks. In general, the opinion expressed hesitance “to conduct a 
judicial inquiry into the credibility of these security concerns, as national 
security is an area where courts have traditionally extended great 
deference to Executive expertise.”55 In particular, the opinion somewhat 
paradoxically invoked the lack of public knowledge as a basis for resisting 
inquiry “at a time when our nation is faced with threats of such profound 
and unknown dimension.”56 Responding to Judge Keith’s aphorism that 
“[d]emocracies die behind closed doors,” Judge Becker quoted a 
columnist who maintained that the threat to democracy would be even 
greater if judicial review opened the door for a successful terrorist attack 
because “[i]f that happens, the public will demand, and will get, 
immense restrictions on liberties.”57 
 
efforts to recover damages from the actors in the debacle ran aground on qualified 
immunity, Higazy v. Millennium Hotel & Resorts, CDL (N.Y.) L.L.C., 346 F. Supp. 2d 
430, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), although some of Mr. Higazy’s claims were reinstated in 
Higazy v. Templeton, Docket No. 05-4148-cv, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 24443  
(2d Cir. 2007), available at http://howappealing.law.com/ 
HigazyVsTempleton05-4148-cv_opnWithdrawn.pdf (un-redacted opinion). 
52 N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 220 (3d Cir. 2002). 
53 Id. at 201. 
54 Id. at 202. 
55 Id. at 219. 
56 Id. at 220. 
57 Id. at 220–21 (quoting Michael Kelly, Editorial, Secrecy, Case By Case, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 28, 2002, at A23). With some irony, given the administration’s efforts to 
avoid habeas petitions, Judge Becker also maintained that the availability of 
substantive habeas corpus relief to detainees obviated the need for public oversight of 
the deportation process. Id. at 221; cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 Chief Judge Scirica’s dissent responded by acknowledging the obligation to defer 
to national security concerns on a case-by-case basis, but refusing to abjure an 
independent role for judicial review, commenting that “deference is not a basis for 
abdicating our responsibilities under the First Amendment,” and citing cases from 
the era of Richard Nixon. Id. at 226–27 (Scirica, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. 
U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321(1972) (holding that “domestic security” is not a 
sufficient basis for relaxing the requirements of a warrant and an independent 
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In the face of this division of authority between the Third and Sixth 
Circuits, the administration adopted a two-pronged response. As a matter 
of practice, the administration officially abandoned its blanket policy of 
“special interest” closures in favor of case-by-case evaluation of the 
concrete imperatives for secrecy.58 As a legal matter, the administration 
sought to insulate the issue from Supreme Court review. Having 
unsuccessfully sought rehearing en banc of Judge Keith’s decision in the 
Sixth Circuit,59 the administration declined to seek certiorari. At the same 
time, the administration opposed a petition for certiorari directed to the 
Third Circuit’s more congenial, and conflicting, decision. Administration 
advocates sought to convince the Court that the conflict was unworthy of 
review because the issue had “little continuing practical effect for the 
government” in light of the abandonment of the “special interest” 
 
assessment of surveillance needs by a magistrate) and N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)). 
58 See Immigration Removal Procedures Implemented in the Aftermath of the September 
11th Attacks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (June 30, 2005) (statement of Lily Fu Swenson, 
Deputy Associate Att’y Gen.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
OversightTestimony.aspx?ID=438 [hereinafter Swenson testimony] (“[N]o alien has 
been subject to those procedures since December 2002. . . . All of the hearings that 
have been fully closed since December 2002 have been closed either on a case-by-case 
basis . . . or because the alien is a victim of child abuse. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.27(b)–(c), 
1208.6, 1240.11(c)(3)(i).”). 
 Intriguingly, Ms. Swenson referred to 766 detainees whose cases had been 
designated “special interest cases,” notwithstanding the administration’s 
representation in CNSS that 751 individuals had been detained for immigration 
violations in connection with the September 11 sweep. Ctr. For Nat’l Sec. Studies v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 98 (D.D.C. 2002). This also conflicted with 
OIG’s identification of 762 “September 11 detainees.” OIG REPORT, supra note 17, at 
20. Given the administration’s penchant for disingenuous parsing of language, one 
wonders which cases were resolved off the books as “special interest cases,” and how 
many other cases were not subjected to “these procedures,” but were instead denied 
open hearings on other grounds. 
 We now know that during the period of September 27, 2002 to October 7, 2002, 
the Department of Justice played a game of three-card monte with the attorney for 
Maher Arar, misleading him as to Arar’s location and rushing through Arar’s 
compelled removal to Syria for torture on the basis of classified, but inaccurate, 
information. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
59 Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. 02-1437, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1278, 
at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2003) 
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procedure and the effort to formulate revised regulations.60 That 
opposition proved successful: review was denied.61 
This allowed the administration to continue to invoke the Third 
Circuit’s opinion and the “threats of . . . profound and unknown 
dimension”62 as a justification for withholding information, and to 
maintain its ability to avoid the Sixth Circuit’s mandate in immigration 
hearings by judicious geographical manipulation. The administration 
continued to proclaim that “except in the territorial region covered by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, there is no legal 
bar to the implementation of measures such as those in the Creppy 
memorandum [because] the Supreme Court declined to review the issue, 
thus leaving the Third Circuit’s decision undisturbed.”63 
In April 2003, a year and a half after the initial sweeps, as the 
invasion of Iraq began, the great bulk of the cases involved had been 
resolved by deportation, departure, or release.64 The petition for 
certiorari in the New Jersey immigration closure case was pending, and 
the appeal from the CNSS FOIA case ordering disclosure of the identities 
of the individual detainees had been argued. On April 29, 2003, the 
Department of Justice Inspector General completed a report setting forth 
the parameters of the September 11 sweeps, the erratic process of 
designating “special interest” cases, the application of shackles, irons, and 
leg restraints, incommunicado detention regardless of actual level of 
suspicion, the often illegal process of indefinite detention for 
investigation, and the harassment and abusive treatment suffered by 
detainees in New York and New Jersey facilities.65 The report’s contents 
began to leak out in May 2003,66 and it was officially released in redacted 
 
60 Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 13, N. Jersey Media Group Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003) (No. 02-1289) (filed Apr. 2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/0responses/2002-1289.resp.pdf. The 
government represented that there were only “three other aliens in the United States 
who remain designated as ‘special interest’ cases” and that “they face no reasonable 
likelihood of proceedings before an immigration judge at any time in the foreseeable 
future.” Id. at 12 n.5. 
61 N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003). 
62 Id. at 220. 
63 Swenson testimony, supra note 58. 
64 See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 60, at 12 (representing 
that only three “special interest” cases remained); OIG REPORT, supra note 17, at 105 
fig. 8 (reporting release/removal dates ranging from September 2001 to August 
2002). The OIG Report also notes sixty-eight cases for which no release or removal 
dates could be ascertained. Id. Again, this could denote either chaotic record-keeping 
or ghost detainees. 
65 OIG REPORT, supra note 17, at 111–85. 
66 Dan Eggen, Report Criticizes Post-Sept. 11 Interviews, WASH. POST, May 10, 2003, at 
A13 (“Several sources familiar with the draft report said it includes significant 
criticism of the government’s conduct. . . . But a senior Justice official called that 
allegation unfounded and said the report, which has been beset with delays, should 
be released soon.”); Justice and 9/11 Detainees: Critical Report (CNN television broadcast 
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form on June 2, 2003.67 As released, the report continued to withhold the 
locations of apprehensions outside New York and New Jersey, as well as 
the identities of the detainees and their attorneys.68 
In this environment, the DC Circuit addressed the appeal from the 
FOIA order to disclose the identity of detainees on June 17, 2003, in 
Center for National Security Studies v. United States Dep’t of Justice.69 Writing 
for a 2–1 majority, Judge Sentelle reversed the order below, and upheld 
the refusal to disclose the identities of detainees as information that 
could be “reasonably expected to interfere with enforcement 
proceedings.” Invoking the danger of an enemy “with capabilities beyond 
the capacity of the judiciary to explore,” Judge Sentelle began the 
analysis with the proposition that the Executive should be deemed to 
have “unique insights” and that claims of possible interference should be 
entitled to “deference.”70 Deferring to affidavits by “the government’s top 
 
May 20, 2003), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0305/30/ 
se.16.html (“CNN learned the Justice Department’s inspector general has found 
significant problems in the way immigration detainees . . . were treated.”). 
67 OIG REPORT, supra note 17, at 16–17, 42. 
68 OIG REPORT, supra note 17, at 22 (redacting locations of arrest); see generally id. 
passim (referring to detainees and attorneys but not including names). A subsequent 
report, released in December 2003, confirmed in graphic detail the abuse of 
detainees in New York facilities. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE 
METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK (2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0312/final.pdf. 
69 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
70 Id. at 920, 927–28. As a legal matter, the opinion inaptly conflates analysis in a 
line of precedent mandating deference in matters of national security under FOIA 
Exemption 1 which was not at issue because the information in dispute was not 
properly classified, and determinations under Exemption 3, which did not apply 
because the explicit statutory mandate of the CIA was irrelevant, with analysis of the 
law enforcement exception under FOIA Exemption 7(A) that was actually at issue. 
Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) with 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) 
(2000). 
 The trial court had noted as much. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 103 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[T]here is simply no existing 
precedent applying the mosaic theory to Exemption 7.”). Commentators have 
concurred. E.g., David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 660 (2005) (referring to “unwillingness to second-
guess the Executive” as “brazenly ahistorical”); id. at 672 (“[M]osaic theory [is] ripe 
for agency opportunism and abuse.”); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts 
Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN L. REV. 131, 167 (2006) 
(commenting that the CNSS opinion was “remarkable . . . because it extended the 
concept of deference beyond its traditional domain” and plausible basis in legislative 
history); Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 58 
ADMIN L REV. 845, 854 (2006) (criticizing mosaic theory as creating a “vacuum of 
knowledge that effectively paralyzes judicial assessment of the government’s claims”); 
cf. Martin Halstuk & Eric Easton, Of Secrets and Spies: Strengthening the Public’s Right to 
Know about the CIA, 17 STAN L. & POL’Y REV. 353, 373 (2006) (noting that Exemption 1 
provides checks on discretion to withhold information because the classification must 
be appropriate). 
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counterterrorism officials,” Judge Sentelle accepted the claims that “what 
may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one 
who has a broad view,” that a “complete list of names informing terrorists 
of every suspect detained . . . would give terrorist organizations a 
composite picture of the government investigation,” and that a list of the 
attorneys of those detained “would facilitate the easy compilation of a list 
of all detainees . . . [and] if such a list fell into the hands of al Qaeda, the 
consequences could be disastrous.”71 Rather than exploring the facts, 
highlighted by the dissent, that the government had acknowledged some 
of the detainees were entirely innocent, that disclosure of the identity of 
those individuals had not been alleged to carry a reasonable probability 
of disclosing a “mosaic” of investigative strategy, and that the publicly 
available records bore evidence of government abuses in the sweeps, 
Judge Sentelle aligned himself with “several federal courts that have 
wisely respected the executive’s judgment in prosecuting the national 
response to terrorism.”72 He invoked the Third Circuit’s opinion in North 
Jersey Media Group, which the administration had struggled to keep from 
Supreme Court review on the ground that it was of no practical 
importance,73 and the Fourth Circuit’s decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,74 
which would be reversed by the Supreme Court a year later.75 
The CNSS plaintiffs sought review in the Supreme Court. In 
opposing certiorari, the administration portrayed the case as a matter 
that raised no real challenge to principles of open government. It 
emphasized that the litigation had already resulted in the release of a 
“significant amount of information,”76 that detainees remained free to 
disclose information regarding their situations, that allegations of abuse 
had been “exhaustively evaluated in a publicly released report by the 
Department of Justice’s Inspector General,”77 and that the case presented 
a garden variety “record-bound” conflict raising no issues of legal 
principle.78 The Supreme Court denied certiorari of CNSS six months 
later, in January 2004.79 
Efforts by advocates had begun in 2001 as an attempt to shed light 
on an ongoing dragnet. Despite the defeats in CNSS and North Jersey 
Media Group, critics did in fact bring to public display details of the 
detentions in the immediate wake of September 11, and of the abuses 
 
71 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F. 3d at 928–29, 933. 
72 Id. at 932. 
73 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
74 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (Jan. 2003); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (July 2002). 
75 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
76 Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 5, Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. Dep’t 
of Justice, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004) (No. 03-472) (filed Dec. 2003), available at 
http://www.cnss.org/Gov.%20Opposition%20to%20Cert.pdf. 
77 Id. at 11 n.3. 
78 Id. at 15. 
79 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004). 
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that accompanied them. Some courts acquiesced in extraordinarily 
speculative national security claims for secrecy—secrecy more plausibly 
explained as a shield against outside inquiry into wrongdoing. But the 
institutional frameworks of transparency ultimately informed the public. 
Some information was gathered by assiduous news media from the 
subjects of government attentions.80 Some was provided by conscientious 
civil servants.81 Persistent advocacy of transparency met partial success in 
the courts, as administration officials disseminated the outlines of the 
initial sweep, and maneuvered to avoid determinative adverse decisions.82 
Legally, the administration established at worst an equivocal legal regime. 
Aided by a right of internal access, political insulation and bureaucratic 
integrity, the Department of Justice Inspector General exercised its office 
with diligence in both gathering information and analyzing it.83 
These disclosures bolstered efforts to seek redress for some victims of 
the abuses immediately following September 11.84 But they emerged too 
late to provide any practical impediment to the abuses accompanying the 
initial sweeps, and transparency mechanisms seem to have provided no 
initial check on the domestic initiatives that followed. The public record 
of litigation provides glimpses of the nature of the abuses accompanying 
the subsequent pursuit of “terrorists” in the continental United States.85 
 
80 See Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 23 (describing investigation and piecemeal 
assembly of information). 
81 See supra notes 32–33. 
82 See supra notes 26–27, 58–61 and accompanying text. 
83 See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
84 See Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307 (JG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170 
(E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006) (sustaining against motion to dismiss claims of abuse in 
custody in class action by detainees, but dismissing claims of pretextual use of 
immigration charges and excessive detention); id. at *9–10 (noting that after oral 
argument on a motion to dismiss, “in light of the OIG Report, the plaintiffs sought 
leave by letter dated June 5, 2003 to amend their complaint. Around that time, the 
government withdrew from representing the named defendants in their individual 
capacities . . . .”); Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1409 (JG), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21434, at *114 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (sustaining claim of abuse in custody and 
discriminatory treatment in custody against motion to dismiss in individual case); id. 
at *87 n.25 (citing OIG REPORT, supra note 17). 
 The Department of Justice Inspector General reports that some internal reforms 
advocated in its report have been effectuated. See generally Letter from Glenn A. Fine, 
Inspector Gen., to Reps. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. & John Conyers, Jr. (Jan. 5, 
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0401/final.pdf, but that efforts 
to put in place internal legal constraints on actions of the Department of Homeland 
Security remain stymied. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1001 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 8 
(Mar. 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703/final.pdf. 
85 See, e.g., Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. CV: 05-093-S-EJL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
70283, at *38 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2006) (sustaining against a motion to dismiss an 
action for damages by an American citizen from Idaho who, on March 16, 2003, “was 
handcuffed and arrested pursuant to a material witness warrant at the ticket counter 
of the Dulles International Airport while he was checking in for his flight to Saudi 
Arabia[,] . . . taken to various different detention centers and eventually transported 
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But there is still no broader public accounting of how many individuals 
have been arrested, detained, and deported, or who they were. Efforts to 
seek information on subsequent sweeps proved to be primarily 
retrospective.86 
 
back to Idaho where, on March 31, 2003, he was released pursuant to certain terms 
and conditions which precluded him from leaving a four-state area of the United 
States.” He was never charged and never called as a witness. (citation omitted)); 
Adam Liptak, Threats and Responses: The Detainees; For Post-9/11 Material Witness, It Is a 
Terror of a Different Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at A1 (reporting that “[a]bout 60 
other men have been held in terrorism investigations under the federal material 
witness law since the Sept. 11 attacks”); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 279 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing on grounds of “special factors counseling hesitation” and 
the need for secrecy an action by Maher Arar, an innocent Canadian citizen who was 
detained in September 2002, deported to Syria, imprisoned, and tortured for a year); 
COMM’N OF INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR 9–10 (Sept. 18, 
2006), available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf (confirming 
Arar’s allegations); Maher Arar: Timeline, CBC NEWS, Jan. 26, 2007, available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/; United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 
125, 129, 137 (2d Cir. 2006) (refusing to dismiss prosecution of a material witness 
alleged to have falsely denied knowing an individual under investigation); id. at 129 
(“After the questioning on September 21, Awadallah was arrested on a material 
witness warrant[,] . . . detained without bail based on judicial findings that he 
possessed information material to the grand jury’s investigation of the September 11 
attacks,” shuttled around the country, held in solitary confinement, and subjected to 
physical abuse.); Habeeb v. Castloo, 434 F. Supp. 2d 899, 912 (D. Mont. 2006) 
(dismissing suit for arrest and attempted deportation in April 2003 of Iraqi refugee, 
on qualified immunity grounds); Class Action Complaint at 2–3, Rahman v. Chertoff, 
No. 05C-3761, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54960 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2007) (challenging the 
DHS practice of misidentifying U.S. citizens (and others) re-entering the U.S. as 
watch list members and their consequent prolonged and unreasonable detention); 
Complaint, Tabbaa v. Chertoff, No. 05-CV-582S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38189, at *52 
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2005) (dismissing claim regarding the search and detention of 5 
Muslims returning from Islamic conference in Canada); FBI’s Anti-Terror “October 
Plan”: Operation Intended To Prevent Terror Attack Timed To Election, CBS NEWS, Sept. 17, 
2004, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/17/eveningnews/ 
main644096.shtml (reporting an “internal e-mail advisory to supervisory agents this 
week from the FBI’s ‘‘04 Threat Task Force’” setting forth a plan “‘to foster the 
impression that law enforcement is focused on individuals who may be a threat,’” 
involving “‘aggressive—even obvious—surveillance techniques to be used on a short 
list of people suspected of being terrorist sympathizers, but who have not committed 
a crime” and authorizing “‘persons of interest,’ including their family members, [to] 
be brought in for questioning”); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, 
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 06-CV-
01770 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://adc.org/PDF/ADC_Complaint.pdf 
(alleging an announcement by the Department of Homeland Security of 230 arrests 
and 900 “investigations”). 
86 See, e.g., Arab-American Group Sues U.S. Government; Organization Files Lawsuit to 
Gain Access to Immigration Violators’ Names, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 17, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15311533/ (reporting a FOIA action seeking access 
to information about the nationalities of more than 230 people arrested for 
immigration violations during the “October Program” in 2004); Complaint, supra note 
85; Susan Jones, Activists Smell a Rat in Homeland Security Efforts, CNSNEWS.COM, Aug. 
18, 2004, http://www.cnsnews.com/ 
ViewNation.asp?Page=%5CNation%5Carchive%5C200408%5CNAT20040818a.html 
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This pattern is largely mirrored in other areas of transparency 
struggles regarding “anti-terrorist” initiatives.87 The secrecy in which 
initiatives are shrouded, combined with resistance to FOIA requests, the 
slow pace of FOIA processing and litigation, and the tendency of 
investigations and leaks to occur only after the fact, has meant that 
transparency mechanisms have generally not functioned to provide 
occasions for public reflection on the adoption of problematic policy. 
With a few exceptions,88 transparency mechanisms are reactive. 
 
(“Several groups in Illinois are now suing the federal government, seeking 
information . . . about the National Security Exit/Entry Program, known as Special 
Registration, which required thousands of immigrants to submit to registration and 
questioning.”); id. (“‘Reports across the nation indicated that many long-time 
residents were detained or deported after they voluntarily appeared as part of the 
Special Registration program.’”). 
87 See discussion of Guantanamo litigation, Patriot Act, and torture litigation infra 
Part III.B–C. 
88 One partial success came in the efforts of Admiral Alberto Mora to derail 
approval of coercive interrogation methods by the Department of Defense. See Jane 
Mayer, The Memo, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/060227fa_fact. Admiral Mora deployed 
an article revealing existing coercive interrogation methods in December 2002 to 
argue in January of 2003 that approval of such techniques should be withdrawn 
because they could not remain secret and would prove embarrassing. Memorandum 
from Alberto J. Mora to Inspector General, Dep’t of the Navy 9 (2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/mora_memo_july_2004.pdf (citing Dana Priest & 
Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; “Stress and Duress” Tactics 
Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at 
A1). See also infra notes 204–05 and accompanying text (discussing the partial 
recognition of Geneva Convention obligations after the leak of a memorandum 
referring to the Conventions as “quaint”). 
 Somewhat more clearly, a series of FOIA requests by the ACLU lent efficacy to a 
campaign to persuade states to withdraw from the MATRIX (Multistate Anti-
TeRrorism Information eXchange) surveillance network. See ACLU, Feature on 
MATRIX, available at http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/15701res20050308.html; 
ACLU, State-by-State Breakdown on Participation in MATRIX, http://www.aclu.org/ 
safefree/resources/16906res20040116.html (providing links to FOIA requests and 
withdrawals from the program); The ACLU in the Courts Since 9/11, 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/since911pastcases_20061019.pdf (describing 
“simultaneous Freedom of Information Act requests in eight states concerning those 
states’ participation in the ‘MATRIX’ database surveillance system” following an 
October 2003 federal FOIA request, resulting in the ultimate abandonment of the 
program in 2005). Cf. American Library Association, Department of Justice Rescinds Order 
for Libraries to Destroy Documents (July 30, 2004), available at http://www.ala.org/ 
al_onlineTemplate.cfm?Section=American_Libraries&template=/ContentManageme
ntDisplay.cfm&ContentID=72146 (describing rescission of order to destroy 
documents in depository libraries after American Library Association filed FOIA 
requests for the documents at issue). 
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B. Transparency Mechanisms as Audits: Guantanamo Tribunals and the Patriot 
Act 
To be reactive is not to be without effect. In corporate culture, the 
findings of audits after the initial implementation of policies can serve as 
spurs to correct mistakes. In national governance, disclosures of the 
manner in which initiatives are implemented can provide a basis to bring 
erring executives back into line with the requirements of policy. 
In the two case studies that follow, FOIA inquiries concerned 
initiatives in the “War on Terror” that were publicly announced. In the 
case of the Guantanamo Combatant Status Review Tribunals, FOIA 
requests and litigation by news media levered information regarding the 
conduct of the tribunals and the identities of the subjects into the public 
arena; they provided a forum for a skeptical trial judge to publicly take 
the administration to task for its efforts to suppress information. In the 
case of the Patriot Act, a persistent and coordinated strategy of political 
opposition, FOIA requests, and substantive litigation combined to 
disclose overreaching and to catalyze internal oversight mechanisms and 
substantive reform. 
1. FOIA Alone: Sunlight on the Guantanamo Tribunals 
The existence of the prison camp at Guantanamo has never been a 
secret; the administration publicly stated an intent to place “enemy 
combatants” in Guantanamo on December 27, 2001,89 and the arrival of 
prisoners in early January 2002 was heralded by a press conference 
announcement.90 But during the next two years, details of the identities 
of the prisoners, their alleged misdeeds, and the treatment accorded 
them emerged only fitfully. 
In response to the Supreme Court’s trilogy of detainee cases in June 
2004,91 the Department of Defense (DoD) established a program of 
“Combatant Status Review Tribunals” to evaluate the justifications for 
holding the remaining Guantanamo detainees.92 As a number of 
individuals subject to the tribunals continued challenges to their 
 
89 DefenseLink News Transcript: DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and 
Gen. Myers (Dec. 27, 2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ 
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2696. 
90 DefenseLink News Transcript: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and 
Gen. Myers (Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ 
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031; Steve Vogel, U.S. Takes Hooded, Shackled Detainees to 
Cuba, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2002, at A10. The government did attempt to suppress 
pictures of the hooded and shackled detainees. Joe Williams, Some Networks Nix 
Prisoner Video, DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2002, at 8. 
91 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
92 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 450 (D.D.C. 2005). See 
also U.S. Dep’t of Def., Detainee Related Documents, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/ 
foi/detainees/index.html (providing lists of detainees and other information about 
them). 
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detention and the conduct of those tribunals in the courts, the Defense 
Department sought to shield information regarding both the identities of 
the Guantanamo prisoners and the functioning of the tribunals.93 In 
November 2004 and January 2005 the Associated Press filed FOIA 
requests seeking transcripts of the tribunal proceedings, documents 
containing allegations or accounts of detainee mistreatment by DoD 
personnel, documents identifying resulting disciplinary action, 
documents provided to each detainee stating the basis for his detention 
as an enemy combatant, and other related documents.94 The requests 
languished while the tribunal process lumbered toward its culmination, 
releasing only a small fraction of the prisoners.95 
On April 19, 2005, the Associated Press filed suit to require the 
processing of its request and the release of transcripts. The Department 
of Defense began to release the bulk of the requested documents 
forthwith.96 This alone is worthy of remark, given the prior efforts to 
shield Guantanamo from public review.97 The thousands of pages of 
transcripts paved the way for analyses casting doubt on the claim that 
Guantanamo housed the “worst of the worst,” even on the government’s 
evidence.98 
 
93 E.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 453 (discussing 
government’s opposition to discovery regarding the functioning of tribunals); Brooks 
Egerton, Losing a Fight for Detainees; Officer Says He Leaked List of Terror Suspects in the 
Name of Justice; Now Convicted, He Could Face Prison Term, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 
18, 2007, at 1A (describing prosecution, beginning in 2005, of Matthew Diaz, military 
lawyer who provided a list of the names of prisoners to civil rights attorneys). The 
Department of Defense continued its court martial proceedings against Cmdr. Diaz 
even after the names had been disclosed in response to FOIA litigation. Id. (“When 
asked why the government pressed on with its criminal case against Cmndr. Diaz, 
Navy spokeswoman Beth Baker said, ‘I can’t give you a philosophical answer.’”). 
94 Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 05 Civ. 5468 (JSR), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 67913, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2006); Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
395 F. Supp. 2d 15, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
95 Associated Press, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (noting that while 520 prisoners were 
classified as “enemy combatants,” only 38 prisoners were exonerated). 
96 Id. 
97 Cf. Guantanamo Inmates Defy American Guards, MSNBC.COM, July 1, 2005, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8435874 (“What emerges from 278 pages of the 
newly released documents is the degree of defiance by the terrorism suspects at 
Guantanamo.”). 
98 See Eric Umansky, Who are the Prisoners at Gitmo?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., 
Sept./Oct. 2006, available at http://www.cjr.org/issues/2006/5/Umanskyb.asp; 
Corine Hegland, Guantanamo’s Grip, NAT’L J., Feb. 4, 2006, available at 
http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0203nj1.htm; MARK 
DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517 
DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA, available at 
http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf (relying on initial 
transcript release).  
 Subsequent FOIA requests by counsel for detainees also facilitated their efforts to 
seek legal vindication. See Melissa Hoffer, Torture in Guantanamo, CAGEPRISONERS.COM, 
Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=13493 (“In April 2005, 
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At the same time, the Department redacted the names of the 
individuals involved, hindering efforts to evaluate the fairness of the 
proceedings and the plausibility of the charges. Administration lawyers 
did not seek to justify the excisions on the ground of any imperative of 
national security. Rather, they argued that the identities were shielded by 
FOIA Exemption 6, which allows the withholding of “personnel and 
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”99 The administration 
maintained that if “terrorist groups or other individuals abroad are 
displeased by something the detainee said to the Tribunal, [the 
Department of Defense] believes that this could put his family at serious 
risk of reprisals,” and that upon the hypothetical release of the prisoners, 
they themselves might be subject to reprisals.100 
On August 29, 2005, Judge Jed Rakoff, who had previously 
encountered the administration’s efforts to shield its abuses from public 
view in the case of Abdallah Higazy,101 registered ironic skepticism 
regarding the administration’s solicitude for the prisoners whom they 
had detained for over two years: “One might well wonder whether the 
detainees share the view that keeping their identities secret is in their 
own best interests. But—given that the detainees are in custody and 
therefore readily available—it is really not difficult to find out.”102 He 
ordered that the detainees each be provided with a brief written 
questionnaire inquiring whether they wished to have their identifying 
information released. 
The administration responded by seeking reconsideration, 
provoking a more biting response from Judge Rakoff. He commented 
that “some might think it strange, even hypocritical, that the military 
officials who held the detainees incommunicado for so many months 
now express such solicitude for the detainees’ privacy rights,”103 rejected 
claims of logistical burden as “a model of hyperbole,” and rebuffed the 
 
my colleagues and I filed a Freedom of Information Act suit seeking records 
concerning our clients’ treatment at Guantánamo. As a result, the U.S. produced 
thousands of documents, including one confirming medical personnel involvement 
in interrogation. Lakhdar has been interrogated between 100 and 200 times.”); Carol 
Leonnig, Guantanamo Detainee Suing U.S. to Get Video of Alleged Torture, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 14, 2005, at A2. 
99 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000); see Associated Press, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 16. 
Administration attorneys may have been constrained from invoking national security 
claims under Exemption 1 by the adverse reaction to the effort to classify reports of 
the Abu Ghraib abuse in 2004, and directions to Defense Department elements 
holding prisoners not to use national security classification to avoid embarrassment. 
See discussion infra notes 268–72 and accompanying text. 
100 Associated Press, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 16. 
101 See supra note 51. 
102 Associated Press, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 16-17. 
103 Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 395 F. Supp. 2d 17, 18–19 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
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claim that the President’s “constitutional authority to wage war as 
Commander in Chief” exempted Guantanamo from judicial oversight.104 
When the questionnaires were finally administered, only 17 of the 
317 prisoners queried manifested an objection to release of their 
identities.105 In light of this response, as well as FOIA’s presumption of 
disclosure, Judge Rakoff concluded that the government had not met its 
burden of demonstrating that disclosure of the identities “‘would 
constitute’ (as opposed to ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute’) a 
‘clearly unwarranted’ (as opposed to simply ‘unwarranted’) invasion of 
personal privacy.”106 He entered an order requiring release of the 
identities. 
Nothing daunted, administration lawyers sought reconsideration, 
asserting that the initial opinion had been inadequately attentive to the 
interests of friends and family members, though they declined the 
opportunity to provide a more particularized showing regarding 
expectations of privacy and possible retaliation. This provoked tart 
responses. Judge Rakoff first rejected the motion as procedurally 
improper,107 but went on to reject it on the merits. As to friends and 
family members, he reiterated that “the Government has not introduced 
the slightest evidence that such embarrassment or retaliation is likely, 
confining itself . . . to wholly conclusory and grossly speculative 
assertions.”108 As to expectations of privacy, he observed that prisoners 
who elected to participate in tribunals had chosen to go forward without 
any assurance that their identities would remain private, observing that 
“it is hard to escape the inference that the Government’s entire 
Exemption 6 argument before this Court is a cover for other concerns, 
 
104 Id. at 20 (“[H]ow long does it take to translate the six or seven sentences that 
constitute this simple questionnaire? In seeking to bring the Department’s treatment 
of the detainees within the ambit of law, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to 
impose far greater logistical burdens.” (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004))). 
105 Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 410 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (63 checked yes, 17 checked no, 35 returned the form without checking 
anything, and 202 declined to return the form). 
106 Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989)). Judge Rakoff rejected the 
claim that the prisoners had a “reasonable expectation” of privacy, and observed that 
since the “Department of Defense has failed to come forward on this motion with 
anything but thin and conclusory speculation to support its claims of possible 
retaliation,” it had entirely failed to meet its burden of establishing a clearly 
unwarranted intrusion on privacy. Id. at 151. 
107 Judge Rakoff began with the procedural observation that the DoD had not 
previously raised this argument: “[A]n argument made only in a footnote is not 
preserved for purposes of reconsideration. . . . To put it colloquially, a motion for 
reconsideration is not a game of ‘gotcha.’” Id. at 153. 
108 Id. at 157. 
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such as the Government’s desire, only recently modified by the courts, to 
keep the detainees incommunicado with the outside world.”109 
On April 19, 2006, a year after the filing of the FOIA action and 
twenty months after the Review Tribunals commenced, the Defense 
Department reversed the redactions of identities,110 and on May 15, 2006, 
it released a list of all present and former Guantanamo detainees.111 
2. The Campaign to Illuminate the Patriot Act 
Few legislators had the opportunity to parse the “USA PATRIOT” 
Act in its entirety when it was proposed in October 2001. Concern about 
the expansion of unchecked surveillance opportunities, however, was 
great enough that a number of its provisions were subject to a four-year 
 
109 Id. at 156 n.2 (citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)). 
110 Pentagon Releases First List of Names of Guantanamo Detainees, USATODAY.COM, 
Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/ 
2006-04-19-gitmo-names_x.htm; see U.S. Dep’t of Def., Detainee Related Documents, 
available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/index.html (noting that 
detainee list was released on April 19, 2006). 
111 Ben Fox, Diverse Group of Detainees at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, May 16, 2006, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/16/ 
AR2006051600124.html (“The list provides the first full official accounting of all 
those who have been held by the military in Guantanamo on suspicion of links to al-
Qaida or the Taliban. The document provides the names, hometowns and dates of 
birth of 759 current and former detainees.”). 
 In a subsequent chapter of the litigation, Judge Rakoff rejected Exemption 6 and 
7(C) privacy claims and ordered the release of the identities of detainees who 
charged abuse by their captors, and who had been involved in detainee-against-
detainee abuse, citing “evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person 
that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” Associated Press v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 05-CV-05468 (JSR), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67913, at *12–
13 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying the standard set forth in Nat’l Archives & Records 
Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004)). He also ordered the release of the identities 
of transferred and released detainees in the face of deliberative privilege claims 
under Exemption 5 and privacy claims under Exemption 6. Id. at 24, 34-35 (citing 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (6) (2000)). 
 In the next iteration, Judge Rakoff ordered the release of height and weight 
information regarding detainees in the face of privacy claims under Exemption 6, on 
the basis of the public interest in evaluating the effect of hunger strikes, but upheld 
withholding of the photographs of Guantanamo prisoners, which had been classified 
“secret,” deferring to affidavits that “official public disclosure of such photographs 
would both increase the risk of retaliation against the detainees and their families 
and exacerbate the detainees’ fears of reprisal, thus reducing the likelihood that 
detainees would cooperate in intelligence-gathering efforts.” Associated Press v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Defense, 462 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The outcome highlights 
the effect of classification, which is the gateway to deference under Exemption 1. In 
the face of any willingness of officials to submit particularized support for claims of 
possible harm to national security, even skeptical judges will accommodate 
withholdings based on national security. 
 On March 16, 2007, DoD released the heights and weights of detainees. See U.S. 
Dep’t of Def., Measurements of Heights and Weights of Individuals Detained by the 
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, available at http://www.dod.mil/ 
pubs/foi/detainees/measurements/index.html. 
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sunset requirement.112 And once adopted, its contents were a matter of 
public record. 
During the first years of the “War on Terror,” however, the use of 
these provisions remained draped in secrecy. The process by which they 
were unveiled displays the interaction among transparency frameworks 
that have emerged outside of the constitutional text. Political advocacy by 
a network of nongovernmental organizations combined with substantive 
litigation to lay the groundwork for a series of invocations of the 
Freedom of Information Act. The information disclosed under FOIA in 
turn triggered further political pressure, leverage in substantive litigation 
and inquiries by the Department of Justice Inspector General. Finally, the 
information disclosed in that iteration generated legislative reform and 
further institutional oversight. 
An initial request in June 2002 from the House Judiciary Committee 
for an accounting of the manner in which the Patriot Act’s disputed 
provisions had been used was first ignored by the administration. When it 
responded in late July, the administration maintained that the answers to 
many of the questions involved classified intelligence information, and 
provided information only to the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence.113 In August 2002, the ACLU, joined by the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and librarian and bookseller 
organizations, filed a series of FOIA requests seeking information 
regarding the deployment of Patriot Act powers, including the backup 
documents used in preparing the responses that had been withheld from 
the House Judiciary Committee.114 
Although the administration nominally granted expedited 
processing of the FOIA request, it adopted a not-uncommon gambit of 
passive resistance. After a month and a half, officials informed the 
requesters that a search for responsive records was still incomplete and 
processing of the records had not begun. On October 24, 2002, the 
requesters filed suit seeking both processing of their request and 
disclosure of wrongfully withheld documents.115 In response to a motion 
for a preliminary injunction, the administration agreed to an order 
 
112 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295 [hereinafter, the “Patriot Act”]; Prominent 
controversy surrounded section 213, authorizing “sneak and peek” warrants; section 
214, authorizing the issuance of pen register warrants on reduced standards of cause 
and connection to intelligence investigations; section 215, authorizing the issuance of 
secret warrants for access to “tangible things” on reduced standards of cause and 
connection to intelligence investigations; and section 505, which broadened authority 
for the FBI to issue national security letters (NSLs) without judicial authorization, 
obligating recipients to turn over consumer financial, telephonic, and electronic 
communication records. §§ 213–215, 115 Stat. at 285–88; § 505, 115 Stat. at 365–66. 
113 ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2003). 
114 Id. at 25. 
115 Id. 
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requiring complete processing of the request by January 15, 2003.116 In 
the succeeding months, the administration released 341 pages of 
responsive records, from which the plaintiffs determined that the FBI 
had deployed judicially unsupervised national security letters (NSLs) in 
large numbers, as well as pen register orders issued on less than probable 
cause.117 
The documents also suggested that the FBI’s concerns about 
possible oversight had some moderating influence on FBI policy 
regarding the newly available mechanism. A November 28, 2001 
memorandum from the FBI General Counsel commented that:  
The USA PATRIOT Act greatly broadened the FBI’s authority to 
gather this information. However, the provisions of the Act relating 
to NSLs are subject to a ‘sunset’ provision . . . . In deciding whether 
or not to re-authorize the broadened authority, Congress certainly 
will examine the manner in which the FBI exercised it. . . . 
Supervisors should keep this in mind when deciding whether or not 
a particular use of NSL authority is appropriate.118 
 
116 Id. In the interim, another D.C. district judge had rebuffed efforts by the 
Department of Defense to frustrate EPIC’s FOIA requests regarding the Information 
Awareness Office of the Department of Defense and its Director, John Poindexter. 
The Defense Department had sought to impose search costs on EPIC on the ground 
that EPIC was not a “representative of the news media” under the Freedom of 
Information Reform Act of 1986. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Def., 241 F. Supp. 
2d 5, 5 (D.D.C. 2003). 
117 The documents released included both policy documents encouraging the 
use of the new surveillance powers and pages of blacked-out documents that 
indicated that large numbers of NSLs and pen registers had been utilized, but that 
withheld identifying characteristics. ACLU, The Patriot FOIA: The Government’s 
Response, http://www.aclu.org/patriot_foia/foia3.html. Some of the documents 
disclosed are available at Electronic Privacy Information Center, Freedom of 
Information Documents on the USA PATRIOT Act, http://www.epic.org/privacy/ 
terrorism/usapatriot/foia/. 
118 Memorandum from the General Counsel, Nat’l Sec. Law Unit, FBI, to All 
Field Offices (Nov. 28, 2001), available at http://www.aclu.org/patriot_foia/FOIA/ 
Nov2001FBImemo.pdf. Although the names of the individuals who approved the 
memorandum were provided, the name of its author was redacted. After he left 
government employment, the drafter of the memo, Michael J. Woods, spoke on the 
record. Woods was struck by how starkly he misjudged the climate. The FBI 
disregarded his warning, and no one noticed: 
 One thing Woods did not anticipate was then-Attorney General John D. 
Ashcroft’s revision of Justice Department guidelines. On May 30, 2002, and Oct. 
31, 2003, Ashcroft rewrote the playbooks for investigations of terrorist crimes 
and national security threats. He gave overriding priority to preventing attacks by 
any means available.  
 Ashcroft remained bound by Executive Order 12333, which requires the use of 
the ‘least intrusive means’ in domestic intelligence investigations. But his new 
interpretation came close to upending the mandate. Three times in the new 
guidelines, Ashcroft wrote that the FBI “should consider . . . less intrusive means” 
but “should not hesitate to use any lawful techniques . . . even if intrusive” when 
investigators believe them to be more timely. “This point,” he added, “is to be 
particularly observed in investigations relating to terrorist activities.” 
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Many documents were withheld or redacted, but the requesters 
focused on the effort to obtain aggregate statistical data concerning the 
administration’s use of the new Patriot Act surveillance mechanisms. This 
data had been withheld under FOIA Exemption 1119 on the ground that 
they were properly classified SECRET and that their release “reasonably 
could be expected to result in damage to national [] security.”120 
According to the administration’s affidavits, even an aggregate account of 
the number of times particular surveillance authorities had been 
deployed “would enable the potential targets of such surveillance to 
conduct their intelligence or terrorist activities . . . more securely” by 
providing “critical information about whether taking evasive action . . . 
would provide a safe harbor from FBI counterintelligence and counter-
terrorism efforts.”121 By keeping potential terrorists (along with the 
public) guessing about how often intrusive and thinly justified 
surveillance was deployed, the FBI could make the lives of their targets 
more uncertain.122 Notwithstanding the fact that the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) required information to be reported to 
congressional oversight committees,123 Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle 
concluded that in light of the “special deference” appropriate in 
Exemption 1 national security cases, the “agency’s expert judgment” that 
the material was properly classified and reasonably related to national 
security was sufficient to justify refusing disclosure.124 
 
Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny; In Hunt for Terrorists, Bureau Examines Records 
of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1. 
119 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000). 
120 ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 28 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(quotations omitted). A side dispute concerned internal e-mails discussing the 
response to the House Judiciary request that had been withheld under Exemption 5. 
Judge Huvelle examined the documents in camera and found that they lacked any 
segregable factual information that was subject to disclosure. Id. at 34. 
121 Id. at 28 (quotations omitted). 
122 The principle apparently deployed can be traced back to Bentham’s 
Panopticon. As long as a guard could be watching, an inmate is impelled to act as if 
surveillance is occurring. The difficulty, of course, is that the same applies to the 
public at large. 
123 ACLU, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 24 n.7. 
124 Id. at 30 & n.11. Three years later, Judge Ronald Whyte rejected analogous 
claims that sought to shield the aggregate statistics regarding use of section 213 
“sneak and peek” warrants as “law enforcement techniques” that can “reasonably be 
expected to risk circumvention of the law.” Gerstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C-03-
04893 RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41276, at *38 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005) 
(rebuffing claims under Exemption 7). Judge Whyte commented that “the 94 USAOs 
have issued only sixty Section 213 warrants. One does not need to be a statistician to 
recognize that the predictive value of such a small sample is exceedingly low. [T]he 
court finds the notion that criminals will plan illegal activity based on whether a 
particular USAO has invoked Section 213 to be dubious.” Id. at *41. 
 The difference between Gerstein and ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice could reflect 
either a different time, a different judge, or a different treatment of claims that did 
not explicitly invoke Exemption 1 classification authority. 
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Political controversy regarding the Patriot Act continued, and the 
ACLU commenced litigation on another front, returning to the 
jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit, which had earlier warned that 
“[d]emocracies die behind closed doors.”125 The ACLU filed Muslim 
Community Ass’n v. Ashcroft in Detroit on July 30, 2003 on behalf of a 
national coalition of Muslim organizations. The suit challenged section 
215 of the Patriot Act, as a violation of both Fourth and First Amendment 
rights.126 
For his part, Attorney General Ashcroft launched a cross-country 
tour to defend the Patriot Act against criticism and to seek expansion of 
surveillance powers. On September 18, 2003, the Attorney General 
declassified “the number of times to date that the Department of Justice 
. . . has utilized Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act” and anticlimactically 
revealed that the number was “zero.”127 Deploying this information, the 
administration moved to dismiss Muslim Community Ass’n on October 2, 
2003 as unripe.128 The motion was set for argument in December 2003.129 
The ACLU sought, in turn, to use the Ashcroft zero-based 
declassification as a lever of its own. On October 23, 2003, ACLU, EPIC, 
and the bookseller and librarian coalition renewed their request for 
information regarding “any and all records relating to Section 215 of the 
USA Patriot Act” and sought expedited processing, alleging that the 
Attorney General’s efforts both underscored the need for more 
information and undercut justifications for withholding information.130 
In the prior round of FOIA requests, the administration had granted 
expedited processing to the coalition’s request as one that “pertain[ed] 
to a matter of widespread and exceptional media interest in which there 
exists possible questions about the government’s integrity which affect 
public confidence,” implicitly acknowledging the controversy 
surrounding the Patriot Act.131 This time, amidst its national surge of 
 
125 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002). 
126 Complaint, Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913 (E.D. 
Mich. July 30, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ 
complaint%20final%20pdf.pdf. The complaint alleged that in addition to its chilling 
effect and substantive privacy violations, section 215’s gag provisions violated the First 
Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 156–57. A motion to dismiss was argued in December 2003, and 
ultimately denied. Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft, 459 F. Supp. 2d 592, 
595, 601 (E.D. Mich. 2006). For pleadings in the case, see ACLU, MCA, et al. v. 
Ashcroft and Mueller (July 30, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/ 
16821res20030730.html. 
127 ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2004); see also id. 
at 30 (referring to the Attorney General’s “cross country tour”); id. at 31 n.8 
(referring to proposals to expand surveillance powers). 
128 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 16–19, Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor v. 
Ashcroft, No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
section215/gov_motion_100303.pdf. 
129 Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 595. 
130 ACLU, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 27. 
131 Id. at 32–33 (quoting Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion, Ex. A, Attach. 2). 
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public advocacy seeking to quell insurgency against the Patriot Act, the 
administration determined that there was “no particular urgency to 
inform the public” and remitted the requesters to a FOIA queue that 
would delay processing for nineteen months, well past the 2004 
presidential elections.132 
FOIA, as amended in 1996, provides that expedited processing 
should be made available in cases where the requester “demonstrates a 
compelling need.”133 FOIA and its implementing regulations provide that 
compelling need can be demonstrated by “a person primarily engaged in 
disseminating information” who makes a showing of “urgency to inform 
the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government activity.”134 
The DOJ’s implementing regulations also authorize expedited processing 
for matters “of widespread and exceptional media interest in which there 
exist possible questions about the government’s integrity which affect 
public confidence.”135 The administration refused expedited processing 
on either ground, denying the existence of current widespread 
controversy even as it campaigned to contain it. It also maintained, 
 
132 Id. at 29 n.5, 30. The administration had used similar tactics in responding to 
EPIC’s September 2003 request regarding memoranda seeking to enlist U.S. 
Attorneys in the surge, by encouraging them to lobby legislators who had voted to 
deny funding for the execution of “sneak and peek” warrants authorized by the 
Patriot Act. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C 
2003) (finding jurisdiction to review the claim, but denying expedited processing). 
According to EPIC, “the parties agreed to dismiss their appeals when the DOJ 
released the documents EPIC had requested, and the issue of expedited processing 
became moot.” Electronic Privacy Information Center, EPIC Litigation Docket, 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/litigation; see also Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of 
Justice, No. 04-5063, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24617, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 24, 2004). 
133 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-231, § 8, 110 Stat. 3048, 3051–52 (1996) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(I) (2000)). 
134 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(II) (2000); see also 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(d)(1)(ii) 
(2006). The existence of a compelling need for information regarding federal 
activities is determined by evaluating “(1) whether the request concerns a matter of 
current exigency to the American public [and] (2) whether the consequences of 
delaying a response would compromise a significant recognized interest.” ACLU, 321 
F. Supp. 2d at 29. 
135 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(d)(1)(iv) (2006). For both tracks, the existence of public 
controversy serves as a gateway to expedited processing. This is another reason that 
FOIA is ill-suited to erect barriers to secretive policies at the outset; it is only once a 
modicum of information has leaked out through other means and become a matter 
of contention in the public sphere, that anything close to real-time disclosure 
becomes possible. This also means that FOIA requests are synergistic with other sub-
constitutional disclosure mechanisms. Leaks from disaffected civil servants or 
complaints by victims of policies set the stage for public discussion; independent 
media that can report without prior restraint produce controversy. Controversy in 
turn provides the predicate for fee waivers and expedited processing. Responses to 
FOIA requests, in turn, authenticate and substantiate the leaks.  
 As the possibility of disseminating information worldwide on the Internet 
becomes more and more available, the “media” exception will come under 
definitional pressure from bloggers and others. 
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through what was later characterized as “administrative error,” that the 
requesters were not entitled to media treatment, notwithstanding the 
recent and un-appealed determination that EPIC was a media entity for 
FOIA purposes.136 In December 2003, the coalition filed ACLU v. 
Department of Justice in D.C. District Court, seeking to require responses to 
its requests. 
On May 10, 2004, Judge Huvelle, who had adjudicated the initial 
Patriot Act FOIA action, proved unsympathetic to the denial of expedited 
consideration. She reviewed the “ongoing debate regarding the renewal 
and/or amendment of the Patriot Act,” newspaper articles submitted by 
the requesters, which manifested widespread public concern (e.g., the 
“many resolutions passed by local and state governments urging Congress 
to narrow the provisions of the Patriot Act”), as well as the Attorney 
General’s Patriot Act tour and his zero-based declassification to counter 
criticism and restore “public confidence in law enforcement.” She 
concluded that the administration erred in determining that the 
statutory prerequisite of “urgency to inform the public” was lacking.137 
Judge Huvelle was more biting in her response to the 
administration’s volte-face on the question of whether Patriot Act usage 
was a matter of “widespread and exceptional media interest” going to 
“possible questions about the government’s integrity.”138 Judge Huvelle 
found “absolutely no justification for reversal,” characterizing the 
government position as turning “a blind eye to the flurry of media 
attention” and “a deaf ear to the Attorney General[].”139 Denial of 
expedited processing, she held, “fails to pass the reasonableness test,” 
and ordered that the parties convene on May 20, 2004 to establish dates 
for production of documents.140 
On May 19, 2004, the administration submitted an extraordinarily 
obscurely worded letter in Muslim Community Ass’n (pending in 
Michigan) reiterating its earlier representations in the case that section 
215 had not been invoked between July 1, 2003 and September 18, 2003. 
Administration attorneys intimated that a classified report about to be 
 
136 ACLU, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 29 n.5; see also Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 241 F. Supp. 2d 
at 11 (holding in a FOIA action that EPIC is a “representative of the news media” 
because it “gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses 
its editorial skills to turn the raw material into a distinct work, and distributes that 
work to an audience” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
137 ACLU, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 29. 
138 Id. at 32. 
139 Id. at 32–33. 
140 Id. at 31, 38. Judge Huvelle again sustained the administration’s national 
security claim to withhold aggregate statistics under Exemption 1, however, 
notwithstanding the Attorney General’s selective declassification. Given the “binding 
precedent” in CNSS, and its acceptance of the “mosaic theory,” Judge Huvelle 
deferred to claims that such statistics “could signal to targets of investigations that it is 
comparatively safe to conduct certain operations . . . . This Circuit’s law constrains the 
Court to conclude that the government’s explanation is sufficiently detailed and 
persuasive . . . .” Id. at 35–38. 
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filed with the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, pursuant to the 
FISA requirements, could reveal uses of section 215, but maintained that 
those uses “fall outside of the time period encompassed by plaintiffs’ 
factual allegations.”141 
Judge Huvelle’s ACLU v. DOJ order resulted in a tender of 
documents to the ACLU/EPIC coalition on June 17, 2004 which 
revealed, among other things, that the FBI had in fact sought and 
obtained surveillance orders under section 215 less than a month after 
the Attorney General announced that the authority had never been used, 
and less than two weeks after administration lawyers had made similar 
representations in Michigan in Muslim Community Ass’n.142 Two days later, 
the ACLU submitted those documents to the trial judge in Muslim 
Community Ass’n, along with a letter objecting to the administration’s 
implicit misrepresentation in arguing that the case was “unripe” because 
section 215 rested unused.143 
Amidst this maneuvering, another aspect of the Patriot Act—its 
authorization of the broad use of warrantless NSLs—began to emerge 
into public contention. In January of 2004, “[i]ndustry sources” were 
quoted by a Las Vegas newspaper as revealing that the FBI had used NSLs 
to obtain records on 270,000 visitors to Las Vegas from casino operators 
and hotels in late 2003 and early 2004 during an “elevated” threat level.144 
According to these reports—which were not entirely accurate—what 
happened in Las Vegas now stayed in an FBI database.145 
 
141 Letter from Joseph W. LoBue, Senior Trial Counsel, Civil Division, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Hon. Denise Page Hood, U.S. Dist Judge, E.D. Mich. (May 19, 2004), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/section215/gov_hood_051904.pdf. 
142 Gail Appleson, FBI Asked for Secret USA Patriot Act Searches, HOUS. CHRON., June 
18, 2004, at A6 (“Last September, at a time when the section was drawing widespread 
criticism from librarians, booksellers and civil rights groups, U.S. Attorney General 
John Ashcroft said the power had never been used. Records obtained by the ACLU 
show that the FBI asked for permission to use the law a few weeks later.”). 
143 Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Letter of May 19, Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of 
Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. June 17, 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/section215/aclu_letter_hood_061704.pdf.  
 Subsequent disclosures of documents regarding section 215 occurred in July 
2004. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Freedom of Information Documents on the USA 
Patriot Act, http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/foia/ (reproducing 
documents); ACLU, PATRIOT FOIA, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/patriot/ 
17497res20040810.html (reproducing documents). The case before Judge Huvelle 
was ultimately settled in August 2004, with the tender of additional documents, 
including a copy of the procedural rules of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court. Id. 
144 Rod Smith, Sources: FBI Gathered Visitor Information Only in Las Vegas, 
LAS VEGAS REV. J., Jan. 7, 2004, at 1A (“Casino operators said they turned over the 
names and other guest information on an estimated 270,000 visitors after a meeting 
with FBI officials and after receiving [NSLs] requiring them to yield the 
information.”). 
145 FBI Chief Counsel Valerie Caproni has stated that NSLs did not actually call 
for most of the hotel records. Comments of Valerie Caproni, FBI Chief Counsel, 
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In early April 2004, the FBI served the president of a small Internet 
access and consulting business with a NSL which required him to turn 
over records on one of his clients and “‘further advised’ [him] that § 
2709(c) prohibited him, or his officers, agents, or employees, ‘from 
disclosing to any person that the FBI has sought or obtained access to 
information or records under these provisions,” ordering that he not 
“even mention the NSL in any telephone conversation.”146 
Notwithstanding the prohibition on disclosure, the internet service 
provider (ISP) president contacted the ACLU. ACLU attorneys filed suit, 
captioned Doe v. Ashcroft, under seal in the Southern District of New York 
challenging both the underlying NSL and the gag order.147 It was three 
weeks before the ACLU obtained an order allowing it to publicly disclose 
that the suit had been filed. Alongside the substantive disputes, the 
ACLU and the administration fought a running battle over the 
administration’s continued efforts to keep details of the NSLs and the 
litigation from public view.148 
 
Lewis & Clark Law School Symposium on “Crime and the War on Terror” (Apr. 20, 
2007), available at http://lawlib.lclark.edu/podcast/?p=203; E-mail from Valerie 
Caproni to Seth Kreimer (June 6, 2007) (on file with author). Ms. Caproni’s account 
is substantiated by OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF 
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS (Mar. 
2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf [hereinafter 
OIG NSL Report], which reports a total of 39,000 NSL requests for the year 2003. Id. 
at xvi. Since each account sought constitutes a separate “request,” the OIG report 
refutes the possibility that 270,000 hotel records were obtained in 2003. Id. at xvi. 
 Apparently the disclosure of 270,000 records resulted from grand jury subpoenas 
and “voluntary” cooperation. Ms.Caproni also stated that the Las Vegas material was 
kept in a separate computer database and purged once the investigation ended. E-
mail from Valerie Caproni, supra. 
146 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see Editorial, 
My National Security Letter Gag Order, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2007, at A17. 
147 334 F. Supp. 2d 471; see Motion For Leave to File Case Under Seal, Doe v. 
Ashcroft, 317 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04-2614), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/motion%20for%20leave%20in%20aclu%20v.%20as
hcroft.pdf. 
148 See Doe v. Ashcroft, 317 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting 
motion to partially unseal, describing administration request “that the ACLU remove 
the briefing schedule from its website,” establishing a “procedure by which those 
disputes can be resolved,” and putting “the burden on the Government to quickly 
justify each particular redaction under the exacting First Amendment standards 
applicable”); ACLU, Government Gag Exposed, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/ 
patriot/18491res20040819.html (disclosing unsealed documents). 
 The most ironic administration initiative was the effort to withhold from public 
view, as a danger to national security, a segment of an ACLU brief in the case quoting 
from United States v. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Keith), 407 U.S. 
297, 314 (1972). The segment reads: “The danger to political dissent is acute where 
the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect 
‘domestic security.’ Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security interest, the 
danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes apparent.” See Letter from 
Ann Beeson, ACLU, to Hon. Victor Marrero, U.S. Dist. Judge (May 14, 2004), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/nsl/gagorder/acluLetter_051404.pdf; see also Dan 
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On September 29, 2004, Judge Victor Marrero held the Patriot Act’s 
authorization of the promiscuous use of NSLs in national security 
investigations unconstitutional as applied.149 Quoting the Supreme 
Court’s recent Hamdi decision that “a state of war is not a blank check for 
the President when it comes to the rights of the nation’s citizens,”150 he 
held that the Patriot Act authority to issue NSLs lacked the “procedural 
protections necessary to vindicate constitutional rights,” since the statute 
both provided no mechanism for challenging the letters in court and 
affirmatively barred recipients from disclosing their existence even to 
attorneys.151 In rejecting the administration’s contention that the rules 
invoked by the FBI were merely hortatory, and therefore infringed on no 
cognizable legal rights, Judge Marrero made reference to the 
information that had emerged in the ACLU’s earlier Patriot Act FOIA 
request to support the conclusion that the commands of the NSLs 
functioned to effectively coerce recipients.152 
On First Amendment grounds, Judge Marrero invalidated the 
provision prohibiting disclosure by the recipients of the letters. He 
acknowledged that cases supported the proposition that “the 
Government should be accorded a due measure of deference when it 
asserts that secrecy is necessary for national security purposes in a 
particular situation involving particular persons at a particular time.”153 He 
rejected, however, the claim that those principles permitted a statute to 
“impose perpetual secrecy upon an entire category of future cases.”154 
 
Eggen, U.S. Uses Secret Evidence in Secrecy Fight with ACLU, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2004, at 
A17. 
149 Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 526–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
150 Id. at 477. Judge Marrero also set the stage by reiterating his own resolve “to 
exert particular vigilance to safeguard against excess committed in the name of 
expediency, to ensure that Americans do not succeed where the terrorists failed, 
inflicting by their own hand the deeper wrongs to the nation’s essence that the 
September 11 external attacks upon physical structures and innocent people were 
unable to realize.” Id. at 478 n.7 (citation omitted). 
151 Id. at 494, 506. 
152 Id. at 502 (“The ACLU obtained, via the Freedom of Information Act 
(‘FOIA’), and presented to the Court in this proceeding, a document listing all the 
NSLs the Government issued from October 2001 through January 2003. Although the 
entire substance of the document is redacted, it is apparent that hundreds of NSL 
requests were made during that period. . . . The evidence suggests that, until now, 
none of those NSLs was ever challenged in any court. First, the Department of Justice 
explicitly informed the House Judiciary Committee in May 2003 that there had been 
no challenges to the propriety or legality of any NSLs. Second, the Government’s 
evidence in this case conspicuously lacks any suggestion either that the Government 
has ever had to resort to a judicial enforcement proceeding for any NSL, or that any 
recipient has ever resisted an NSL request in such a proceeding or via any motion to 
quash.”). 
153 Id. at 524 (emphasis in original). 
154 Id. He quoted with approval the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion in Detroit Free Press: 
“The Government could use its ‘mosaic intelligence’ argument as a justification to . . . 
operate in virtual secrecy in all matters dealing, even remotely with ‘national 
security,’ resulting in a wholesale suspension of First Amendment rights.” Id. at 524 
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Political debate regarding the NSL process continued through the 
presidential election. After the election, another client approached the 
ACLU to challenge a gag order accompanying the issuance of an NSL to 
a library consortium. Filed on August 9, 2005 as Doe v. Gonzales to avoid 
violating the statutory gag order, the case identified the plaintiff as a 
“member of the American Library Association” who had been served with 
an NSL seeking “subscriber information, billing information and access 
logs.”155 Although Doe had refused to comply with the NSL, no 
enforcement proceeding had been brought. The anonymous librarian 
sought a preliminary injunction to allow him to participate in pending 
debate on the Patriot Act by publicly identifying himself as a recipient of 
an NSL.156 
Judge Janet Hall’s opinion in Doe v. Gonzales, issued September 9, 
2005, began its discussion of the government’s interest in using NSL gag 
orders by citing Hamdi and Judge Tatel’s dissent in CNSS.157 She 
concluded that the statutory gag language included in the NSL 
functioned as a prior restraint and was insufficiently justified to comply 
with First Amendment protections: “Nothing specific about this 
investigation has been put before the court that supports the conclusion 
that revealing Doe’s identity will harm it. The record supplied by the 
defendants suggests that the disclosure of Doe’s identity ‘may’ or ‘could’ 
harm investigations related to national security generally. . . . Just such a 
speculative record has been rejected in the past by the Supreme Court in 
the context of a claim of national security.”158 Judge Hall concluded by 
issuing the requested injunction allowing Doe to come out as a recipient 
of an NSL; she stayed the order temporarily to allow the administration 
to seek a further stay from the Second Circuit. On September 20, 2005, 
the Court of Appeals granted the Government’s motion to stay Judge 
Hall’s order, but the case swiftly became less anonymous when court 
 
n.256 (quoting Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F. 3d 681, 709 (6th Cir. 2002)). He 
also noted, 
In general, as our sunshine laws and judicial doctrine attest, democracy abhors 
undue secrecy, in recognition that public knowledge secures freedom. Hence, an 
unlimited government warrant to conceal, effectively a form of secrecy per se, has 
no place in our open society. Such a claim is especially inimical to democratic 
values for reasons borne out by painful experience. 
Id. at 519–20. 
155 Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D. Conn. 2005). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 76. 
158 Id. at 76–77 (citing Pentagon Papers Case, N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 
U.S. 713, 725–26 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)). Judge Hall continued, “Further, 
the information that is before the court suggests strongly that revealing Doe’s identity 
will not harm the investigation. SEALED MATERIAL CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.” Id. at 
77. “The court asked the defendants’ counsel at oral argument if he could confirm 
there was a ‘mosaic’ in this case: were there other bits of information which, when 
coupled with Doe’s identity, would hinder this investigation. Counsel did not do so.” 
Id. at 78. 
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personnel neglected to redact the name of the plaintiff from the 
caption.159 Notwithstanding this breach in the now notional security, on 
October 7, 2005, Justice Ginsburg declined to lift the stay.160 
As the sunset date of the Patriot Act approached, further disclosures 
emerged. On the basis of leaks from “government sources,” the 
Washington Post disclosed that, utilizing the Patriot Act’s lenient 
procedures, the FBI annually issued 30,000 NSLs, “a hundredfold 
increase over historic norms.”161 It also made public the “unannounced 
decisions” to reverse policy and retain all records on innocent individuals 
and companies once investigations are closed, while making government 
data banks available to “state, local, and tribal” governments and “private 
sector entities.”162 
In March 2005, EPIC had filed a FOIA request seeking further 
information from the Department of Justice regarding the use of the 
Patriot Act.163 The FBI officially granted a request for expedited 
processing,164 apparently recognizing that administration attorneys had 
argued ineffectually before Judge Huvelle that the earlier Patriot Act 
request was not a matter of public urgency.165 Still, the request languished 
in informal limbo, and EPIC filed an action to compel disclosures in 
April 2005 and a motion to compel the effectuation of the expedited 
processing on June 14, 2005 before Judge Gladys Kessler, who had earlier 
ordered the CNSS disclosures at the trial level. In late October, as a status 
 
159 “[T]he parties learned that, through inadvertence, Doe’s identity had been 
publicly available for several days on the District Court’s Web site and on PACER, the 
electronic docket system run by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
. . . The parties also learned that the media had correctly reported Doe’s identity on 
at least one occasion.” Doe v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2006) (citing Alison Leigh 
Cowan, Librarians Must Stay Silent in USA Patriot Act Suit, Court Says, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 
21, 2005, at B2). 
 The Cowan article states,  
“Though the plaintiffs’ organization has not been named in the various 
proceedings, a close reading of the court record suggests that it is Library 
Connection in Windsor, Conn. A search of a court-operated Web site offered a 
pointer to the plaintiffs’ identity. There, a case numbered 3:2005cv01256 is listed 
under the caption, ‘Library Connection Inc. v. Attorney General.’”  
Id. 
160 Doe, 127 S. Ct. at 5. 
161 Gellman, supra note 118. By “comparing unsealed portions of the file” in the 
case with “public records” and “information gleaned” from investigation, the article 
also identified George Christian as the “John Doe” librarian plaintiff in Doe v. 
Gonzales. Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Action No. 05-845 (GK), 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40318, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2005); see also Elec. Privacy Info. 
Ctr., Freedom of Information Documents on the USA PATRIOT Act, 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/foia/ (reproducing request and 
subsequent responses). 
164 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40318, at *1. 
165 See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 33 (D D.C. 2004). 
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conference before Judge Kessler loomed, the FBI released a small set of 
documents, among which were items indicating that the FBI had 
“investigated hundreds of potential violations related to its use of secret 
surveillance operations,” and had identified “at least a dozen violations of 
federal law or bureau policy from 2002 to 2004.”166 Judge Kessler found 
the government’s response to be inadequate, commenting that the 
administration had released an “incredibly small amount of pages,” and 
concluding that the administration’s efforts “have been unnecessarily 
slow and inefficient.”167 She set a mandatory schedule for the processing 
and release of documents,168 and another set of documents was released 
in December 2005, identifying further violations and triggering an 
investigation by the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of 
Justice.169 The December release immediately preceded the December 16, 
2005 decision in the Senate to block renewal of the Patriot Act.170 
 
166 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40318, at *4 n.2 (reporting that as 
of a status conference held November 8, 2005, 250 pages had been released); Dan 
Eggen, FBI Papers Indicate Intelligence Violations; Secret Surveillance Lacked Oversight, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2005, at A1 (reporting “hundreds of potential violations”); Eric 
Lichtblau, Tighter Oversight of F.B.I. Is Urged After Investigation Lapses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
25, 2005, at A16 (reporting “at least a dozen” violations based on documents received 
by EPIC, and noting that “the bureau said on Monday that internal reviews had 
identified 113 violations since last year that were referred to a federal intelligence 
board”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., supra note 163 (identifying documents disclosed in 
October). 
167 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40318, at *4. 
168 Id. at *5. 
169 Eric Lichtblau, At F.B.I., Frustration Over Limits on an Antiterror Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2005, at 48 (noting evidence in EPIC documents that the Justice 
Department’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review had been criticized internally 
for being too protective of civil liberties, and that there had thus been efforts to 
“bypass” that office); Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Report Cites Intelligence-Rule Violations 
by F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at A21 (“The inspector general’s review grew out of 
documents, dealing with intelligence violations, that were released last year under a 
Freedom of Information Act request by the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
. . . . The inspector general then obtained more documents on violations and 
included an 11-page analysis of the problem as part of a broader report Wednesday 
on counterterrorism measures.”); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1001 OF THE USA 
PATRIOT ACT 20–30 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/ 
s0603/final.pdf.  
 EPIC filed another request for reports submitted by the FBI Intelligence 
Oversight Board, which resulted in the release of more documents. EPIC, Litigation 
Docket, http://www.epic.org/privacy/litigation/ (discussing EPIC v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, No. 06-00029 (D.D.C. filed Jan 10, 2006)). The Inspector General apparently 
obtained an un-redacted set of the reports, which were used in its analysis. OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra. 
170 Claims of causation are muddied by the contemporaneous publication of the 
existence of illegal NSA surveillance programs by the New York Times, see James 
Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2005, at A1, as well as by disclosures that the Defense Department had engaged in 
aggressive surveillance of domestic dissenters, see Walter Pincus, Defense Facilities Pass 
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In March 2006, after nearly expiring, the sunsetted Patriot Act 
provisions were finally renewed until December 31, 2009.171 But Congress 
imposed modifications. Among other things, the revised authority for 
NSLs explicitly allows recipients of letters to contact attorneys and to 
challenge the letters in court, and sets limitations on their scope and the 
procedure by which gag orders are issued.172 In May 2005, the 
administration conceded in Doe v. Gonzales, the semi-secret Library 
Connection case, that the librarian could reveal his identity and the 
Second Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot.173 The administration then 
withdrew the NSL.174 
The still-anonymous ISP owner in the case before Judge Marrero 
remained under gag order. The changed legal landscape persuaded the 
Second Circuit to vacate Judge Marrero’s order enjoining the 
enforcement of the NSL against the ISP, and remand the case so that the 
trial court “can address the First Amendment issues presented by the 
revised version.”175 On remand, Judge Marerro invalidated the gag order 
under the revised statute, but stayed his decision pending appeal.176 
In September 2006, the long-gestating opinion in Muslim Community 
Ass’n of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft was issued, denying the administration’s 
motion to dismiss on ripeness and standing grounds.177 The ACLU, 
 
Along Reports of Suspicious Activity; ‘Raw Information’ From Military, Civilians Is Given to 
Pentagon, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2005, at A12; Lisa Myers et al., Is the Pentagon Spying on 
Americans?, MSNBC.COM, Dec. 14, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10454316. 
171 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109–177, § 102, 120 Stat. 192, 195 (2006). 
172 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109–177, § 115, 120 Stat. at 211–13 (allowing judicial review); § 116, 120 Stat. at 213–
17 (restricting the scope of nondisclosure orders). 
173 Doe I v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 420–21 (2d Cir. 2006). The court refused the 
administration’s request for a vacatur without substantial comment. Judge 
Cardamone’s concurrence was more emphatic: 
To me, the government’s request for vacatur in the Connecticut case is not 
surprising, but right in line with the pervasive climate of secrecy. It sought to 
prevent, through § 2709(c), the Doe plaintiffs from ever revealing that they were 
subjects of an NSL, effectively keeping that fact secret forever. Then, by 
requesting vacatur of the decision below, the government attempts to purge 
from the public record the fact that it had tried and failed to silence the 
Connecticut plaintiffs. 
Id. at 423.  
174 Press Release, ACLU, Government Drops Demand for Library Records (June 
26, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nationalsecurityletters/ 
25997prs20060626.html; see also Press Release, ACLU, Supreme Court Unseals 
Documents in USA Patriot Act Case (Aug. 3, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
safefree/nationalsecurityletters/26379prs20060803.html. 
175 Doe I, 449 F.3d at 419. 
176 Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see Editorial, My 
National Security Letter Gag Order, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2007, at A17. 
177 459 F. Supp. 2d 592, 601-02 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
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protecting its own victory from reversal, dismissed the action a month 
later.178 
The Patriot Act renewal imposed new obligations of transparency. In 
addition to requiring reports to congressional committees on the use of 
NSLs, section 215, and data mining activities,179 the Reauthorization Act 
mandated that the Department of Justice’s Inspector General conduct a 
series of audits of “the effectiveness and use, including any improper or 
illegal use,” of NSLs and section 215 orders issued and obtained by the 
Department.180 
The first iteration of audits was published in March 2007.181 The 
audit of section 215 usage revealed precisely the information that the 
administration had argued between 2002 and 2004 would endanger 
national security, by providing “‘critical information’ about whether 
taking evasive actions . . . would provide a safe harbor from FBI 
counterintelligence and counter-terrorism efforts.”182 As it turns out, 
section 215 authority has as yet become neither a broad threat to privacy 
nor a menace to terrorists. The authority generated no FISA orders 
 
178 ACLU Withdraws Lawsuit Challenging Patriot Act, WASH. POST., Oct. 29, 2006, at 
A10 (“The ACLU said Friday it is withdrawing the lawsuit because of ‘improvements 
to the law.’”). 
179 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109–177, § 106(h), 120 Stat. 192, 199–200 (2006) (enacting reporting requirements 
for section 215 orders); § 108, 120 Stat. at 203–04 (enacting reporting requirements 
for “multipoint electronic surveillance”); § 109, 120 Stat. at 204–05 (enacting 
reporting requirements for pen registers and physical searches); § 118, 120 Stat. at 
217–18 (requiring that reports on NSLs be submitted to the Committee on the 
Judiciary, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary, 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the Senate); § 126, 120 Stat. at 227–28 (requiring reports on data 
mining activities). 
180  USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109–177, § 106A, 120 Stat. at 200–02 (requiring audits of the use of section 215); § 
119, 120 Stat. at 219–21 (requiring audits of the use of NSLs). In addition to the fact 
that the Inspector General has proven willing to exercise independent judgment in 
other areas of the “War on Terror,” congressional experience with unadorned 
reporting obligations has been decidedly mixed. See Gellman, supra note 118 
(recounting the 2004 requirement of report on the “scope of” NSLs, and reporting 
that the “process and standards for approving them” had gone “[m]ore than a year 
. . . without a Justice Department reply” (quotation marks omitted)). 
181 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS (Mar. 
2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703a/final.pdf [hereinafter 
OIG 215 Report]. 
182 ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 28 (D.D.C. 2003). The 
report did redact some information regarding whether the targets of investigation 
were U.S. persons, and the details of the deployments. See generally OIG 215 Report, 
supra note 181, at 19–22. 
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during either 2002 or 2003, seven orders during 2004, and fourteen 
during 2005.183 
The FISA court never denied a section 215 order. But the OIG audit 
identified thirty-one instances in which the FBI began the process of 
seeking a section 215 order, and then abandoned the effort. These cases 
highlight the impact of review from the chain of attorneys running from 
the FBI General Counsel’s National Security Law Branch (NSLB), which 
was required to approve applications, through the Office of Intelligence 
Policy Review (OIPR), which then approved and submitted applications 
to the FISA court.184 Many details regarding these “withdrawn” 
applications were redacted, but apparently applications for FISA warrants 
for library records were withdrawn on more than one occasion.185 In one 
of these cases, an NSLB supervisor blocked the effort to seek a section 
215 order for library records “because of the political controversy 
surrounding section 215 requests from libraries.”186 However, as the 
report tantalizingly put the outcome, “Once the field office was advised 
that NSLB would not send the application to OIPR, the field office 
sought [REDACTED] and eventually obtained [REDACTED].”187 
The report on NSLs was more sobering. As it turns out, the figure of 
30,000 annual NSLs which had leaked in 2005188 represented less than 
half of the actual usage. According to the 2007 OIG audit, the actual 
number of NSL requests in 2004 was closer to 65,000.189 Reporting of the 
 
183 OIG 215 Report, supra note 181, at 19 tbl.3.1; see also id. at xxii (“We found no 
instance where the information obtained from a section 215 order resulted in a major 
case development such as the disruption of a terrorist plot.”); id. at 74 & n.90 
(reporting that some field agents viewed section 215 as a “tool of last resort,” while an 
OIPR attorney believed “nothing would be lost” if the authority were repealed). 
During 2005, in addition, the FISA court issued 141 orders under section 215 which 
were used to obtain subscriber information associated with numbers identified by 
trap and trace orders directed to telecommunications companies. Id. at vi, vi n.9, 35 
(identifying “combination” orders seeking associated information, and noting that 
the Reauthorization Act rendered such orders unnecessary by allowing trap and trace 
orders to access the data). 
184 Id. at 23. 
185 Id. at 24 (“FBI field offices sought but did not obtain section 215 orders for 
library records on [REDACTED] occasions”). The report also identified situations in 
which OIPR refused to seek university records because it viewed them as being 
protected from disclosure by the Buckley Amendment. Id. at 29–33. 
186 Id. at 28. 
187 Id. at 28. 
188 Gellman, supra note 118, at A1. 
189 OIG NSL Report, supra note 145, at xix chart 4.1. The report revealed that 
official records for 2004 reported 56,507 NSL requests and 47,221 in 2005. Id. 
Moreover, an audit of FBI case files indicated that 17% more NSLs were issued than 
were reported. Id. at xvi. In addition, the OIG report estimated that roughly 6% of 
the properly docketed requests were actually not incorporated into the figures 
reported to Congress because of delays and incorrect data entries. Id. at xvii. Taken 
together, this information suggests that over 65,000 NSLs (17% more than 56,507) 
were actually issued in 2004. The audit was hampered because “an unknown amount 
of data . . . was lost from the OGC data base when it malfunctioned.” Id.; cf. Padilla 
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letters was slipshod, and supervision was haphazard.190 Previous classified 
reports required by Congress had substantially understated the number 
of NSLs issued because of delays and mistakes, and public reports had 
understated numbers because of creative use of definitions.191 A random 
audit of seventy-seven investigative files revealed twenty-two possible 
violations of law and policy regarding NSLs.192 The audit also delicately 
presented the “Noteworthy Fact” that “no clear guidance was given to FBI 
agents on how to reconcile the limitations expressed in the Attorney 
General Guidelines, which reflect concerns about the impact on privacy 
of FBI collection techniques, with the expansive authorities in the NSL 
statutes.”193 
 
Evidence Missing, Feds Say, CBSNEWS.COM, Mar. 9, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2007/03/09/terror/main2554265.shtml. 
190 See OIG NSL Report, supra note 145, at xiv–xv (noting that there was “no 
policy or directive requiring retention of signed copies of national security letters”). 
191 Id. at xvii (reporting that 4,600 NSL requests were not reported to Congress 
because of delays in reporting, and that the March 2006 FBI reported to Congress 
that data in reports “may not have been accurate”); id. at xix (“The number of NSL 
requests we identified significantly exceeds the number reported in Department’s 
first public annual report . . . .”); id. (reporting that the OIG identified 47,221 
requests in 2005, whereas the FBI had identified only 9,254 requests). 
192 Id. at xxxi. Twenty-two violations were identified in a review of 293 NSLs. Id. 
Especially troubling was the misuse of “exigent letters,” which misrepresented the 
circumstances of their issuance. Id. at xxxiv. Projecting this out to the 44,000 NSLs 
issued during 2003 to 2005, see id. at xx chart l.1, this suggests at least 4,000 
violations. And these are only the violations that are revealed by a file review. This is 
to be contrasted with a total of twenty-six instances during the period 2003 to 2005 in 
which the FBI voluntarily reported possible violations to the Intelligence Oversight 
Board (IOB). Id. at xxix. Of course, the IOB’s only authority is to report violations to 
the President, who has not in the past proven overly fastidious about violations of law 
in the pursuit of terrorists. 
 It appears that some of these issues had been raised internally and suppressed. 
Edmund L. Andrews, Official Alerted F.B.I. to Rules Abuse 2 Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
19, 2007, at A10; R. Jeffrey Smith & John Solomon, Amid Concerns, FBI Lapses Went On, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2007, at A1 (“Bassem Youssef, who currently heads the CAU, 
raised concerns about the tardy legal justifications shortly after he was assigned to the 
job in early 2005.”) 
193 OIG NSL REPORT, supra note 145, at xli–xlii. The report noted as well that 
there is no requirement to purge databases when an investigation proves a target’s 
innocence. “[O]nce information is obtained in response to a [NSL], it is indefinitely 
retained and retrievable by the many authorized personnel who have access to various 
FBI databases.” Id. 
 Leaks in January of 2007 also revealed that the Defense Department and CIA 
investigators generated their own stock of information through judicially 
unsupervised and congressionally unauthorized NSLs. Eric Lichtblau & Mark 
Mazzetti, Military Expands Intelligence Role in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at A1 (“[I]t 
was not previously known, even to some senior counterterrorism officials, that the 
Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency have been using their own 
‘noncompulsory’ versions of the letters. Congress has rejected several attempts by the 
two agencies since 2001 for authority to issue mandatory letters, in part because of 
concerns about the dangers of expanding their role in domestic spying.”) 
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The report provided one muted note of consolation for civil 
libertarians. Given the fact that each account accessed was treated as a 
separate “request,” the order of magnitude of the NSL “requests” 
reported gives some assurance that NSLs are not being used to generate 
material for massive data mining programs. Since an effective data 
mining effort would review hundreds of thousands or millions of records, 
the fact that the FBI reviews less than 70,000 accounts per year confirms 
that the NSLs have not been put to such uses. The new bottom-line 
reporting regulations provide an ongoing check on a temptation to use 
NSLs for data mining.194 
The Inspector General’s report has in turn precipitated another 
round of FOIA requests regarding NSLs, as well as further oversight 
hearings from the now-opposition controlled Congress.195 The FBI in 
turn has instituted an internal investigation and has issued new 
guidelines designed to discipline the use of NSLs.196 
C. Transparency and Torture: Democracy and the Problem of “Unknown 
Unknowns” 
The “dark side” of the “War on Terror” was nowhere more 
prominent than in the use of brutally coercive methods against suspected 
opponents by an administration that kept its methods secret and publicly 
disavowed “torture.” This divergence between word and deed may have 
arisen out of the involuntary homage of vice to virtue. It owed its source 
in part to the not-unprecedented belief that sufficient secrecy could 
impart legal impunity.197 And it rested in part on the political calculation 
 
194 I thank Valerie Caproni for this insight, but note that recent FOIA disclosures 
reveal that FBI NSLs have in the past demanded revelation of the “community of 
interest” of particular callers, which substantially broadens their scope. See Eric 
Lichtblau, F.B.I. Data Mining Reached Beyond Initial Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/washington/09fbi.html 
(describing NSLs calling for “which people the targets called most frequently, how 
long they generally talked and at what times of day,” regarding “people and phone 
numbers ‘once removed’ from the actual target of the national security letters”). This 
tactic has apparently been suspended. See id. 
195 Ellen Nakashima, FBI Gets Six Years for FOIA Request, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 
2007, at A13 (describing FOIA request for NSL information, and earlier request 
regarding Investigative Data Warehouse); Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, 
No. 07-0656 (JDB) (D.D.C. June 15, 2007), available at http://www.eff.org/flag/nsl/ 
bates_order.pdf (setting a deadline for response to NSL FOIA request, and ordering 
FBI to process 2,500 pages of documents every thirty days.). 
196 Lara Jakes Jordan, FBI Drafts Rules to Curb Privacy Abuse, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, June 14, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/14/AR2007061400767.html. 
197 Letter from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to President George W. Bush (Feb. 1, 
2002), reprinted in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE 
WAR ON TERROR 92 (2004) (arguing that the presidential determination would allow 
the use of forward leaning methods of interrogation, while minimizing the “legal risks 
of liability, litigation, and criminal prosecution”); Eric Schmitt & Carolyn Marshall, In 
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that a manifest policy of kidnapping and torture would impugn the 
administration’s legitimacy in the eyes of the nation and the world and 
endanger its domestic political success.198 
Whatever its basis, the secrecy gradually unraveled, and it is 
instructive to review the role sub-constitutional frameworks of 
transparency played in that process. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, no 
mean analyst of political reality (whatever his other characteristics), 
observed in February 2002: 
[A]s we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know 
we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we 
know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And 
if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free 
countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult 
ones.199 
 
Secret Unit’s ‘Black Room,’ A Grim Portrait of U.S. Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, at A1 
(“Placards posted by soldiers at the detention area advised, ‘NO BLOOD, NO FOUL.’ 
The slogan, as one Defense Department official explained, reflected an adage 
adopted by Task Force 6-26: ‘If you don’t make them bleed, they can’t prosecute for 
it.’ . . . [P]risoners at Camp Nama often disappeared into a detention black hole, 
barred from access to lawyers or relatives. . . . ‘The reality is, there were no rules 
there,’ another Pentagon official said”); see Seymour M. Hersh, The Redirection, NEW 
YORKER, Mar. 5, 2007, at 54, 65 (“Iran-Contra was the subject of an informal ‘lessons 
learned’ discussion two years ago among veterans of the scandal. Abrams led the 
discussion. One conclusion was that even though the program was eventually 
exposed, it had been possible to execute it without telling Congress,” suggesting that 
tighter security would assure immunity from interference.). 
 For an earlier version of this gambit, see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 688–
89 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting a U.S. 
Army document stating that “Any claim against the US Government for alleged injury 
due to EA 1729 [LSD] must be legally shown to have been due to the material. 
Proper security and appropriate operational techniques can protect the fact of 
employment of EA 1729.”). 
198 The Working Group on Detainee Interrogation observed with understated 
foresight, “Should information regarding the use of more aggressive interrogation 
techniques than have been used traditionally by U.S. forces become public, it . . . may 
produce an adverse effect on support for the war on terrorism.” DEP’T OF DEF., 
WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON 
TERRORISM (Apr. 4, 2003), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 
286, 346 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter WORKING 
GROUP REPORT]. 
 Similarly, Adm. Mora argued that inevitable leaks would generate “severe” 
political fallout that could endanger political support for military initiatives. 
Memorandum from Alberto J. Mora to Inspector General, Dep’t of the Navy 6, 9–10 
(2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/mora_memo_july_2004.pdf 
[hereinafter Mora Memo]. 
199 DefenseLink News Transcript: DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and 
Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ 
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636 (deflecting a question challenging the assumption 
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction). 
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The next three years witnessed a gradual migration of the 
administration’s policies of abuse from the third category toward the 
first. 
1. The Policy that Dares not Speak its Name 
Before the “Global War on Terror,” policies of kidnapping potential 
opponents, then secreting them in “black sites” while subjecting them to 
incommunicado detention, psychic pressure, coercive interrogation, and 
physical abuse seemed to belong only to the official arsenals of America’s 
enemies and less savory allies. America condemned the Third Reich for 
its “special interrogation” tactics and concentration camps, the Soviet 
Union for its brainwashing and gulags, and the People’s Republic of 
China for its re-education camps. It viewed the “disappearances” of 
Argentina’s “dirty war” as an embarrassment, and by the mid-1980s 
American courts had come to view the torturer, like the pirate and slave 
trader, as an enemy of humanity.200 
September 11 was said to change many things. But officially, 
American repugnance for torture and regard for the rule of law were not 
among them. When the invasion of Afghanistan yielded prisoners, 
military spokesmen announced that while “[t]hese are potentially very 
dangerous people . . . [w]hen we get prisoners, we don’t torture them 
. . . . We keep them warm, we keep them fed, we keep the rain off their 
heads.”201 When John Walker Lindh was indicted, Attorney General 
Ashcroft declaimed: “The United States is a country of laws, and not of 
men. . . . At each step in this process, Walker Lindh’s rights, including his 
rights not to be—not to incriminate himself and to be represented by 
counsel, have been carefully, scrupulously honored.”202 Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld was said to be “visibly perturbed” by allegations of 
 
200 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[F]or purposes of 
civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”); see also Torture Victim Protection 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Apr. 18, 1988, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (ratifying the Convention). 
 I discuss the link between the rejection of torture and America’s constitutional 
identity in Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and Screw: Constitutional Constraints on 
Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 311–16 (2003); see also Jeremy 
Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1681, 1739–48 (2005) (outlining deep links between the prohibition of torture and 
the rule of law). To be sure, official practice often diverged from official policy; from 
CIA medical experiments and interrogation manuals to connivance in brutal 
repression and death squads. But official military doctrine did not permit abuse of 
prisoners, and official policy maintained allegiance to human rights norms. 
201 John Hendren, U.S. Shifts Its Focus in Afghanistan to Prisoners, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
30, 2001, at A1. 
202 Attorney General John Ashcroft, News Conference—Indictment of John 
Walker Lindh (Feb. 5, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
archive/ag/speeches/2002/020502transcriptindictmentofjohnwalkerlindh.htm. 
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detainee mistreatment and responded emphatically to uphold American 
honor: 
“Let there be no doubt . . . [t]he treatment of the detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay is proper, it’s humane, it’s appropriate and it is 
fully consistent with international conventions. . . . No detainee has 
been mistreated in any way. And the numerous articles, statements, 
questions, allegations and breathless reports on television are 
undoubtedly by people who are either uninformed, misinformed or 
poorly informed.”203 
In early 2002, President Bush was publicly confronted with a choice 
between pressure from the State Department to treat captured prisoners 
in accord with the Geneva Conventions and adherence to a 
memorandum from Alberto Gonzales—rapidly leaked to the public—
arguing that a “new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations 
on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its 
provisions.”204 Bush’s official response was to partially reverse his earlier 
decision to ignore the Geneva Convention. He announced that he had 
“determined that the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban 
detainees, but not to the al-Qaida detainees” while maintaining that  
[t]he United States is treating and will continue to treat all of the 
individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely and, to the extent 
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner 
consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of 
1949. . . . The detainees will not be subjected to physical or mental 
abuse or cruel treatment.205  
As the ranks of detainees swelled, and complaints of abusive conditions 
and interrogations were voiced, the administration continued to disavow 
“torture,” to tout its adherence to the Convention Against Torture “as 
 
203 Richard A. Serrano & John Hendren, Rumsfeld Strongly Denies Mistreatment of 
Prisoners, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at A1. 
204 Rowan Scarborough, Powell Wants Detainees To Be Declared POWs, WASH. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2002, at 1. 
205 The White House, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov./news/releases/2002/02/print/ 
20020207-13.html. Consistent with the disingenuous legalism that has characterized 
this administration, the announcement guaranteeing “humane” treatment applied 
only to detainees at Guantanamo, leaving open the possibility of treating al-Qaeda 
detainees elsewhere inhumanely since Bush had “determined” that the Geneva 
Convention did not cover them. See SEYMOUR HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND 5 (2004) 
(reporting that a “secret statement of the President’s views, which he signed on 
February 7, 2002, had a loophole that applied worldwide. ‘I . . . determine that none 
of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan or 
elsewhere throughout the world.’”); accord Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106 (citing as an example of “painstakingly constructed . . . 
loopholes” the February 2002 directive regarding humane treatment: “A close 
reading of the directive, however, revealed that it referred only to military 
interrogators—not to C.I.A. officials.”) 
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ratified,” and to maintain that detainees were being treated 
“humanely.”206 
As would later become clear, this public posture coexisted with a 
quite different “off the books” reality. Beginning in September 2001, 
President Bush authorized the CIA to engage in kidnapping and secret 
coercive interrogations in the pursuit of “terrorists.”207 This authority did 
not lie fallow; suspects were “rendered” to countries where they could be 
tortured, and the CIA began to establish a network of “black sites” where 
“no holds barred” interrogation could proceed without interference.208 
 
206 Letter from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., to Sen. Patrick 
J. Leahy (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/ 
letter-to-leahy.pdf (“United States policy is to treat all detainees and conduct all 
interrogations, wherever they may occur, in a manner consistent with” U.S. 
obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment “as ratified.”); see also Press Release, The White House, 
Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims 
of Torture (June 26, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2003/06/20030626-3.html (“Torture anywhere is an affront to human dignity 
everywhere”); HERSH, supra note 205, at 19 (describing an “angry” lecture by Haynes 
asserting that “[w]e don’t torture”). 
 As has been extensively discussed, these assurances were rife with disingenuous 
language. “Torture” was defined extraordinarily narrowly and the obligations of the 
Convention “as ratified” were read to allow physical assaults short of “torture.” For my 
own prior analysis, see Seth F. Kreimer, “Torture Lite,” “Full Bodied” Torture, and the 
Insulation of Legal Conscience, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 187, 189–201 (2005). 
207 Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 
2005, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html (reporting that intelligence officials 
“believe that the CIA general counsel’s office acted within the parameters of” the 
September 17, 2001, presidential finding authorizing covert action against al-Qaeda 
in approving the black-site program, since the “black-site program was approved by a 
small circle of White House and Justice Department lawyers and officials, according 
to several former and current U.S. government and intelligence officials”); Mayer, 
supra note 205 (“[S]ince September 11th the C.I.A. ‘has seemed to think it’s 
operating under different rules, that it has extralegal abilities outside the U.S.’ 
Agents, [a former FBI agent] said, have ‘told me that they have their own enormous 
office of general counsel that rarely tells them no. Whatever they do is all right. It all 
takes place overseas.’”); John Barry, Michael Hirsh & Michael Isikoff, The Roots of 
Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, available at http://www.why-war.com/news/ 
2004/05/24/theroots.html (“One Justice Department memo, written for the CIA late 
in the fall of 2001, put an extremely narrow interpretation on the international anti-
torture convention, allowing the agency to use a whole range of techniques—
including sleep deprivation, the use of phobias and the deployment of ‘stress 
factors’—in interrogating Qaeda suspects. . . . According to knowledgeable sources, 
the president’s directive authorized the CIA to set up a series of secret detention 
facilities outside the United States, and to question those held in them with 
unprecedented harshness. Washington then negotiated novel ‘status of forces 
agreements’ with foreign governments for the secret sites. These agreements gave 
immunity not merely to U.S. government personnel but also to private contractors.”). 
208 HERSH, supra note 205, at 53 (describing December 18, 2001 kidnapping of 
Ahmed Agiza, Muhammed al-Zery, two Egyptians who had sought asylum in Sweden); 
see Craig Whitlock, A Secret Deportation of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, July 25, 2004, at 
A1 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A11976-
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Secret authority for military coercion followed. In December 2001, 
the confidential official guidance to interrogators of John Walker Lindh 
was that “the secretary of Defense’s counsel has authorized him to ‘take 
the gloves off.’”209 Lindh was “fed sparingly and given only minimal 
medical attention,” “blindfolded and bound with plastic cuffs so tight 
they cut off the circulation to his hands,” and “threatened . . . with death 
and torture.” His “clothes were cut off him, his hands and feet were again 
shackled, and he was bound tightly with duct tape to a stretcher. Still 
blindfolded and completely naked, he was then placed in a metal 
shipping container,” and he was then questioned.210 When, as part of his 
defense in a criminal prosecution, Lindh’s lawyers threatened to make a 
public record of the abuse to which he had been subjected, the 
administration entered into a lenient plea agreement rather than risk 
that exposure.211 In the same time period, the President authorized the 
Defense Department to establish a top secret “special-access program” 
authorized to assassinate, kidnap, and harshly interrogate “high-value” al 
Qaeda suspects in “secret interrogation centers.”212 
 
2004Jul24.html; Larisa Alexandrovna & David Dastych, Soviet-Era Compound in 
Northern Poland Was Site of Secret CIA Interrogation, Detentions, RAW STORY, Mar. 7, 2007, 
http://www.rawstory.com/ 
news/2007/Sovietera_compound_in_Poland_was_site_0307.html (“Only the Polish 
prime minister and top Polish intelligence brass were told of the plan, in which 
agents of the United States quietly shuttled detainees from other holding facilities 
around the globe for stopovers and short-term interrogation in Poland between late 
2002 and 2004.”); id. (describing use of these sites for “no holds barred” 
interrogations). 
209 Richard Serrano, Prison Interrogators’ Gloves Came Off Before Abu Ghraib, L.A. 
TIMES, June 9, 2004, at A1 (“Lindh was being questioned while he was propped up 
naked and tied to a stretcher in interrogation sessions that went on for days, 
according to court papers. In the early stages, his responses were cabled to 
Washington hourly, the new documents show.”) 
210 Richard A. Serrano, Lindh Defense Team Offers Abuse List, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
2002, at A1. 
211 See Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad, NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50 available  
at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/03/10/030310fa_fact2?currentPage=1 
(“‘The Defense Department was really worried about the claims of mistreatment,’ 
George Harris [one of Lindh’s lawyers] said. ‘They said the deal had to be struck 
before the suppression hearing, so the details wouldn’t get out. They really wanted us 
to agree to drop any claims of intentional mistreatment. That was key to Rumsfeld.’”); 
Andrew Cohen, Lindh Layers are Peeling Away, CBSNEWS.COM, Mar. 11, 2003, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/11/news/opinion/courtwatch/main5434
97.shtml (“It was clear, although the government never explicitly conceded so, that 
prosecutors were open to a deal with Lindh because of the brutal way in which he was 
treated by his military captors in Afghanistan and the spurious way in which federal 
law enforcement officials had observed Lindh’s constitutional rights. It is no 
coincidence that the Lindh deal came about on the eve of a scheduled week-long 
hearing that was going to bring into the open the specifics of how he was treated and 
by whom.”). 
212 HERSH, supra note 205, at 16. 
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As interrogations in Guantanamo and other sites continued between 
August 2002 and March 2003, and preparations for the war in Iraq 
proceeded, administration lawyers and policy makers generated further 
secret legal and policy memoranda legitimizing a variety of “Counter-
Resistance Techniques” that contemplated psychic and physical assaults 
on prisoners in the search for intelligence.213 Details that have emerged 
from this period again establish that these authorities were not mere 
thought experiments.214 
In late 2002, FBI agents at Guantanamo registered complaints 
regarding the legality of interrogation practices.215 Internal military 
reports of these abuses provoked struggles in late 2002 and early 2003 by 
principled members of the military to turn policy and practice away from 
barbarism—efforts that proved only partially and temporarily 
successful.216 Approval for a memorandum authorizing severe physical 
 
213 Again, these memoranda have been widely discussed. My own account can be 
found in Kreimer, supra note 206, at 190–94. For one salient example of manipulative 
use of language, consider Memorandum from James T. Hill, Gen., U.S. Army, to 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Counter-Resistance Techniques (Oct. 25, 
2002), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 197, at 167, 179 (expressing the belief that the 
following techniques are “legal and humane”: “use of stress positions . . . for a 
maximum of four hours”; denial of “non-emergent” medical care; “[d]eprivation of 
high and auditory stimuli”; hooding; removal of clothing; “[f]orced grooming 
(shaving of facial hair etc.)”; and using “fear of dogs . . . to induce stress”). 
214 See, e.g., HERSH, supra note 205, at 2 (describing CIA analyst who examined 
interrogations at Guantanamo in mid-2002 and “came back convinced that we were 
committing war crimes”); id. at 6 (reporting FBI complaints of “slapping, . . . 
stripping, . . . pouring cold water, . . . making [prisoners] stand until they got 
hypothermia”); Jane Mayer, The Memo, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32 (Official logs 
described a detainee being “subjected to a hundred and sixty days of isolation in a 
pen perpetually flooded with artificial light, . . . interrogated on forty-eight of fifty-
four days, for eighteen to twenty hours at a stretch” and being “stripped naked; 
straddled by taunting female guards . . . forced to wear women’s underwear on his 
head, and to put on a bra; threatened by dogs; placed on a leash; and told that his 
mother was a whore. By December [2002], Qahtani had been subjected to a phony 
kidnapping, deprived of heat, given large quantities of intravenous liquids without 
access to a toilet, and deprived of sleep for three days.”) 
215 152 CONG. REC. S9998–99 (2006) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin on the 
nomination of Kenneth Wainstein to be Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security), available at http://www.senate.gov/~levin/newsroom/ 
release.cfm?id=263599 (describing statement by former FBI Deputy General Counsel 
Marion Bowman that in late 2002, he “recommended [to FBI General Counsel 
Wainstein] that we notify DoD’s general counsel that there were concerns about the 
treatment of detainees at Guantanamo.”). 
216 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 214 (providing an account of efforts beginning in 
December 2002 by Admiral Alberto Mora, General Counsel of the Navy, triggered by 
whistleblowing investigators and psychologists to change policy and stem “escalating 
levels of physical and psychological abuse” in Guantanamo interrogations); Mora 
Memo, supra note 198; HERSH, supra note 205, at 2–10 (describing efforts of General 
John A. Gordon, Deputy National Security Advisor, in fall 2002 to seek high-level 
review of Guantanamo policies, which were met with a “full-court stall” by the 
Pentagon). 
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abuse was revoked, the abuse at Guantanamo was suspended, and a 
“working group” was convened to examine the problem. In the course of 
the deliberations, high-level JAG officers tabled strenuous objections to 
the prospect of legitimizing abuse.217 The working group, however, 
ultimately disseminated an opinion authorizing prisoner abuse, but 
concealed its contents from potential opponents within the 
government.218 
2. Seeping Transparency: “Information Wants to Be Free” 
 a. Leaks and Hints 
Official denials notwithstanding, the policy of abuse was not entirely 
hidden from view. In deliberating internally, the administration 
apparently adopted an analysis that placed almost unlimited weight on 
avoiding dangers that could arise from the possible direct actions of 
opponents and discounted the possible doubts or adverse collateral 
effects of its own actions.219 In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 
 
[B]y the fall of 2002, some senior Justice Department officials were uneasy with 
the Pentagon’s handling of the detainees . . . .  
 
“[Counsel to the Vice-President David] Addington’s position was, ‘We think what 
we’re doing is right—why should we stop doing it?’ a former White House 
official said. ‘If the courts tell us we’re wrong, we’ll stop then.” . . .  
 
At Ms. Rice’s urging, Mr. Rumsfeld also agreed to give comprehensive briefings 
on Guantanamo to cabinet-level national-security officials and their deputies. 
Officials said the higher-level presentation was delivered on Jan. 16, 2003. . . . ‘It 
was basically a sales job . . . .’ 
Tim Golden, Tough Justice; Administration Officials Split Over Stalled Military Tribunals, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at A1. The Mora Memo maintains that reports of abusive 
interrogation practices at Guantanamo ceased on January 15, 2003. Mora Memo, 
supra note 198, at 21. It does not purport to opine on actions elsewhere, and in 
December of 2003, FBI agents were complaining of “torture” tactics at Guantanamo. 
See E-mail from unknown author to Gary Bald (Dec. 5, 2003) (regarding 
Impersonating FBI at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI.121504.3977.pdf; cf. Detainee 
Interviews (Abusive Interrogation Issues) (May 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_4194.pdf (reporting that the FBI 
objected to interrogation tactics in 2002 and 2003). 
217 Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., Unclassified Memoranda, collected at 
Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf. 
218 WORKING GROUP REPORT supra note 198; see Mayer, The Memo, supra note 214; 
Mora Memo, supra note 198; Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/09/silver-linings-or-strange-but-true.html (Sept. 
21, 2005) (describing back-channel promulgation of policy and marginalization of 
JAG officers). 
219 RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE 62 (2006) (describing “the Cheney 
Doctrine”: “Even if there’s just a one percent chance of the unimaginable coming 
due, act as if it is a certainty. It’s not about ‘our analysis,’ as Cheney said. It’s about 
‘our response.’”); id. at 166 (“Essentially the ‘war on terror’ was being guided by little 
more than ‘the principle of actionable suspicion . . . . [T]he whole concept was that 
not having hard evidence shouldn’t hold you back.”). 
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intimations of this attitude began to emerge in public discussion as 
members of an administration frantic to gather information regarding a 
threat of unknown dimensions contemplated barbaric measures.220 As 
what President Bush later referred to coyly as “an alternative set of 
procedures”221 began to be deployed, their traces appeared in media 
reports.222 Administration officials projecting a posture of toughness 
hinted at these measures in public statements.223 But the administration 
 
220 E.g. John Cloud, Hitting the Wall, TIME, Nov. 5, 2001, at 65 (“Last week the 
Washington Post reported that some frustrated officials were actually discussing 
whether to seek approval for using truth drugs on the detainees. (The FBI denied the 
story.) Another option, since the U.S. would not formally condone torture, is to 
extradite the most intransigent detainees to allied nations known for bare-knuckle 
police work—a legally questionable move made on rare occasions even before Sept. 
11.”). 
221 President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military 
Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20060906-3.html. 
222 Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at A1 ( giving an account of “renditions” to Egypt and 
Guantanamo, and quoting “U.S. officials” and “diplomats” as stating that “dozens” of 
renditions had occurred to “get information from terrorists in a way we can’t do on 
U.S. soil”); Eric Umansky, Failures of Imagination, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct. 
2006, available at http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2006/5/ 
Umansky.asp (describing the genesis of the Chandrasekaran and Finn article, supra: 
“Chandrasekaran was reporting from Pakistan and saw a reference in a local paper to 
an al Qaeda suspect who had been flown away in the middle of the night by the U.S. 
Chandrasekaran ran the plane’s tail number, which had been published, through an 
FAA database and quickly suspected that a CIA front was involved. ‘I tried finding the 
number for the company listed and couldn’t get anything,’ . . . . The following spring, 
in early 2002, Chandrasekaran was stationed in Indonesia and saw a squib in a local 
paper about an Arab handed over to foreigners at a military air base. ‘I went to the 
guy’s neighborhood, talked to Indonesia intel sources, and one opened up to me,’ he 
remembers.”); Jess Bravin, Interrogation School Tells Army Recruits How Grilling Works, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2002, at A1 (describing tactics “just a hair’s-breadth from being 
an illegal specialty under the Geneva Convention”); Philip Shenon, Officials Say Qaeda 
Suspect Has Given Useful Information, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, at A12 (“[S]uspects will 
not be subjected to any form of torture. But officials said other, nonviolent forms of 
coercion were being used, including sleep deprivation and a variety of psychological 
techniques that are meant to inspire fear.”); Jess Bravin & Gary Fields, How Do U.S. 
Interrogators Make a Captured Terrorist Talk?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2003, at B1 (“[T]he 
treaty has no enforcement mechanism, as a practical matter, ‘you’re just limited by 
your imagination,’ a U.S. law-enforcement official says.”); id. (describing physical 
assaults and extradition “to some other country that’ll let us pistol whip this guy”). 
223 Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist 
Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence and the H. 
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 105th Cong. 590 (2002) (testimony of Cofer 
Black) (“Operational flexibility: This is a highly classified area. All I want to say is that 
there was a ‘before’ 9/11 and there was an ‘after’ 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come 
off. Nearly three thousand al-Qa’ida terrorists and their supporters have been 
detained.”); Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; 
“Stress and Duress” Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1. 
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struggled to keep hard confirmation of abuses out of the public record.224 
In the absence of such confirmation, administration spokesmen and 
apologists could seek to portray accusations of abuse as based in political 
animus and misinformation.225 The canons of responsible journalism 
combined with faith in the efficacy of traditional American values and 
the threat of accusations of unpatriotic rumor-mongering to limit 
reporting of thinly confirmed abuses.226 
Still, facts are stubborn things, and by early 2003, the combination of 
off-the-record statements by American officials, reports by third party 
observers, and corroborating details began to congeal into accounts of 
abuses that were publishable in mainstream American media. The most 
prominent initial report appeared in the Washington Post in December 
2002, as military lawyers struggled to reverse official approvals of abusive 
interrogation.227 
Other domestic accounts followed over the next three months,228 
while foreign newspapers ran similar reports.229 But amidst the fog of war 
 
224 See, e.g., discussion of Lindh plea bargain, supra notes 210–11; Pentagon Photos 
Whodunnit, CBSNEWS.COM, Nov. 8, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/ 
11/08/attack/main528709.shtml (“The Pentagon Friday was investigating to find out 
who took and released photographs of terror suspects as they were being transported 
in heavy restraints aboard a U.S. military plane. Four photographs of prisoners—
handcuffed, heads covered with black hoods and bound with straps on the floor of a 
plane—appeared overnight on the web site of radio talk show host Art Bell. 
‘Anonymous mailer sends us photos taken inside a military C-130 transporting 
POWS,’ the headline said.”); Bruce Kennedy, The Truth is Out There: How “Detainees” 
Are Really Treated, Nov. 8, 2002, available at http://www.jihadunspun.com/ 
inHumanTerms/humanitarian/ttio.html (displaying the four photographs); Richard 
Sisk, POW Pix Stir Furor; Military Denies Abuse, DAILY NEWS, Nov. 9, 2002, at 2. 
225 See, e.g., supra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing statements by 
Rumsfeld); Center for Defense Information, Q & A with Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen 
H. Baker, U.S.N, Senior Fellow, CDI (Jan. 25, 2002), 
http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1185 (“I think 
the ‘outcry’ is unfounded and primarily the result of the notorious British tabloids, 
Islamic groups in London, and political critics that have specific agendas to pursue. I 
think the majority of the American public, and the world, understands that 
inhumane treatment of prisoners is not the American way.”); Office of the Press 
Sec’y, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer (Mar. 3, 2003) (“The standard for any type of 
interrogation of somebody in American custody is to be humane and to follow all 
international laws and accords dealing with this type [of] subject.”). 
226 See Umansky, supra note 222. 
227 Priest & Gellman, supra note 88 (providing accounts of interrogation 
techniques in American detention facilities, including “stress and duress” methods, 
criminal investigation into death of two prisoners at U.S. Air Force base, and alleged 
abuses); id. (quoting one official as commenting, “If you don’t violate someone’s 
human rights some of the time, you probably aren’t doing your job”). 
228 Umansky, supra note 222 (reporting that after a New York Times reporter filed 
a story on death in custody in Afghanistan, it was held back by editors because of 
doubts about sourcing); Carlotta Gall, U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in 
Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A14 (the story by Umansky); Knut Royce, Mixed 
Reviews from Experts; Critics: Makes Case on Deceit, Not Terror, NEWSDAY, Feb. 6, 2003, at 
A7 (quoting Vincent Cannistraro, the former director of CIA’s counterterrorism 
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in Afghanistan and the mounting public relations campaign for invading 
Iraq, it was difficult to establish or scrutinize underlying policy.230 
The invasion of Iraq brought the prospect of further prisoners. In 
April 2003, internal military dismay with the prospect of abandoning 
limits that had constrained abuse for two generations impelled military 
lawyers to confidentially approach civilian human rights advocates in an 
effort to spark opposition.231 Although advocates began to undertake 
these initiatives, they gained relatively little public traction, and in the 
absence of hard evidence, the administration’s disavowal of “torture” and 
“inhumane” treatment continued to dominate general public 
discussion.232 Inquiries from Congress were deflected;233 complaints from 
 
center, referring to “a senior al-Qaida detainee who had been held in the U.S. base at 
Guantanamo, Cuba, and was ‘rendered’ to Egypt after refusing to cooperate[, and 
‘t]hey promptly tore his fingernails out and he started to tell things’”); Bravin & 
Fields, supra note 222 (quoting an unnamed “U.S. law-enforcement official” saying 
that “because the [Convention Against Torture] has no enforcement mechanism, as a 
practical matter, ‘you’re just limited by your imagination,’ . . . . You go to some other 
country that’ll let us pistol whip this guy.”); Raymond Bonner et al., Questioning Terror 
Suspects in a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at A1 (“Senior American 
officials said . . . interrogation would rely on what they consider acceptable 
techniques like sleep and light deprivation and the temporary withholding of food, 
water, access to sunlight and medical attention . . . covering suspects’ heads with 
black hoods for hours at a time and forcing them to stand or kneel in uncomfortable 
positions in extreme cold or heat . . . some suspects had been turned over to security 
services in countries known to employ torture.”); Mayer, supra note 211 (describing 
the interrogation of Lindh). 
229 E.g., Al-Qaeda Operatives Running Scared—Countdown to Conflict, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 5, 2003, at 4 (“CIA interrogators continued questioning Khalid 
[Sheikh Mohammed] yesterday. He is likely to be bound hand and foot and kept 
awake for days in solitary confinement. US intelligence officers will use psychological 
‘stress and duress’ techniques to break him . . . .”). 
230 At the same time, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decisions 
denying relief to Guantanamo detainees in Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 
1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
231 Barry, Hirsh & Isikoff, supra note 207 (“Covertly, though, the JAGs made a 
final effort. . . . The JAGs told Horton they could only talk obliquely about practices 
that were classified. But they said the U.S. military’s 50-year history of observing the 
demands of the Geneva Conventions was now being overturned.”); Seymour M. 
Hersh, The Gray Zone, NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004, at 38, 42 (“In 2003, Rumsfeld’s 
apparent disregard for the requirements of the Geneva Conventions while carrying 
out the war on terror had led a group of senior military legal officers from the Judge 
Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps to pay two surprise visits within five months to Scott 
Horton, who was then chairman of the New York City Bar Association’s Committee 
on International Human Rights. ‘They wanted us to challenge the Bush 
Administration about its standards for detentions and interrogation’ . . . .”). 
232 David E. Kaplan, Playing Offense: The Inside Story of How U.S. Terrorist Hunters Are 
Going After al Qaeda, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 2, 2003, at 18 (providing a largely 
admiring account of the administration’s “lock[ing] up” nearly 1,000 al Qaeda 
members and supporters in 2002, establishing “a network of holding centers and 
prisons the United States began using in the war on terrorism,” and carrying out 
renditions of “dozens” of prisoners ); Peter Slevin, U.S. Pledges Not to Torture Terror 
Suspects, WASH. POST, June 27, 2003, at A1 (reporting on a statement by Defense 
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the International Committee of the Red Cross were buried.234 By the fall 
of 2003, the administration sought to bolster its flagging efforts in Iraq by 
bringing to bear the interrogation techniques it had deployed 
elsewhere.235 
In this environment, advocacy groups turned to the Freedom of 
Information Act. Notwithstanding the earlier bleak reception before the 
DC Circuit in CNSS,236 in early October 2003 the ACLU and a coalition of 
civil rights organizations filed a Freedom of Information Act request. 
Citing the news reports and complaints of abuse, it sought documents 
regarding “policies, procedures or guidelines,” and legal discussion of 
abuse of prisoners in American custody, as well as documents regarding 
enforcement of such guidelines, violations, and treatment of detainees. 
237 Allegations continued to leak into the news media,238 and Maher Arar, 
 
Department General Counsel Haynes that the U.S. would not engage in “cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment”). 
233 See Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Statement on the Abuse of Prisoners in 
U.S. Military Custody (May 5, 2004), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/ 
press/200405/050504c.html (describing inquiries from his office and Sen. Specter’s 
in summer and fall 2003). 
234 Douglas Jehl, Earlier Jail Seen as Incubator for Abuses in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 
2004, at A1 (“After several visits to Camp Cropper, where they interviewed Iraqi 
prisoners, officials of the I.C.R.C. in early July 2003 cited at least 50 incidents of abuse 
reported to have taken place in a part of the prison under the control of military 
interrogators.”); Umansky, supra note 222 (“Charles Hanley, a special correspondent 
for The Associated Press . . . came across a little-noticed Amnesty International report 
charging that ‘very severe’ human rights abuses were occurring at U.S. prisons [in 
Iraq] . . . [that] suggested that the Amnesty allegations were based at least in part on 
leaks from the International Committee for the Red Cross . . . .”). 
235 Seymour M. Hersh, Rumsfeld’s Dirty War on Terror (Part 2), GUARDIAN, Sept. 13, 
2004, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20040914004848/ 
books.guardian.co.uk/extracts/story/0,6761,1303429,00.html. (“By the autumn of 
2003, a military analyst told me, the extent of the Pentagon’s political and military 
misjudgments in Iraq was clear. The solution, endorsed by Rumsfeld and carried out 
by Cambone, was to get tough with the Iraqi men and women in detention—to treat 
them behind prison walls as if they had been captured on the battlefields of 
Afghanistan.”); HERSH, supra note 205, at 59–62 (describing abuse so extreme that 
the CIA “checks with their lawyers and pulls out.”). 
236 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 
2003). 
237 Letter from Amrit Singh, Staff Attorney, ACLU, to Freedom of Information 
Officer (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/ 
nnACLUFOIArequest.pdf. 
238 Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2003, at 
51; see Josh Gerstein, Op-Ed, Selective Secrecy, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 15, 2004, at 11 (giving an 
account of October of 2003 when “Red Cross officials expressed their concerns about 
Guantanamo for articles published or aired by the Associated Press, National Public 
Radio, and the New York Times,” as well as publishing “emotional first-hand audio 
accounts from its staff” on its website, but noting that the author’s FOIA request for 
Red Cross complaints had been denied); cf. Gerstein v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 03-5193 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2004) (denying FOIA request) (referred to in Nat’l Inst. of 
Military Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 404 F. Supp. 2d 325, 340 (D.D.C. 2005)). 
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a Canadian deported by the U.S. to be tortured in Syria a year earlier was 
released to begin his campaign for vindication.239 Yet, the Defense 
Department denied expedited processing of the ACLU request on the 
ground that the subject lacked urgency.240 
 b. Internal Scrutiny and Abu Ghraib 
In late 2003, complaints of abusive interrogation techniques again 
began to make their way up the hierarchy of the administration. FBI 
agents stationed at Guantanamo complained of “torture techniques”;241 
FBI and CIA agents objected to military abuses in Iraq and withdrew 
from cooperation;242 complaints from the field in Iraq by officials of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority and the State Department provoked 
discussions at high-level national security meetings;243 and Army reports 
began to note potential human rights violations.244 In December 2003, 
 
239 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“On October 5, 
2003, Syria, without filing any charges against Arar, released him into the custody of 
Canadian Embassy officials in Damascus.”); Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy to William 
J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Sept. 9, 2003), available at 150 CONG. 
REC. S781, S783–84 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2004) (raising questions about the treatment 
of Arar). 
240 Letter from H.J. McIntyre, Dir., Directorate for Freedom of Info. and Sec. 
Rev., Dep’t of Def., to Amrit Singh, Staff Attorney, ACLU Found. (Oct. 30, 2003), 
available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/mmDODrejectexpproc.pdf 
(denying expedited processing). At the same time, the administration sought to 
suppress information regarding the custodial treatment of Jose Padilla. Tim Grieve, 
Trust Us, SALON.COM, May 17, 2004, http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/ 
2004/05/17/trust/index.html (When the Department of Defense allowed Padilla’s 
counsel to interview him in late 2003, according to counsel, “We were prohibited 
from asking him about the conditions of his confinement.”). 
241 See E-mail from unknown author to Gary Bald (Dec. 5, 2003) (regarding 
Impersonating FBI at the U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI.121504.3977.pdf; Counterterrorism 
Interdepartmental Memorandum (Nov. 25, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
torturefoia/released/FBI_4625_4629.pdf (documenting the impersonation of FBI 
agents by DoD interrogators). 
242 Mark Bowden, The Ploy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 2007, available at 
http://www.ocnus.net/artman/publish/article_28511.shtml. (“In early 2004, both 
the CIA and the FBI complained to military authorities about such practices. The spy 
agency then banned its personnel from working at [one facility.]”). 
243 Johanna McGeary, The Scandal’s Growing Stain, TIME, MAY 18, 2007, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,994176,00.html (“Aides to Bremer and 
Secretary of State Colin Powell say that as early as last fall, both men raised the issue 
in meetings with the rest of the Administration’s national-security team. Yet no action 
was taken . . . .”). 
244 HERSH, supra note 205, at 28 (citing Nov. 5, 2003 report by General Ryder to 
General Sanchez regarding potential “human rights violations” and “serious 
concerns” about interrogation in Iraq); see also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE 
ICRC REPORT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) 
ON THE TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER 
PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT 
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Jack Goldsmith, who had been appointed to head the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) in October 2003, advised the Department of Defense 
that the earlier OLC memo defining away the prohibition on torture “was 
under review” and “should not be relied upon.”245 Fatefully, on January 
13, 2004, Sgt. Joseph Darby submitted a complaint and a compact disc of 
Abu Ghraib pictures to a military investigator for the Criminal 
Investigative Division.246 The Army issued a one-paragraph press release 
referring to an investigation of prisoner abuse at an unspecified prison in 
Iraq, withholding specific details.247 A week later, reports of the nature of 
the abuse began to circulate.248 On January 28, 2004, the Canadian 
government announced a full public inquiry into the deportation to Syria 
and alleged torture of Maher Arar.249 On January 31, 2004, General 
 
AND INTERROGATION (Feb. 2004), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU 
GHRAIB 384 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
245 Letter from Daniel Levin, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Feb. 4, 
2005), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/Levin.Haynes.205.pdf.  
 At roughly the same time, American agents kidnapped an innocent German 
citizen, Khalid El Masri. El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532–33 (E.D. Va. 
2006) (reporting that he was detained on December 31, 2003; flown to Kabul by CIA 
agents, and then beaten, detained, and interrogated). Also, American military 
operators in Iraq began to increase abusive interrogations in an effort to suppress 
insurgents. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt & Carolyn Marshall, In Secret Unit’s “Black Room,” A 
Grim Portrait of U.S. Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, at A1 (describing abuses by 
special forces in early 2004 “[a]s the Iraqi insurgency intensified”); Seymour M. 
Hersh, Moving Targets, NEW YORKER, Dec. 15, 2003, at 48, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/ 
fact/031215fa_fact (“The Bush Administration has authorized a major escalation of 
the Special Forces covert war in Iraq. . . . A new Special Forces group . . . has been 
assembled . . . . Its highest priority is the neutralization of the Baathist insurgents, by 
capture or assassination.”). 
246 See, e.g., John Shattuck, On Abu Ghraib: One Sergeant’s Courage a Model for US 
Leaders, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 16, 2005, at 9, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0516/p09s02-coop.html; Hersh, supra note 231, at 
43 (“The abuses at Abu Ghraib were exposed on January 13th, when Joseph Darby, a 
young military policeman assigned to Abu Ghraib, reported the wrongdoing to the 
Army’s Criminal Investigations Division. He also turned over a CD full of 
photographs. Within three days, a report made its way to Donald Rumsfeld, who 
informed President Bush.”). 
247 Sherry Ricchiardi, Missed Signals, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Aug./Sept. 2004, at 22, 
24 (quoting a release: “An investigation has been initiated into reported incidents of 
detainee abuse at a Coalition Forces detention facility. The release of specific 
information concerning the incidents could hinder the investigation, which is in its 
early stages. The investigation will be conducted in a thorough and professional 
manner.”). 
248 Barbara Starr, Details of Army’s Abuse Investigation Surface, CNN.COM, Jan. 21, 
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/20/sprj.nirq.abuse/ (“U.S. soldiers 
reportedly posed for photographs with partially unclothed Iraqi prisoners, a 
Pentagon official told CNN on Tuesday . . . Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has 
been briefed on the investigation . . . .”). 
249 Maher Arar: Timeline, CBC NEWS, Jan. 26, 2007, available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/ (reporting that on January 22, 2004, 
LCB_11_4_ART11_KREIMER.DOC 12/5/2007 2:28:20 PM 
2007] THE STRATEGY OF TRANSPARENCY 1199 
Antonio Taguba was appointed at the request of General Ricardo 
Sanchez, the commander of coalition forces in Iraq, to investigate 
prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib.250 
General Taguba completed his report in early March, setting forth 
both the “sadistic, blatant and wanton” prisoner abuse by guards and 
apparent collusion and acquiescence by officers.251 For reasons that are 
still unexplained, the report was classified “Secret,” although the 
administration subsequently conceded that this classification was an 
error.252 
In the next month, intimations regarding the report began to leak 
into the public media, and the administration continued to seek to 
suppress them. As fighting raged in Iraq, and the administration 
prepared to argue before the Supreme Court for unreviewable power 
over detainees, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Richard Myers, personally persuaded CBS news anchor Dan Rather to 
delay the network’s broadcast of the pictures and its account of the 
Taguba report on Abu Ghraib.253 On the afternoon of April 28, 2004, 
 
Arar filed suit against the U.S. Government); dismissed in part, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. 
Supp. 2d 250, 287–88 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
250 ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 6 (2004), available at http://www.npr.org/ 
iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT]. 
251 Id. at 14–20. 
252 Torture Report May Have Broken Classification Rules, SECRECY NEWS, May 5, 2004, 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2004/05/050504.html (quoting 
Pentagon spokesmen and Secretary Rumsfeld as disavowing any knowledge of why 
the report was classified). In response to complaints from transparency advocates, the 
Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) opened an inquiry. FAS Project on 
Government Secrecy, ISOO Will Investigate Secrecy of Torture Report, SECRECY NEWS, May 
7, 2004, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2004/05/050704.html. 
ISOO ultimately generated remedial actions by the Department of Defense. Letter 
from J. William Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, to Steven Aftergood, Dir., 
Project on Gov’t Secrecy (Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
news/2004/10/isoo102904.pdf. (“[P]ursuant to Section 5.2 of Executive Order 
12958, as amended, I have pursued with the Department of Defense (DoD) the issues 
you identified in your letter. This is to advise you that I have been informed by DoD 
that they have declassified the majority of the classified information [in the Taguba 
Report noting a] recent DoD-wide message from the Secretary of Defense 
emphasizing command responsibility for holding both original and derivative 
classifiers of information accountable for the accuracy of their classification 
decisions.”); Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. Donald Rumsfeld, DOD Information 
Security Program (Sept. 4, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
bush/secdef091604.pdf (emphasizing importance of not using classification to avoid 
“embarrassment” or “conceal violations of law” in memo directed particularly to 
“corrective action” regarding “information related to detainees [or] prisoner abuse”). 
253 Umansky, supra note 222, at 22 (“As Dan Rather, the segment’s 
correspondent, noted, CBS had held the story for two weeks at the request of Richard 
Myers, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, who, citing the major fighting in Fallujah, 
a Shiite uprising in Najaf, and two American civilians being held hostage in Iraq, had 
argued that the photos would further inflame matters in the region.”); see, e.g., David 
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then-Associate Solicitor General Paul Clement, arguing in Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, entered into a colloquy with Justice Ginsburg regarding the 
possibility of prisoner abuse, and again disavowed any policy of abusive 
interrogation.254 That evening, as the New Yorker magazine prepared to 
break the Abu Ghraib story, CBS 60 Minutes II broadcast the story and 
some of the graphic pictures.255 
Once breached, the secrecy and dissimulation regarding the pictures 
and the Taguba report crumbled. Pictures ricocheted around the globe, 
and copies of the Taguba report began to appear on the Internet. By 
early May, the administration was reduced to issuing threats of criminal 
prosecution for the leakers of the report and sending internal e-mails 
adjuring military personnel to “1) NOT GO TO FOX NEWS TO READ 
OR OBTAIN A COPY[;] 2) NOT comment on this to anyone[;] 3) NOT 
delete the file if you receive it via e-mail, but 4) CALL THE ISD 
HELPDESK AT 602–2627 IMMEDIATELY.”256 
3. Transparency Deployed: The Slow March Toward Known Knowns 
The outlines of the Abu Ghraib abuses themselves became rapidly 
known, but the background of the abuses, the scope of parallel 
barbarities, and the broader policies regarding interrogation and 
 
Folkenflik, Iraq Prison Story Tough To Hold Off On, CBS Says, BALT. SUN, May 5, 2004, at 
1D. 
254 [Justice RUTH BADER GINSBURG]: But if the law is what the executive says 
it is, whatever is necessary and appropriate in the executive’s judgment . . . [w]hat 
is it that would be a check against torture? . . . 
 
[Justice GINSBURG:] Suppose the executive says mild torture we think will 
help get this information. It’s not a soldier who does something against the 
Code of Military Justice, but it’s an executive command. Some systems do 
that to get information. 
Mr. CLEMENT: Well, our executive doesn’t . . . . 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–23, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 
03-1027), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/03-1027.pdf.  
 The Department of Justice refused to comment on whether Clement was aware of 
the abuse at Abu Ghraib. Grieve, supra note 240 (“An employee in Clement’s office 
referred a call from Salon last week to Justice Department spokesperson Monica 
Goodling. Asked what Clement or Ashcroft knew of the Abu Ghraib situation at the 
time of oral arguments in the Hamdi and Padilla cases, Goodling said: “We wouldn’t 
have any comment.”). 
255 60 Minutes II (CBS television broadcast Apr. 28, 2004) (transcript on file with 
the Lewis & Clark Law Review); see Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW 
YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42, 43, available at http://www.newyorker.com/ 
fact/content/articles/040510fa_fact?040510fa_fact (quoting from a copy of the 
Taguba report “obtained by The New Yorker,” describing some of the graphic abuses); 
cf. Sewell Chan & Jackie Spinner, Allegations of Abuse Lead to Shakeup at Iraqi Prison, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2004, at A24 (describing abuses and the content of “sealed 
charging papers”). 
256 E-mail from Information Services Customer Liaison, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, to 
All ISD Customers, U.S. Dep’t of Defense (May 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,634637,00.html. 
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detainee treatment were less transparent. Under the pressure of 
worldwide condemnation, the administration in turn decried the specific 
abuses and abusers at Abu Ghraib, and the CIA, the Defense 
Department, and the FBI embarked on internal investigations.257 
Inquiries in the Republican-controlled Congress, however, were met with 
a combination of disingenuous disavowals, misleading misdirection, and 
outright obstruction.258 
 
257 For a discussion of the CIA investigation, see ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 351 F. 
Supp. 2d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[O]n May 11, 2004, the CIA’s Office of Inspector 
General (the ‘OIG’) ‘commenced a criminal investigation of allegations of 
impropriety in Iraq.’”).  
 For a discussion of the DoD investigation, see Michael Hirsh & John Barry, The 
Abu Ghraib Scandal Cover-Up?, NEWSWEEK, June 7, 2004, at 34, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/53972 (describing apparently cursory Defense 
department investigations and efforts to silence witnesses to Abu Ghraib abuses). 
 For a discussion of the FBI investigations, see, e.g., Letter from T. J. Harrington, 
Deputy Ass’t Dir., Counterterrorism Div., FBI, to Maj. Gen. Donald J. Ryder, Criminal 
Investigation Command, U.S. Dep’t of the Army (July 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/010505.html (detailing prior FBI 
complaints); E-mail regarding GTMO-Related E-mails, Notes, etc. (May 10, 2004), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_4142.pdf (directing BAU 
members to preserve backup data); R. Jeffrey Smith, Justice Redacted Memo on Detainees: 
FBI Criticism of Interrogations Was Deleted, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2005 at A3 (referring to 
a different May 10, 2004, FBI memo documenting a chronology of prior FBI 
objections to abusive interrogation); Mark Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Has the 
Government Come Clean?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/48419 (“After Mueller’s testimony [on May 20, 2004], 
[FBI spokesman Michael] Kortan said the FBI general counsel’s office began a more 
systematic effort to document the abuses that had been recorded by its agents in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Guantanamo. The result was a flood of alarming reports . . . .”). 
258 See, e.g., Isikoff & Hosenball, supra note 257 (describing May 2004 testimony 
from the FBI Director as “confusing” and “obfuscatory”); Hirsh & Barry, supra note 
257, at 36 (“On Capitol Hill, legislators on both sides of the aisle complain testily that 
the Pentagon has turned into an informational black hole. Some 2,000 out of 6,000 
pages were missing from the copy of the Taguba report delivered from the Pentagon 
to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Pentagon spokesman Larry DiRita last week 
called this merely an ‘oversight.’”); Press Release, Reaction of Sen. Patrick Leahy to 
Attorney General Ashcroft’s Refusal to Provide Memos on Torture Policy (June 8, 
2004), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200406/060804a.html; see also 
DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS: THE 
DOWNING STREET MINUTES AND DECEPTION, MANIPULATION, TORTURE, RETRIBUTION, 
AND COVERUPS IN THE IRAQ WAR 149–50 (2005) available at http://rawstory.com/ 
other/conyersreportrawstory.pdf (describing thwarted efforts to seek information on 
approval of abusive interrogation in the aftermath of Abu Ghraib disclosures). 
 The prospect of exposure may have generated some positive change in the CIA’s 
detention program. On May 28, 2004, Khalid El-Masri was released. See El-Masri v. 
Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 534 (E.D. Va. 2006) (filed Dec. 6, 2005; dismissed on 
state secrets privilege ground on May 12, 2006) (“El-Masri says he remained 
imprisoned in Kabul until May 28, 2004, after which he was flown in a private jet, 
again blindfolded, from Kabul to Albania, where he was deposited by his captors on 
the side of an abandoned road.”), aff’d, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).  
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With congressional investigation stymied, other mechanisms started 
to fill in the picture. In May and June 2004, internal whistleblowers began 
to disseminate to the media and the Internet both legal memoranda 
authorizing abusive interrogation, and the supporting documents of the 
Taguba report.259 Ultimately, in late June, the administration officially 
released some of the memoranda.260 
Based on these disclosures, the ongoing public controversy, and the 
emerging hints of documentary evidence, on May 25, 2004, the ACLU 
coalition renewed its October 2003 FOIA requests regarding detainee 
abuse, this time seeking specific documents identified in the media.261 
The coalition filed suit a week later in the Southern District of New York, 
beyond the precedential reach of the D.C. Circuit’s CNSS opinion, to 
compel processing and production.262 The Department of Justice, in 
 
259 E.g., Barry, Hirsh & Isikoff, supra note 207, at 29 (describing memoranda); 
Jess Bravin, Pentagon Report Set Framework for Use of Torture; Security or Legal Factors Could 
Trump Restrictions, Memo to Rumsfeld Argued, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2004, at A1 (reporting 
contents of memoranda); Morning Edition: Ashcroft Won’t Release Torture Memos to Senate 
(NPR radio broadcast June 9, 2004), recording available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=1950677 (at 1:00) (“The memorandum, first 
reported by The Wall Street Journal on Monday, has since been obtained by NPR and 
is on the NPR Web site.”); Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for 
Use of Torture; Justice Dept. Gave Advice in 2002, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at A1 
(reporting on the August 2002 Bybee memo); Opinion, Tormented Truths; Secrecy 
Obscures Why Administration Sought Memos on Uses of Torture, NEWSDAY, June 10, 2004, at 
A42; Osha Gray Davidson, The Secret File of Abu Ghraib, ROLLING STONE, July 28, 2004, 
available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/ 
6388256/the_secret_file_of_abu_ghraib/ (describing Taguba report appendices 
leaked to the author in June, but not posting them); see Alexander Cohen, The Abu 
Ghraib Supplementary Documents, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, Oct. 8, 2004, available at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=396&sid=100 (posting files 
forwarded by Osha Gray Davidson after reviewing them for sensitive information 
October 8, 2004). 
260 Nat’l Sec. Archive, The Interrogation Documents: Debating U.S. Policy and 
Methods (July 13, 2004), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127 
(compiling documents, and describing leaks, culminating in partial releases of 
documents by the White House and Defense Department). 
261 Letter from Lawrence S. Lustberg to H.J. McIntyre, Dir., Directorate for 
Freedom of Info. & Sec. Review, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (May 25, 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/jjACLUSecondFOIArequest.pdf 
(requesting records regarding the treatment of post-September 11 detainees). 
262 Complaint, ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 
04-CV-4151 (AKH)), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/ 
CCR_ACLU_FOIATortureComplaint.pdf ACLU, Responsive Records Specifically 
Identified in Plaintiffs’ May 25, 2004 Torture FOIA Request, http://www.aclu.org/ 
torturefoia/Documents_081604.pdf (table of identified documents). 
 Under FOIA, venue lies in the district in which the claimant resides as well as the 
District of Columbia of the location of the requested records. Freedom of 
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). 
 Other NGOs also began to deploy FOIA to bring detainee abuses to light. See, e.g., 
Photos of Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Sought Under FOIA, SECRECY NEWS, May 12, 2004, available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2004/05/051204.html; Human Rights 
First, Command’s Responsibility: Detainee Deaths in U.S. Custody in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
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which the FBI was marshaling the record of its objections to abuses, 
granted expedited processing on June 2, 2004. The State Department, 
which had opposed suspension of the Geneva Conventions, followed suit 
on June 18, 2004, although neither agency was able to provide a schedule 
for that processing.263 The Defense Department, joined by the CIA, 
however, again saw no “compelling need” in the request and denied 
expedited processing on June 21, 2004.264 On June 28, 2004, the Supreme 
Court issued its opinions rebuffing the administration in Hamdi and 
Rasul, and reaffirming that “a state of war is not a blank check for the 
President.”265 On July 6, 2004, the ACLU filed an amended FOIA 
complaint and a motion for preliminary relief. 
After a month and a half of motion practice and negotiation, the 
matter came for a hearing before Judge Alvin Hellerstein in the Southern 
District of New York. Judge Hellerstein was unsympathetic to what he 
referred to as the government’s “scant production,” its delaying tactics, 
and its claims of national security as justification for the delay.266 Setting a 
deadline of October 15, 2004 for the production or identification of 
responsive documents, Judge Hellerstein observed: 
[T]he glacial pace at which defendant agencies have been 
responding to plaintiffs’ requests shows an indifference to the 
commands of FOIA, and fails to afford accountability of 
government that the act requires. If the documents are more of an 
embarrassment than a secret, the public should know of our 
government’s treatment of individuals captured and held abroad. 
“[H]istory and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of 
 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/dic/index.asp; Human Rights First, 
Human Rights First’s Freedom of Information Act Requests Relating to Deaths in Custody, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/dic/foia.asp; Sam Hananel, Amnesty 
Int’l Seeks Military’s Taser Files, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 30, 2004 (reporting an Amnesty 
International FOIA request regarding the use of Tasers in Iraq and Afghanistan). 
263 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5 
n.2, ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04-CV-4151 
(AKH)), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/ 
ffACLUExpProcMemo.pdf. 
264 Letter from C.Y. Talbott, Chief, Office of Freedom of Info. and Sec. Rev., U.S. 
Dep’t of Def., to Jennifer Ching, Att’y for ACLU (June 21, 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/iiDODDenyExpProc.pdf. 
265 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 
(2004); cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). It appears that the Justices were 
cognizant of the mounting tide of disclosures regarding the administration’s abuses. 
See Grieve, supra note 240 (“Justices Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O’Connor 
met with a panel of Iraqi judges in the Netherlands earlier this month, and they said 
afterward that they had conveyed to the Iraqis—subtly, for fear of exposing any bias 
in court-martial cases to come—their concern over the Abu Ghraib abuses. In a 
follow-up interview with the Associated Press, Kennedy said the Iraqi judges ‘innately 
knew, instinctively knew, how concerned we were’ about what happened at Abu 
Ghraib.”). 
266 ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501, 503–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see id. at 
502 (“Ours is a government of laws . . . . No one is above the law . . . .”); id. at 504 
(“Merely raising national security concerns can not justify unlimited delay.”). 
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detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression 
and abuse.”267 
As it moved to respond to Judge Hellerstein’s deadline, one might 
have expected that the administration would claim the right to withhold 
documents on the basis of national security under FOIA Exemption 1 
that had proven so efficacious in beating back efforts to uncover 
information concerning the use of the Patriot Act. The administration 
had, after all, classified the Taguba report and threatened to prosecute 
those who had leaked it, and it could rely on precedent according 
“special deference” to the government’s expertise regarding national 
security. But no such claims were raised. 
The full reason for this uncharacteristic restraint remains unclear, 
but traces of an answer emerge in the public record. William Leonard, 
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office which has 
responsibility for monitoring and reviewing government decisions and 
policies regarding classified national security information, had been 
appointed by President Bush in 2002, after a career that included service 
at the head of the Pentagon’s Information Security program.268 In May of 
2004, as the Abu Ghraib story broke, open government activists officially 
requested that he investigate the classification of the Taguba report.269 
Mr. Leonard, who had served on the Interagency Security Classification 
Appeals Panel, apparently took the request seriously. According to one 
report, he “made a personal visit to the Defense Department to ask why 
elements of Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba’s report on the abuse of prisoners 
in Iraq had been classified,” commenting, “On the surface, they gave the 
appearance that the classification was used to conceal violations of law 
which is specifically prohibited.”270 In July 2004, Mr. Leonard publicly 
challenged the classification of portions of the Working Group report 
authorizing coercive interrogation.271 In apparent response to Mr. 
 
267 Id. at 504–05 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)). 
268 Information Security Oversight Office, Director J. William Leonard, 
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/about/director.html; see Classified National Security 
Information, Exec. Order No. 12,958, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/eo-12958-amendment.html#part-5 
(setting forth authority of ISOO). 
269 ISOO Will Investigate Secrecy of Torture Report, SECRECY NEWS, May 7, 2004, 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2004/05/050704.html; see also 
Classified National Security Information, 68 Fed. Reg. at 15,327 (The ISOO has 
authority to “require of each agency those reports, information, and other 
cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill its responsibilities” and “consider and 
take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the 
Government with respect to the administration of the program established under this 
order.”). 
270 Paul Shukovsky, U.S. Moves to Classify Abuse Suit Documents, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, June 24, 2004, at A1. 
271 Shaun Waterman, Pentagon Classifying “Impulse” Criticized, WASH. TIMES, July 8, 
2004, at A6. (reporting on Leonard’s demand for an explanation of classification of 
the observation that, “Consideration must be given to the public’s reaction to 
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Leonard’s efforts, on September 16, 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld distributed 
a memorandum calling for “corrective action . . . at DoD components 
that generate information related to detainees and prisoner abuse” to 
eschew the use of classification to conceal violations of law.272 Because 
Exemption 1 can be invoked only where government officials certify that 
material is properly classified, it appears that Mr. Leonard’s integrity 
precluded the “national security” gambit before Judge Hellerstein. 
On October 14, 2004, the administration released the first 6,000 
pages of documents, including the annexes to the Taguba report.273 
Partially redacted FBI memoranda documenting both military 
interrogation abuses and the FBI’s tabled objections to them began to 
emerge in December 2004 after the presidential election,274 along with a 
tide of other evidence of abusive policies.275 The flow of documents has 
not slackened in the subsequent three years. As motion practice 
 
methods of interrogation that may affect the military commission process. The more 
coercive the method, the greater the likelihood that the method will be met with 
significant domestic and international resistance.”). 
272 Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. Donald Rumsfeld, DOD Information 
Security Program (Sept. 16, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/ 
secdef091604.pdf (“It is important to state that classifiers shall not: a) use 
classification to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; b) 
classify information to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; 
c) classify information to prevent or delay the release of information that does not 
require protection in the interest of national security.”); see Letter from J. William 
Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, to Steven Aftergood, Dir., Project on Gov’t 
Secrecy (Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2004/10/ 
isoo102904.pdf (noting declassification of Taguba report after Leonard’s having 
“pursued” the issue with the Department of Defense, and noting a series of “ancillary 
initiatives” to enhance “command responsibility” and “reinforce sound 
classification”). 
273 See Press Release, ACLU, Federal Government Turns Over Thousands of 
Torture Documents to ACLU (Oct. 21, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
intlhumanrights/gen/13803prs20041021.html. Many of the documents are available 
at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/101504.html. 
274 See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, FBI E-Mail Refers to Presidential Order 
Authorizing Inhumane Interrogation Techniques (Dec. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/18769prs20041220.html; Isikoff & Hosenball, 
supra note 257 (“The result was a flood of alarming reports that have now been 
turned over to the American Civil Liberties Union in its Freedom of Information 
lawsuit seeking the release of government documents on the treatment of prisoners. 
The release of these documents has exacerbated tensions between the FBI and the 
Pentagon over the issue. Defense officials have privately complained that bureau 
officials affirmatively decided to turn over the documents in the lawsuit in order to 
protect itself from charges that it was complicit in the improper treatment of 
prisoners. ‘This is cover [your] a---- at its finest,’ one Pentagon official told 
NEWSWEEK.”). FBI documents released in the first wave had been almost entirely 
redacted. See Press Release, ACLU, supra note 273. 
275 See ACLU, Torture Documents Released Under FOIA, http://www.aclu.org/ 
safefree/torture/torturefoia.html (reflecting waves of released documents released 
from 2005 to 2007, including “reprocessed” documents where redacted material was 
restored under pressure); ACLU, List of FOIA Releases, http://www.aclu.org/ 
safefree/torture/logs.html (same for 2004 to 2005). 
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continued before Judge Hellerstein, by the end of 2006 the New York 
litigation had resulted in the release of over 100,000 pages of 
documents.276 
The process was a matter of trench warfare as administration lawyers 
tenaciously sought to delay and excuse production, while attorneys from 
the ACLU, augmented by trial practitioners from the private sector, 
doggedly pressed for disclosure.277 In these battles, in September 2005, 
Judge Hellerstein reluctantly accepted the CIA’s claim that revealing the 
presence or absence of a memorandum granting authority to set up 
detention facilities would “reveal intelligence sources or methods,” but 
he required the CIA to reveal the existence of an OLC memorandum to 
the CIA interpreting the Convention Against Torture.278 
At the same time, Judge Hellerstein rejected the Defense 
Department’s efforts to withhold from public disclosure photographs 
and videotapes depicting abuse of detainees, in particular the contents of 
the compact disc that specialist Darby had used to expose the abuses at 
 
276 Press Release, ACLU, FBI Inquiry Details Abuses Reported by Agents at 
Guantanamo (Jan. 3, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/ 
torture/27816prs20070103.html. The ACLU has provided a searchable data base of 
the documents at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/search/search.html. 
277 ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., No. 04 Civ. 4151 (AKH), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24387, 
at *2–4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2004) (ordering briefing schedule, identification of 
documents, and processing by the Defense Department at the rate of 10,000 
documents per month); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 351 F. Supp. 2d 265, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (refusing CIA request for stay of identification order, because investigation of 
impropriety was being carried out by the CIA Inspector General); id. (commenting 
that “Congress has set the laws, and it is the duty of executive agencies to comply with 
them”); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 357 F. Supp. 2d 708, 709–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing 
to allow stay pending appeal of order to CIA, characterizing CIA’s position as 
“implausible”); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(upholding withholding of Red Cross documents under exemption 3); id. at 556, 
568–69 (accepting a Defense Department representation that it could not find 
documents which had been identified in the media); id. at 567–68 (accepting 
redactions based on in camera review of taking a twenty percent sample of the 
redacted documents for in camera examination, and accepting redactions). 
278 ACLU, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 561, 564–65 (lamenting that “[t]he danger of 
Glomar responses is that they encourage an unfortunate tendency of government 
officials to over-classify information, frequently keeping secret that which the public 
already knows, or that which is more embarrassing than revelatory of intelligence 
sources or methods,” and observing that “[t]he discussions of these documents in the 
public press, undoubtedly arising from numerous leaks of the documents, raise 
concern, however, that the purpose of the CIA’s Glomar responses is less to protect 
intelligence activities, sources or methods than to conceal possible ‘violations of law’ 
in the treatment of prisoners, or ‘inefficiency’ or ‘embarrassment’ of the CIA,” but 
concluding that “there is small scope for judicial evaluation in this area”); ACLU v. 
Dep’t of Def., 396 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (denying reconsideration by 
CIA of order requiring disclosure by CIA of memorandum regarding Convention 
Against Torture); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 406 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(denying reconsideration of order allowing Glomar response by plaintiffs on the basis 
of further admissions by the CIA that the agency involved itself in detainee 
interrogations). 
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Abu Ghraib. As they had in the CNSS litigation, and as they were doing 
contemporaneously in the Associated Press Guantanamo transcript 
litigation, the administration’s lawyers sought to invoke the privacy rights 
of the victims of abuses as a basis for refusing disclosure, claiming that 
disclosure of the photographs would constitute an “unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy” under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C).279 Judge 
Hellerstein began by observing he had ordered the redaction of 
identifying features of the photographs, and that with such redactions, 
publication of personally unidentifiable photographs would invade no 
cognizable privacy interests.280 More importantly, he held, any invasion of 
privacy interests would not be “unwarranted.”281 Given the conceded 
wrongdoing, the ongoing public discussion of previously leaked photos, 
and the importance of “debate about the causes and forces that led to 
the breakdown of command discipline at Abu Ghraib prison and, 
possibly, by extension, to other prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Guantanamo, and perhaps elsewhere,” disclosure “coheres with the 
central purpose of FOIA, to ‘promote honest and open government and 
to assure the existence of an informed citizenry [in order] to hold the 
governors accountable to the governed.’”282 
Judge Hellerstein closed by addressing what he referred to as the 
government’s “eleventh-hour” argument, raised two months after the 
initial argument of the motions in the case, that the photographs were 
exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 7(F) because disclosure 
“could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety of any 
individual.”283 Relying on an affidavit from General Myers (who had 
persuaded Dan Rather to delay publication of the Abu Ghraib story a 
year and a half earlier), the administration maintained that publication 
of the photographs was “likely to incite violence against our troops and 
Iraqi and Afghan personnel and civilians.”284 The administration argued 
that once any possibility of violence could be shown, the wording of 
Exemption 7(F) precluded any countervailing justification for disclosure. 
Judge Hellerstein firmly rebuffed the administration’s gambit.285 
As a matter of fact, Judge Hellerstein evidenced skepticism that 
release of the photographs would discernibly increase the danger to 
American lives or safety: 
 
279 ACLU, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 569. 
280 Id. at 572. 
281 Id. at 571. 
282 Id. at 573–74 (partially quoting National Council of La Raza v. Dep’t of Justice, 
411 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2005), in which the Second Circuit four months earlier 
had rejected an administration effort to avoid disclosing an OLC legal opinion 
regarding the use of local authorities in immigration enforcement). Judge 
Hellerstein relied as well on the balancing of privacy and accountability interests in 
National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
283 ACLU, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F)). 
284 ACLU, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 575. 
285 Id. 
LCB_11_4_ART11_KREIMER.DOC 12/5/2007 2:28:20 PM 
1208 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:4 
The terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan do not need pretexts for 
their barbarism; they have proven to be aggressive and pernicious 
in their choice of targets and tactics. . . . With great respect to the 
concerns expressed by General Myers, my task is not to defer to our 
worst fears, but to interpret and apply the law, in this case, the 
Freedom of Information Act, which advances values important to 
our society, transparency and accountability in government.286 
As a matter of law, Judge Hellerstein held that Exemption 7(F) could not 
be read to defeat the underlying purposes of FOIA, and that the 
possibility of hostile reaction would not “blackmail” the court into 
suppressing evidence that could spark accountability for substantial 
wrongdoing.287 Turning the question of patriotism of the administration, 
he wrote: 
Publication of the photographs is central to the purposes of FOIA 
because they initiate debate, not only about the improper and 
unlawful conduct of American soldiers . . . but also about other 
important questions as well—for example, the command structure 
that failed to exercise discipline over the troops, and the persons in 
that command structure whose failures in exercising supervision 
may make them culpable along with the soldiers who were court-
martialed . . . . 
The fight to extend freedom has never been easy, and we are once 
again challenged, in Iraq and Afghanistan, by terrorists who engage 
in violence to intimidate our will and to force us to retreat. Our 
struggle to prevail must be without sacrificing the transparency and 
accountability of government and military officials. These are the 
values FOIA was intended to advance, and they are at the very heart 
of the values for which we fight . . . .288 
In March of 2006, while an appeal from Judge Hellerstein’s order 
was pending, the online publication Salon obtained copies of contested 
Abu Ghraib photos and published them on the Internet.289 Two weeks 
later, the administration abandoned its appeal and identified the Salon 
photos as authentic.290 The release of the photographs had no 
discernable effect on the welfare of American forces at home or abroad, 
nor, it must be admitted, on the quest for accountability. 
 
286 Id. at 576. 
287 Id. at 575–76. 
288 Id. at 578; see ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., No. 04 Civ. 4151 (AKH), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 40894, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2006) (ordering release of one further 
redacted photograph). 
289 Joan Walsh, The Abu Ghraib Files, SALON.COM, Mar. 14, 2006, 
http://www.salon.com/news/abu_ghraib/2006/03/14/introduction/. 
290 Mark Benjamin & Michael Scherer, U.S. Agrees To Release Abu Ghraib Photos, 
SALON.COM, Mar. 29, 2006, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/03/29/ 
aclu_abu_ghraib/; Josh White, Government Authenticates Photos From Abu Ghraib, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 11, 2006, at A16. 
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4. Sunlight and Disinfection? 
While their policies remained in shadow, administration apologists 
shaped public discourse by touting disavowals of “torture,” portraying 
particular leaks as “rumor, innuendo, and assertions,”291 and denigrating 
critics as “either uninformed, misinformed or poorly informed.”292 After 
October 2004, these ploys became less effective. FOIA had not served to 
reveal “unknown unknowns,” but to authenticate leaks that established 
the existence of “known unknowns.” As documents finally began to 
emerge in the ACLU coalition litigation before Judge Hellerstein, the 
patterns of abusive interrogation began to move from the realm of 
speculation to the realm of fact in public debate. It is difficult (though 
not impossible) to characterize a hard copy of an FBI e-mail, or 
memorandum to a top Defense Department aide from the Defense 
Intelligence Agency as the “breathless” effusions of soft-headed 
alarmists.293 When the strained and parsimonious definition of “torture” 
is available verbatim in black and white, it becomes harder (though again 
not impossible) to use verbal misdirection as a means of deflecting 
critique.294 
The ACLU took advantage of emerging technology and the 
resources of its law firm partners to highlight the solidity of the 
evidentiary pieces as they were pried loose. It issued regular press releases 
highlighting the most striking items. But it also backed up its claims with 
copies of the revelatory documents available to the world on its website, 
and made the entire documentary corpus available in searchable form. 
As well as providing authentication, this approach allowed the public 
access to the haphazard and obfuscatory patterns of redactions as they 
took place. 
The documents released in what the ACLU labeled its “Torture 
FOIA” litigation formed the basis for a gathering series of accounts in the 
mainstream media highlighting both the barbarity of the practices and 
the implausibility of administration denials of knowledge and 
 
291 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Statement from Pentagon Spokesman 
Lawrence DiRita on Latest Seymour Hersh Article (Jan. 17, 2005), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8134. 
292 Richard A. Serrano & John Hendren, Rumsfeld Strongly Denies Mistreatment of 
Prisoners, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at A1. 
293 For one reported attempt by Alberto Gonzales, see Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. 
Opens Inquiry Into Abuse of U.S. Detainees, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 2005, at A20 (“Alberto R. 
Gonzales . . . said the administration did not condone torture of prisoners in 
American custody. . . . Mr. Gonzales expressed skepticism about some details in the 
bureau’s internal reports, pointing to one e-mail message from an agent in Iraq that 
cited a supposed executive order from President Bush authorizing abusive 
techniques. . . . He said: ‘That never occurred. And so, if something like that is wrong 
in these e-mails, there may be other facts that are wrong in the e-mails.’”). 
294 Cf. 151 CONG. REC. S699 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2005), (statement of Sen. Feinstein) 
available at http://feinstein.senate.gov/05speeches/cr-gonzales.htm (quoting 
Gonzales as taking the position that torture is forbidden but there is no prohibition 
of “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” of aliens overseas). 
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responsibility.295 The revelation of the FBI reports triggered internal 
investigations by the Department of Justice Inspector General296 and a 
specially commissioned Army investigation team,297 as well as hearings by 
 
295 E.g., Barton Gellman & R. Jeffrey Smith, Report to Defense Alleged Abuse By Prison 
Interrogation Teams, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2004, at A1 (“The American Civil Liberties 
Union released 43 [documents] after compelling the Bush administration to provide 
them—many still heavily censored—in a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information 
Act.”); R. Jeffrey Smith & Dan Eggen, New Papers Suggest Detainee Abuse Was Widespread, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2004, at A1 (“The details of the abuse appeared to catch some 
administration officials by surprise, although five agencies for weeks have been 
culling releasable records from their files, under an agreement worked out by U.S. 
District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein.”); Isikoff & Hosenball, supra note 257 (“[A] stack 
of newly disclosed and startling FBI documents recording agents’ reports about 
serious abuses at [Gitmo] have been released largely as a result of a [FOIA] lawsuit 
brought by the [ACLU] in New York.”); Nat Hentoff, What Did Rumsfeld Know?, 
VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 11, 2005, at 22 (“But now, with the release by the ACLU of actual 
government documents not intended for the public to see, the president is 
confronted with irrefutable evidence of continued violations of not only the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and the U.N. Convention Against Torture, but also our own 
torture statute forbidding such practices.”); Schmitt & Marshall, supra note 197 
(“Some of the serious accusations against Task Force 6-26 have been reported over 
the past 16 months by news organizations including NBC, The Washington Post and 
The Times. Many details emerged in hundreds of pages of documents released under 
a [FOIA] request by the [ACLU].”). 
296 Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Opens Inquiry Into Abuse of U.S. Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 14, 2005, at A20 (“In a letter to the Justice Department inspector general on Dec. 
21, [2004,] after the first batches of documents from the [ACLU] became public, 
Representative John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, the ranking Democrat on the House 
Judiciary Committee, and five other lawmakers, all Democrats, made an ‘urgent 
request’ for the office to investigate the reports of torture and to determine how 
presidential or military directives played into such tactics. Glenn A. Fine, the 
inspector general at the Justice Department, responded on Jan. 4 , [2005,] saying that 
his office had already begun ‘examining the involvement of [the] Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.’”). The investigation had still not concluded two years later. OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION 
OF SECTION 1001 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT, at 11 (Mar. 2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703/final.pdf (“The OIG is reviewing FBI 
employees’ observations and actions regarding alleged abuse of detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib prison, and other venues controlled by the U.S. 
military. . . . The OIG investigative team is in the process of drafting the report 
summarizing the results of the investigation.”). 
297 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 15-6: FINAL REPORT—INVESTIGATION 
INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION 
FACILITY (2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/ 
d20050714report.pdf [hereinafter Schmidt/Furlow Report] (submitting report of 
investigation of abuse by military personnel, triggered by FOIA releases, but avoiding 
comment on legality of guidance from Secretary of Defense). Military investigations 
had not infrequently proven to be less than aggressive, and other FOIA inquiries had 
revealed this quality. See, e.g., Mark Benjamin & Michael Scherer, A Miller Whitewash?, 
SALON.COM, Apr. 25, 2006, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/04/25/ 
miller/ (giving an account of a Dec. 20, 2005 Army Inspector General report, 
revealed by a FOIA inquiry, which distinguished between “briefing” and “discussions” 
in order to exonerate General Geoffrey Miller from allegations that he lied to 
Congress when he stated that “he had ‘no direct discussions’” with Rumsfeld aide 
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Congress.298 Under congressional scrutiny, the Defense Department 
General Counsel rescinded the 2003 Working Group Report which had 
authorized coercive interrogation.299 
The weight of documents released in the Torture FOIA litigation 
provided leverage for further inquiry by skeptical members of Congress 
in confirmation hearings.300 Synergistically, congressional inquiry 
extracted materials which had been redacted from the initial Torture 
FOIA disclosures.301 
 
Stephen Cambone about Abu Ghraib); cf. Josh White, Bad Advice Blamed for Banned 
Interrogation Tactics, WASH. POST, June 17, 2006, at A16 (“Pentagon officials released a 
heavily redacted version of [Army General] Formica’s [investigation] report Friday, 
more than a year and a half after its completion, as part of its response to a [FOIA] 
lawsuit from the [ACLU]. The final report was issued on Nov. 8, 2004, and Pentagon 
officials briefed members of Congress last year on its contents.”). 
298 E.g., Hearing on Guantanamo Bay Detainee Treatment Before the S. Armed Servs. 
Comm., 108th Cong. (July 13, 2005) (opening remarks of Sen. Warner) (“Today we 
meet to receive the testimony of the U.S. Southern Command investigation into the 
e-mails that came to light as a consequence of a FOIA request in December of 
2004.”). 
299 Josh White, Military Lawyers Fought Policy on Interrogations, WASH. POST, July 15, 
2005, at A1 (reporting a March 17, 2005 memo “that rescinded the working group’s 
report”). 
300 United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Notice of Committee 
Hearing, Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on “Detainees” (June 8, 
2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1542; Press Release, 
Sen. Carl Levin, Statement of Senator Carl Levin on the Nomination of Judge 
Michael Chertoff to be Secretary of Homeland Security (Feb. 14, 2005), available at 
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=232095 (relying on Torture FOIA 
disclosures to cross-examine Michael Chertoff on confirmation).  
 The OLC memorandum approving a narrow definition of “torture” was 
rescinded in the immediate aftermath of its disclosure in the aftermath of the Abu 
Ghraib disclosures. See Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 
2007, (Magazine), available at http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/090407E.shtml 
(“In April 2004, however, Goldsmith’s priorities were reversed when the Abu Ghraib 
scandal broke.” In June 2004, “Yoo’s August 2002 opinion was leaked to the media. 
. . . A week after the leak of Yoo’s August 2002 memo, Goldsmith withdrew the 
opinion.”); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 156–62 (2007) (describing 
incentive to “rectify” an “egregious and now public error,” “precipitated” by “public 
outcry”). 
 The prospect of cross-examination of Gonzales on the basis of the Torture FOIA 
materials surely contributed to the incentives to issue a public replacement for the 
memorandum on December 30, 2004. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting 
Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Deputy Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/ 
18usc23402340a2.htm; see also Daniel Klaidman, Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, 
Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb 6, 2006, at 34 (describing the “fierce behind-the-scenes 
bureaucratic fight” leading up to the December 2004 memo). 
301 See Letter from William E. Moschella, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Sen. Carl Levin, Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 
(Mar. 18, 2005), available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2005/ 
DOJ.032105.pdf (producing un-redacted versions of previously redacted material, 
including the statement that FBI agents viewed material obtained by coercion at 
Guantanamo as “suspect at best”). 
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Material obtained by the Torture FOIA litigation figured 
prominently in the debates leading to the adoption of the McCain anti-
torture amendment in December 2005.302 The documents provided 
substance for legal actions filed in both U.S. and foreign venues by 
former detainees seeking redress for abuse.303 They provided 
 
302 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd(a) (2006) (enacting a 
prohibition on “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” of any 
“individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States 
Government”).  
 After consideration of the McCain Amendment commenced in July 2005, the 
disclosure in the Washington Post of an account of CIA “black sites,” based on leaks 
by outraged officials, strengthened the hand of proponents. Dana Priest, CIA Holds 
Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1; see R. Jeffrey Smith, 
Fired Officer Believed CIA Lied to Congress; Friends Say McCarthy Learned of Denials About 
Detainees’ Treatment, WASH. POST, May 14, 2006, at A1 (“A senior CIA official, meeting 
with Senate staff in a secure room of the Capitol last June, promised repeatedly that 
the agency did not violate or seek to violate an international treaty that bars cruel, 
inhumane or degrading treatment of detainees, during interrogations it conducted 
in the Middle East and elsewhere. . . . But . . . the agency’s deputy inspector general, 
who for the previous year had been probing allegations of criminal mistreatment by 
the CIA and its contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan—was startled to hear what she 
considered an outright falsehood . . . during the discussion of legislation that would 
constrain the CIA’s interrogations. That CIA officer was Mary O. McCarthy, 61, who 
was fired on April 20 for allegedly sharing classified information with journalists 
. . . .”); see also Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 4, 2005, at A1 (“The CIA inspector general is investigating a growing 
number of what it calls ‘erroneous renditions,’ according to several former and 
current intelligence officials.”); Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor; 
Anti-Terror Effort Continues to Grow, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2005, at A1 (“[A] former CIA 
officer said the agency ‘lost its way’ after Sept. 11.”). 
 The first leaked information regarding the NSA’s ongoing warrantless 
surveillance program further undercut the administration. Risen & Lichtblau, supra 
note 170. 
303 For the domestic cases, see El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 
2006) (filed Dec. 6, 2005; dismissed on state secrets privilege ground on May 12, 
2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Complaint, Ali v. Rumsfeld (N.D. Ill.) (filed 
Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/lawsuit/ 
PDF/rums-complaint-022805.pdf, transferred sub nom., In re Iraq and Afghanistan 
Detainees Litigation, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (D.D.C. 2005), dismissed, 479 F. Supp. 2d 
85 (D.D.C. 2007); see also ACLU, Fact Sheet: Legal Claims in Ali et al., v. Rumsfeld 
(Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/ 
17595prs20050301.html (reviewing claims in Ali). Internationally, in 2004, the Center 
for Constitutional Rights unsuccessfully asked the German government to indict 
Secretary Rumsfeld for war crimes. See Center for Constitutional Rights, CCR Seeks 
Criminal Investigation in Germany of U.S. Officials for War Crimes in Abu Ghraib Torture, 
available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/ 
report.asp?ObjID=TCRlT9TuSb&Content=471 (reporting a November 30, 2004 
criminal complaint by Iraqi torture victims lodged with the “Generalbundesanwalt” 
[Federal Prosecutor’s Office] in Karlsruhe, Germany). But see Germany Rejects Attempt 
to Prosecute Rumsfeld, EXPATICA, Feb. 10, 2005, available at 
http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?channel_id=2&story_id=16810. That 
effort was followed by a complaint to the United Nations about the German 
government’s failure to prosecute. See Center for Constitutional Rights, Complaint to 
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background, as well, for efforts in litigation to obtain further information 
regarding the conditions of detainees.304 
Most strikingly, the documents were deployed before the Supreme 
Court by advocates challenging the administration’s claim of 
unreviewable power over detainees. As documentary evidence of abuses 
continued to emerge from Judge Hellerstein’s order in late 2005 and 
2006, the Supreme Court considered the petition for certiorari and the 
merits of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.305 Advocates for the detainees adduced 
both the Torture FOIA documents themselves and the resulting public 
commentary and investigation to argue that restraints on treatment of 
detainees were necessary to assure adherence to minimal requirements 
of human rights.306 
Again, proof of causation is difficult, but when the smoke cleared in 
June of 2006, the majority opinion in Hamdan not only granted relief to 
Mr. Hamdan and his compatriots in Guantanamo, but was crafted to 
 
the United Nations Charges German Prosecutor Caved in to U.S. Pressure in Dismissing Torture 
Case Against Rumsfeld and Other High-Ranking Officials for Torture and War Crimes, 
available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/ 
report.asp?ObjID=kRrFM3yEeF&Content=716 (describing a February 27, 2006 
complaint by human rights groups to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, claiming that the German Federal Prosecutor’s 
dismissal of a torture case filed by Iraqi citizens against Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and others was dismissed for political reasons); see also Amnesty 
International, Amnesty International’s Supplementary Briefing to the U.N. 
Committee Against Torture (May 3, 2006), available at http://web.amnesty.org/ 
library/Index/ENGAMR510612006 (“Memos obtained by the ACLU in December 
2004 under Freedom of Information Act requests, for example, revealed that four 
members of a US special operations unit had been disciplined for excessive force, 
including improperly using tasers on prisoners. According to the memos, dated June 
2004, detainees held in Iraq often arrived at prisons bearing ‘burn marks’ on their 
backs.”). 
304 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 474 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(holding, based on documents received in Torture FOIA litigation, that plaintiffs 
stated a claim for due process violations arising from mistreatment of detainees), 
vacated, Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Associated Press v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Def., No. 05 Civ. 5468, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67913, at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 
2006) (citing Torture FOIA documents in support of grant of FOIA request 
regarding Guantanamo records). 
305 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (argued March 2006, decided 
June 29, 2006); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 546 U.S. 1002 (2005) (granting certiorari 
November 7, 2005). 
306 Brief for Appellee at 13, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(No. 04-5393), 2004 WL 3080434; Brief for Human Rights First as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 14–15, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-
184), 2005 WL 2178808; Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 20–21, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-
184), 2006 WL 53969; id. at 20 n.27 (“Voluminous documentation of the above is 
available at http:// www.aclu.org/torturefoia.”); Brief for Human Rights First et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4–5, 5 n.3, 26–28, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. 
Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 53968. 
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impose legal restraints on abuse by American operatives overseas.307 This, 
indeed, was the administration’s understanding of Hamdan, for in 
September of 2006, President Bush publicly acknowledged for the first 
time that “a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives 
captured during the war have been held and questioned outside the 
United States, in a separate program operated by the Central Intelligence 
Agency,” and announced that these “suspected terrorists” were being 
transferred to Guantanamo for trial before military commissions.308 
Although still coy about the “details of their confinement,” Bush 
admitted that those detainees had been the subject of a tough 
“alternative set of procedures,” while continuing to maintain that the 
procedures “were safe, and lawful, and necessary.” He assured the public 
(yet again) that the “United States does not torture.” The reason for this 
disclosure and transfer, said Bush, was that Hamdan “has put in question 
the future of the CIA program” by prohibiting “outrages upon personal 
dignity” and “humiliating and degrading treatment.”309 With looming 
congressional elections, the administration sought legislation that would 
reverse the legal restraints. 
The ensuing maneuvers before the still Republican-controlled 
Congress were far from transparent. The resulting legislative landscape 
disavows “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,” but largely 
withholds effective judicial relief from its victims; the Supreme Court is 
poised to address part of Congress’ handiwork.310 The administration 
continues to seek means of suppressing the disclosure of its abuses,311 
 
307 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006) (determining that 
Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions applies to detainees). 
308 President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military 
Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20060906-3.html. A 
grassroots indication of the import of the decision was the boom in efforts to insure 
CIA operators against damage actions. R. Jeffrey Smith, Worried CIA Officers Buy Legal 
Insurance; Plans Fund Defense in Anti-Terror Cases, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2006, at A1 
(“CIA counterterrorism officers have signed up in growing numbers for a 
government-reimbursed, private insurance plan that would pay their civil judgments 
and legal expenses if they are sued or charged with criminal wrongdoing . . . .”). 
309 President George W. Bush, supra note 308. 
310 See Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (granting certiorari to address 
suspension of habeas corpus for detainees in Guantanamo). 
311 E.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
the government could invoke the state secrets doctrine); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. 
Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing case in part on claims for secrecy, 
thereby supporting the government’s efforts not to cooperate with the Canadian 
inquiry); Transcript of Gonzales-Leahy Exchange on Arar, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 18, 
2007, available at http://www.thestar.com/article/172671; Tim Harper, Senators Still 
Seek Answers on Arar; Want Name Added to Probe of U.S. List, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 2, 
2007, at A10 (noting that Sen. Leahy agreed to be gagged as the price of receiving a 
classified briefing regarding Arar); Carol D. Leonnig & Eric Rich, U.S. Seeks Silence on 
CIA Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2006, at A1; Press Release, ACLU, Government Backs 
Down in Its Attempt To Seize “Secret” Document From ACLU (Dec. 18, 2006), 
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while deploying secret legal opinions claiming the authority for the CIA 
to continue to administer “torture lite” in the teeth of statutes 
prohibiting “cruel inhuman and degrading” treatment.312 The trench 
warfare in the FOIA case before Judge Hellerstein continues.313 
IV. THE STRATEGY OF TRANSPARENCY IN DARK TIMES 
Civil libertarians like me are fond of constitutional morality tales 
with clean and satisfying endings. The archetype runs from Thomas 
Jefferson’s triumphal pardons of the Sedition Act defendants to Richard 
Nixon’s resignation in penance for constitutional transgressions. That 
fondness is strengthened by the training of legal advocacy: a winning case 
should be resolved on the merits, and that resolution should generate a 
“holding.”314 
Judged by this standard, the results of a strategy of transparency 
could be cause for despair. Commentators have deplored the outcome of 
FOIA litigation regarding the “War on Terror,” which has resulted in 
judicial opinions that acquiesce in suppression of information on the 
 
available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/27727prs20061218.html 
(discussing the government’s effort to subpoena “all copies” of a document regarding 
photographing of detainees, detailing the unsuccessful effort to seal proceedings 
before Judge Rakoff). 
312 See Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement Of Severe 
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A1 (describing secret legal opinions 
authorizing a “combination of painful physical and psychological tactics, including 
head-slapping, simulated drowning and frigid temperatures”); Dan Eggen & Michael 
Abramowitz, Congress Seeks Secret Memos On Interrogation, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2007, at 
A1. 
313 Dan Eggen, CIA Acknowledges 2 Interrogation Memos, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2006, 
at A29 (“After years of denials, the CIA has formally acknowledged the existence of 
two classified documents governing aggressive interrogation and detention policies 
for terrorism suspects, according to the American Civil Liberties Union. But CIA 
lawyers say the documents—memos from President Bush and the Justice 
Department—are still so sensitive that no portion can be released to the public.”); 
Press Release, ACLU, Pentagon Wrongfully Withholding Images of Detainee Abuse, 
ACLU Tells Court (Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/ 
torture/27453prs20061120.html (detailing argument in appeal to the Second Circuit 
of an order to release twenty-one photographs depicting abuse of detainees by U.S. 
forces in Afghanistan and Iraq); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., No. 04 Civ. 4151 (AKH), 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40894 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
torturefoia/legaldocuments/DistrictCourtOrder060906.pdf (ordering release of 
photographs). 
314 Even this expectation forgets the lesson, for example, of Korematsu, a case 
whose holding was transformed from precedent to anti-precedent, and whose dictum 
regarding “strict scrutiny” of racial classifications became the keystone of two 
generations of equal protection analysis. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 n.3 
(1954) (citing Korematsu for the proposition that “[c]lassifications based solely upon 
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions 
and hence constitutionally suspect.”). 
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flimsiest of speculations when “national security” is invoked.315 Even 
where abuses have been revealed, critics have lamented, revelation has 
not been followed by repudiation.316 But the standard is wrong and the 
despair is excessive. 
To be sure, judicial opinions regarding the strategy of transparency 
in the first years of the “War on Terror” contain prominent examples of 
supine acquiescence to the threat of unknown dangers.317 But the 
administration carefully avoided pushing those cases to resolution in the 
Supreme Court.318 Even at the height of the terror, the legal landscape 
was at worst equivocal.319 
 
315 See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 70 at 632, 654; Fuchs, supra note 70 at 166–67; 
Wells, supra note 70 at854; Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
885, 891 (2006) (“[O]pen government seems more like a distant, deferred ideal than 
an actually existing practice.”); id. at 906 (“The events of September 11 seem to have 
reinforced” judicial deference.); id. at 913 (“[T]he public remains largely ignorant 
. . . .”); id. at 939 (arguing that the judiciary has proved a “weak enforcer” of open 
government requirements). 
316 The comments of Professor Roberts typify the laments. ALASDAIR ROBERTS, 
BLACKED OUT 233–37 (2006) (mourning the “wildly misplaced” hopes that the 
revelation of detainee abuse would result in public referendum on torture in the 
2004 presidential election); see Umansky, supra note 222 (“As a result of the 
administration’s stonewalling, the abuse story has been deprived of the oxygen it 
needs to move forward and stay in the headlines. . . . The abuse story has become 
what Mark Danner, writing in The New York Review of Books, memorably dubbed a 
“frozen scandal.”); Tom Engelhardt, When Facts Fail, SALON.COM, Feb. 28, 2006, 
http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2006/02/28/engelhardt/print.html 
(quoting Danner: “With this administration, we’ve got revelation of torture, of illegal 
eavesdropping, of domestic spying, of all kinds of abuses when it comes to arrest of 
domestic aliens, of inflated and false weapons of mass destruction claims before the 
war; of cronyism and corruption in Iraq on a vast scale. You could go on. But no 
official investigation follows.”).  
 In some sense this is the obverse of the claims of Professor John Yoo, that the 
election of 2004 was an approval of the imperial presidential decisions to engage in 
torture. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106 (quoting 
Yoo as suggesting “that President Bush’s victory in the 2004 election, along with the 
relatively mild challenge to Gonzales . . . was ‘proof that the debate is over[,] . . . 
[t]he issue is dying out[, and t]he public has had its referendum’”). 
317 N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 220 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(discussed supra notes 52–57); Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 
F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussed supra notes 69–72); ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 28 (D.D.C. 2003) (discussed supra notes 113–21, relying 
on CNSS). 
318 See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (describing strategy of declining 
to appeal Detroit Free Press, opposing certiorari in North Jersey Media Group, and 
abandoning challenged policy); supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text 
(describing successful arguments against review in CNSS based on the claim that the 
DOJ Inspector General had already released a report of investigation); supra note 34 
(describing strategy of mooting habeas petitions by Sept. 11 dragnet detainees); supra 
note 173 and accompanying text (describing rejected effort to vacate order declaring 
gag rule unconstitutional in Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 420–21 (2d Cir. 2006)); 
supra notes 210–11 (describing plea bargain with John Walker Lindh designed to 
prevent disclosure of the coercive interrogation to which he had been subject); supra 
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By the end of George W. Bush’s first term, internal acts of 
bureaucratic integrity began to remove the option of promiscuous use of 
national security classification authority to bar FOIA inquiries into abuse 
of detainees,320 and internal resistance by military officers and civil 
servants of principle had laid a paper trail revealing the scope and origin 
of those abuses.321 
In June 2004, the Supreme Court had declared that “a state of war is 
not a blank check for the President.”322 This direction, combined with the 
often disingenuous lengths to which the administration had gone to 
prevent disclosure, led lower courts to view speculative justifications for 
secrecy with a significantly more skeptical eye in important cases 
involving detainees at Guantanamo,323 use of intrusive surveillance,324 and 
coercive interrogation.325 
 
note 254 and accompanying text (describing disavowal of coercive interrogation 
before the Supreme Court in oral argument). 
319 Lower courts had initially been skeptical of attempts to conceal information. 
See ACLU of N.J., Inc. v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 655 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2002) (discussed supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text); Detroit Free Press v. 
Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (discussed supra notes 35–36 
and accompanying text); N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 
288, 291 (D.N.J. 2002) (discussed supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text); Ctr. for 
Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussed 
supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text); In re Material Witness Warrant, 214 F. 
Supp. 2d 356, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussed supra note 51); see also Haddad v. 
Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799, 805 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (on remand discussed supra 
note 51); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, Nos. 02-70339, 02-70605, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19991, *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2002) (discussed supra note 51); ACLU v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003) (ordering timely processing of 
Patriot Act FOIA request discussed supra note 113 and accompanying text); Elec. 
Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Def., 241 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. Jan. 2003) (rejecting 
efforts to impose search costs on public interest FOIA requester seeking information 
regarding “Total Information Awareness” program). 
  While the D.C. Circuit in CNSS and the Third Circuit in North Jersey Media Group 
reversed the lower courts, each case generated a strong dissent and the Sixth Circuit 
in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682–83 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussed supra 
notes 47–51) emphatically rejected speculation as a justification for concealment. 
320 See supra notes 268–72 and accompanying text (describing intervention of 
William Leonard, Director of the Information Security Oversight Office in the 
summer of 2004 and subsequent reiteration of mandate not to use classification to 
shield wrongdoing). No battle is ever permanently won, however. In 2006, criticism in 
the Department of Defense Inspector General’s Review of DoD Directed Investigations of 
Detainee Abuse was classified “SECRET/NOFORN.” It was declassified and released in 
May 2007. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REVIEW OF DOD-
DIRECTED INVESTIGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE (2006) available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/abuse.pdf, and Posting of Steven Aftergood to 
Secrecy News Blog, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2007/05/ 
dod_inspector_general_reviews.html. 
321 See supra notes 215–17; supra notes 241–45; supra note 250 (Taguba report). 
322 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). 
323 See supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text, discussing Associated Press v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Def., 395 F. Supp. 2d 15, 16–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (expressing skepticism 
regarding justifications for withholding release of attorneys names); Associated Press 
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A balanced judgment, moreover, must focus not only on information 
withheld, but on information revealed. Given the volatility of 
information, it takes only one success to achieve disclosure, while efforts 
at concealment must be renewed with each threatened revelation.326 If 
the goal is not to optimize national decision-making, but to provide a fail-
 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 395 F. Supp. 2d 17, 18–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting arguments 
for reconsideration as “strange, even hypocritical”); Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Def., 410 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (ordering release of names of 
detainees, rejecting “conclusory speculation”); id. at 153, 157 (rejecting motion for 
reconsideration, expressing annoyance at effort to play a “game of ‘gotcha,’” and 
rejecting “wholly conclusory and grossly speculative assertion” viewed as a “cover” for 
illegitimate efforts to impose incommunicado detention); see Associated Press v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Def., No. 05 Civ 05468 (JSR), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67913 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 20, 
2006) (ordering release of names of detainees who had charged abuse by their 
captors); Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 462 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (ordering the release of height and weight information). 
324 Gerstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C-03-04893 RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
41276 (N. D. Cal. Sept 30, 2005) (rejecting “parade of horribles” based on 
“conclusory assertion” as basis for withholding compilation of uses of section 213 
“sneak and peek” warrants, and commenting on “unsavory” tactics by government); 
see ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 32–33 (D.D.C. 2004) (discussed 
supra notes 137–40; rejecting delays as having “absolutely no justification,” 
characterizing administration’s litigation position as “turn[ing] a deaf ear to the 
Attorney General”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, Civ. Action No. 05-845 
(GK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40318 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2005) (discussed supra notes 
163–69, describing document production as “incredibly . . . slow and inefficient” and 
ordering processing schedule); Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (discussed supra notes 146–54, declaring gag provision of Patriot Act regarding 
NSLs unconstitutional as applied to ISP, and rejecting efforts to seal pleadings); Doe 
v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D. Conn. 2005) (discussed supra notes 155–59 
and accompanying text, declaring unconstitutional effort to gag librarian who had 
received NSL). 
325 See supra notes 259–90 and accompanying text, describing “torture files” 
litigation; ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501, 502, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(decrying “glacial pace” of production and delaying tactics, admonishing 
administration that “[n]o one is above the law,” and ordering processing and 
production schedule); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., No. 04 Civ. 4151 (AKH), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 24387, at *2–4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2004) (ordering briefing schedule, 
identification of documents, and processing by the Defense Department at the rate of 
10,000 documents per month); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 351 F. Supp. 2d 265, 277 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing CIA request for stay of identification order, because 
investigation of impropriety was being carried out by the CIA Inspector General); id. 
(commenting that “Congress has set the laws, and it is the duty of executive agencies 
to comply with them”); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 357 F. Supp. 2d 708, 709–10 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (refusing to allow stay pending appeal of order to CIA, characterizing CIA’s 
position as “implausible”); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 575–76 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ordering release of Abu Ghraib photos, refusing to “defer to our 
worst fears,” or to accede to “blackmail”). 
326 See, e.g., Timothy Besley &Andrea Pratt, Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media 
Capture and Government Accountability, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 720, 725 (2006) (arguing that 
a government seeking to avoid accountability will bribe media outlets only if it can 
persuade all media outlets to accept the bribe). 
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safe against egregious abuses by the current regime, sporadic lightning 
flashes may be adequate to reveal the outlines of the landscape. 
Reported litigation successes, moreover, understate the information 
actually revealed. A significant amount of information has come to light 
through leaks which trigger subsequent official and journalistic inquiry 
and set the stage for FOIA requests.327 A wealth of other data has been 
officially revealed without authoritative judicial intervention in the 
shadow of both FOIA litigation and other frameworks of transparency. 
The cases above detail such revelations regarding the post September 11 
dragnet,328 the MATRIX program,329 the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals in Guantanamo,330 the implementation of the Patriot Act, 331 
and the physical abuse of prisoners detained overseas during the “War on 
Terror.”332 
 
327 See supra note 144 (describing leak of surveillance activities in Las Vegas in 
2003); supra notes 161–62 (describing leak regarding magnitude of NSL surveillance 
and record retention policy); supra note 169 (describing reports of illegal wiretapping 
and gathering of information by military intelligence); supra notes 220, 222, 224, 227, 
228 (describing leaks and journalistic investigation that revealed abuse of detainees); 
supra note 231 (describing efforts by JAG officers to mobilize resistance to abusive 
interrogation practices); supra note 248 (describing leaks regarding initial Abu 
Ghraib investigation); supra notes 255, 259 (describing leaks and publication of Abu 
Ghraib photos, Taguba report, and authorizations for coercive interrogation). 
328 See supra note 21 (describing journalistic investigation and interviews 
identifying 235 detainees); supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text (describing 
materials revealing the number and status of post-September 11 detainees in January 
2002 and June 2002 in response to FOIA requests and filing of suit ); supra note 32 
(describing INS permission for “know your rights” presentations); supra notes 33, 65–
68 (describing DOJ Inspector General’s investigation begun March 2002; report filed 
in April 2003, leaked in May 2003, and released in June 2003 regarding September 11 
dragnet). 
329 See supra note 88. 
330 See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (describing the release of 
Guantanamo CSRT transcripts in response to filing of FOIA action), supra note 98 
(describing successful FOIA requests by attorneys for detainees). 
331 See ACLU, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (describing release of 341 pages of documents 
in response to FOIA request, discussed supra notes 113–20); supra notes 140–42 
(describing the release of documents demonstrating misrepresentations regarding 
usage of section 215 after expedited processing ordered in ACLU, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 
27); supra note 166 and accompanying text (describing release of 250 pages of 
documents revealing abuses of NSL process in response to filing of Elec. Privacy Info. 
Ctr., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40318); supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text 
(describing further release of documents in response to processing order in EPIC v. 
Dep’t of Justice, and resulting Office of Inspector General inquiry); supra notes 180–94 
and accompanying text (describing publication of Department of Justice Inspector 
General report on use of Patriot Act authorities). 
332 See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text (describing release of 
documents regarding coercive interrogation policy, after portions had been leaked); 
supra notes 273–76 (describing release of 100,000 pages of documents regarding 
coercive interrogation after order requiring processing of FOIA request); supra note 
274 (describing release by FBI of documents detailing abuses by CIA and Defense 
Department). 
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Most importantly, the failure of the public to immediately repudiate 
the administration in the election of 2004 is not a “holding.” It is part of 
an ongoing political negotiation for the soul of America. In that 
negotiation, the strategy of transparency has had a long term impact on 
the legitimacy of an overreaching administration in the eyes of the judges 
who review its claims, the civil servants who make up the government, 
and the electorate who evaluate the administration’s statements. 
The era of a “Global War on Terror” that can conduct abuse entirely 
in the shadows seems to be drawing to a close. The public is increasingly 
cognizant of the outrages committed in its name, and the Legislative 
branches, freed from one-party control by the election of 2006, are 
beginning to reassert their constitutional oversight authority, backed by 
the subpoena power. Whether these developments will suffice to turn the 
nation’s policy back toward its tradition of respect for human dignity is a 
tale yet to be told. 
As our democracy begins to confront former Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
now “known knowns,” there is some hope to be gained from his analysis 
of the impact of transparency on an earlier presidency. On June 14, 1971, 
Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman spoke to Richard Nixon about the 
publication of the Pentagon Papers by the New York Times. Referring to 
a young and canny Counselor to the President, Haldeman was recorded 
as saying: 
Rumsfeld was making this point this morning. . . . [T]o the ordinary 
guy, all this is a bunch of gobbledygook. But out of the 
gobbledygook, comes a very clear thing: [unclear] you can’t trust 
the government; you can’t believe what they say; and you can’t rely 
on their judgment[. A]nd the . . . implicit infallibility of presidents 
. . . is badly hurt by this, because it shows that people do things the 
president wants to do even though it’s wrong . . . .333 
Counselor Rumsfeld’s concern that the exposure of abuses and 
blunders would contribute to the unraveling of the carefully constructed 
patriotic enthusiasm for the Executive who perpetrated them proved 
prescient a generation ago. It may again in our time, a testament to the 
resilience of the constitutional mechanisms we inherited from the 
repudiation of Watergate, and the ongoing constituencies for the rule of 
law. 
 
 
333 Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Transcript: Oval Office Meeting with 
Bob Haldeman (June 14, 1971), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ 
NSAEBB/NSAEBB48/oval.pdf. 
